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ABSTRACT

This unit for U.S. history classes provides students with the chance to learn about the historical roots of U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union in a lively, informative manner and from a variety of different perspectives. The unit enables students to use their own judgement in selecting, evaluating, and reflecting on the significance of U.S. policies toward the Soviet Union from the 1940s through 1990. The question is posed: under what circumstances should the United States become directly involved in European affairs? The unit begins by asking this question when the preponderance of power in post World War I Europe swung from the victorious Western democracies to dangerous dictatorships that arose in the 1920s and 30s to threaten the world's peace and security. The same question is broached in the context of the Munich Agreement and British requests for arms. Students learn about the major strategic campaigns of the United States and its allies during World War II in Europe, and are given the opportunity to simulate the negotiation of the Yalta Agreement. They use their understanding of those decisions to support traditionalist, revisionist, or conservative schools of thought on Yalta and the break up of the Grand Alliance. The unit next examines how the United States responded politically, socially, and militarily to Japanese actions in World War II. The unit includes information on post World War II Europe and how the balance of power was stabilized by 1950. The unit concludes by attempting to foresee the balance of power in the future. (DK)

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FROM HOT TO COLD WAR

by Thomas Ladenburg and Geoffrey Tegnell

SSEC American History Series

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FOREWORD

Enthusiasm for learning U.S. history does not just happen. Tom Ladenburg and Geoff Tegnell, history teachers in Massachusetts, are well aware of that fact. To stimulate student interest, Ladenburg and Tegnell have written many of their own materials. Their units examine primary sources as well as writings of historians to help students understand the motives of the people who actually made this country's history. They study the same event from multiple perspectives. They are challenged to integrate divergent perceptions and to emerge with their own views, shaped by the facts and concepts presented. Students learn to write carefully reasoned essays that foreshadow major arguments and use relevant facts to support them.

By completing a course making these demands on them, students emerge with a heightened awareness of political issues, an understanding of how our forebears handled these issues, an idea of what they believe (hopefully with passionate intensity), and the ability and desire to communicate their beliefs as well as understand the positions of others. Most important, their work in U.S. history prepares students to participate in our democratic institutions.

The Social Science Education Consortium has previously published three other units by Tom Ladenburg. As we publish additional units, we welcome users' feedback. In fact, we would like nothing better than to be the facilitator for a network of history teachers exchanging ideas and materials that work. We invite your participation.

James R. Giese, Executive Director
Social Science Education Consortium

INTRODUCTION

Unit Overview

Now more than ever, American students must be knowledgeable about the history of the Cold War. Recent dramatic economic, political, and social changes in Eastern Europe and the USSR call upon Americans to exercise forethought in fashioning foreign policy. To facilitate the creation of well-planned U.S. policies toward the USSR, American citizens need to understand the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union in historical context. *From Hot to Cold War* provides students with the chance to learn about the roots of present U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union in a lively, informative manner and from a variety of different perspectives. This unit enables students to use their own judgment in selecting, evaluating, and reflecting on the significance of U.S. policies toward the Soviet Union from the 1940s to the present. It is expected that such opportunities for contextual learning and personal decision-making contribute to the sine qua non of a vital democracy, well-informed citizen-voters.

This unit poses a question that has confronted American strategists from George Washington to George Bush: under what circumstances should the United States become directly involved in European affairs? The unit begins by asking this question when the preponderance of power in post-World War I Europe swung from the victorious Western democracies to dangerous dictatorships that arose in the 1920s and 30s to threaten the world's peace and stability. The same question is broached in the context of the Munich Agreement and again when Britain beseeched the United States for arms to fend off Hitler's legions. In the context of this query, students learn about the major strategic campaigns of the United States and its allies during World War II in Europe and are given the opportunity to simulate the Big Three in renegotiating the Yalta Agreement. Furthermore, they are challenged to use their understanding of the decisions made at that conference to support traditionalist, revisionist, or conservative schools of thought on Yalta and the break-up of the Grand Alliance.

The European focus of this unit is interrupted temporarily to examine how the United States responded politically, socially, and militarily to Japanese aggression in China and then to Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor and seizure of an Asian empire. The unit revisits the difficult decision made by U.S. policymakers concerning use of nuclear weapons against cities in Japan, and asks students to decide whether the Baruch plan went far enough or too far in seeking to put nuclear technology under control of the United Nations. With the collapse of the Grand Alliance, the question of how United States power should be employed in Europe is posed. Students are given the opportunity to decide what the United States should do in response to such events as Soviet pressure on Greece and Turkey and the Berlin blockade. Moreover, students are asked to decide whether the United States should return to its pre-World War II isolation, attempt to contain Soviet expansion, or threaten use of nuclear weapons, in strategic response to Soviet action in Europe. The unit next records how the balance of power in Europe was stabilized by 1950. In the unit essay, students are requested to reflect on their learning, indicating the extent of responsibility they believe the United States and its allies share with the Soviet Union for the Cold War stalemate. The unit concludes by looking 40 years ahead to ask how U.S. policymakers should respond to changes in the Cold War balance of power occasioned by Mikhail Gorbachev's "new thinking" on the arms race and his attempt to restructure the Soviet economy and its political system.

Purpose and Rationale

The authors of this unit believe the traditional way of teaching the Cold War as a morality play with heroes and villains is simplistic and unproductive. Instead, it is our contention that the most important questions that can be posed by teachers have no simple answers and that students learn best by being engaged in simulations and discussions that raise these complex questions and encourage informed decision-making. Thus, by examining many of the important issues that faced U.S. strategists from 1938 to 1950, students can not only learn the foundations of current U.S. foreign policy, but also become better equipped as citizens to respond to future foreign policy questions.

This unit involves student in a four-stage learning process. First, they learn about the social, political, economic, and military context in which foreign policy decisions were made. Next, they are asked to make, provide supporting evidence for, and defend specific policy decisions. Third, students are taught what actually happened in each case and are given an opportunity to reflect on their own decision. Lastly, students have the opportunity to adopt the stance of historian to reexamine the unit's lessons, first by writing a unit essay, and next by applying their insights to current issues in U.S.-USSR relations.

As a result of using this unit, students learn significant concepts shaping U.S. foreign policy. They are confronted with the paradox of wishful American isolationism of the 1930s in a world made unsafe for democracy by the rise of oppressive and expansionist dictatorships. Furthermore, they learn that there were alternatives to the decisions that led the U.S. and the Soviet Union into the Cold War. In addition, they investigate the success of the containment policies of the post-1946 era in holding Soviet expansion in check. Finally, they are asked to use their understanding of the roots of U.S. policy toward the USSR to respond to present Soviet leadership and policies that, some have said, signal an "end of the Cold War."

Summary of Chapter Activities

The following outline of each chapter may serve as a guide for teachers in preparing their lessons.

Chapter 1: The Rise of the Dictators

This chapter examines the rise of post-World War I dictatorships in the Soviet Union, Italy, and Germany, which tipped the European balance of power against the Western democracies and threatened the peace of 1919. On the first day, students prepare a map of Europe in the 1930s. On the second day, students compare and contrast the three dictatorships and examine the dilemma their belligerent policies posed for leaders from the Western democracies, including the United States.

Chapter 2: Munich: Anatomy of a Crisis

This chapter focuses on Hitler's 1938 demands on Czechoslovakia, which led to the Munich Conference. Students read a brief history of Czechoslovakia, review Hitler's violations of the Versailles Treaty, evaluate his claim to the Sudetenland, and compare the relative strength of crisis antagonists. They are asked to decide if the British delegation should appease Hitler and thus possibly encourage him to make more territorial demands or confront him and thereby risk starting a world war.

Chapter 3: Isolationists, Internationalists, and Lend-Lease

This chapter describes the blitzkrieg tactics by which German armies conquered Poland, Denmark, Norway, the Low Countries, and France and chronicles Germany's massive air assault on Britain. The focus shifts to the United States, where Congress must decide whether to authorize a loan of U.S. military equipment to Britain. Arguments made by isolationists and internationalists from that time are provided. Maps permit students to review the course of World War II 1939-1940, and role cards allow them to assume the identities of important participants in this debate.

Chapter 4: World War II and Japanese-American Relocation

This chapter opens with a description of Japan's attack on Manchuria and China. It turns briefly to the debates between isolationists and internationalists in the United States, and between the army and the commercial factions in Japan. The chapter then describes Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor and its follow-up conquests in the Pacific. Students then read a selection about the American home front and a more detailed description of the relocation of Japanese-Americans. Students fill out a map of Japan's conquests. Then students are asked to decide whether removal of Japanese-Americans to relocation camps far from the west coast of the United States was a justifiable and necessary wartime measure.

Chapter 5: War in Europe

This chapter commences by presenting the debate among U.S. military strategists over whether to concentrate U.S. forces in the Pacific or European front, and whether to attack Germany by an immediate invasion of France or by peripheral campaigns in Africa and Italy. The Anglo-American desert war against the resourceful Rommel, followed by the slow advance through Sicily and Italy, are described. Other major campaigns covered include Operation Barbarossa, the grueling siege of Stalingrad, the Soviet victory at Kursk, and the Red Army advance into Eastern Europe. The U.S./British battle for Europe is recounted, from the elaborate ruses used to confuse defending Germans, to the landing at the breakout in Normandy, finally concluding with the Battle of the Bulge. Through a map activity, students review the course of the war in Europe from 1941-1945. Then they play the roles of British, American, and Soviet generals in order to present estimates of their countries' contributions to the effort against the Axis.

Chapter 6: The Yalta Conference

This chapter presents information needed to facilitate a two-day student simulation of the Yalta Conference. Six major issues are explained, along with possible solutions, and students are provided with role cards that allow them to present arguments to support their country's (Britain, Soviet Union, and United States) positions. End-of-chapter material explains how each issue was resolved at Yalta and provides three conflicting evaluations of the conference results: that Britain and the United States appeased the Soviet Union; that the conference was a victory for American diplomacy; and that, given the circumstances, the result was the best that could be expected.

Chapter 7: The Decision to Drop the Bomb

This chapter asks students to decide whether the bomb should be dropped on Japan without a prior demonstration of its destructive power and reassurance to the Japanese that they could keep their emperor. Among the information given to help students make the decision are a review of the Pacific campaign, a description of the resistance by Japanese soldiers at Okinawa and Iwo Jima, and a report on the frantic preparations to defend Japan. Students are also informed of the desperate shape of the Japanese economy, the movement in Japan to end the war, and arguments by U.S. scientists and military strategists for or against a prior demonstration.

Chapter 8: The Bomb, Part II

This brief chapter renders an account of the Potsdam Declaration, the Soviet Union's entrance into the war against Japan, and Japan's surrender. The rest of the narrative describes the damage done by the A bomb in Hiroshima, focusing on the suffering of a single Japanese child. This information is presented to encourage further discussion of the decision to use the bomb.

Chapter 9: Ban the Bomb? The Impasse Over Nuclear Disarmament

The chapter begins with statements of positions by members of President Truman's cabinet on whether the United States should offer a plan to ban nuclear weapons, with the key provision that the United States would dismantle its own nuclear arsenal. Students evaluate the Baruch plan that was proposed to the United Nations in 1946, along with the Soviet counter-proposal. The chapter ends with the explosion of the Soviet Union's first atomic bomb in May 1949, one year after disarmament talks broke down.

Chapter 10: From Wartime Allies to Cold War Enemies

This chapter raises the question of responsibility for the breakup of the Grand Alliance. Eighteen events, such as the U.S./Britain unilateral reorganization of the Italian government and the Soviet imposition of the Lublin communist regime on Poland, are related to help students make this analysis. Other topics include the British suppression of the communist uprising in Athens and the Soviet-inspired property nationalization and political party suppression policies in Eastern Europe. The chapter

ends in March of 1946, with Winston Churchill's famous "Iron Curtain" speech. Students categorize, analyze, and debate events as they prepare their cases.

Chapter 11: Years of Decision

This chapter presents three defensive postures the United States might assume in response to Soviet military threat in Europe. These are sphere of influence or isolation (Henry Wallace), massive retaliation and liberation (John Foster Dulles), and containment (George Kennan). Students read the rationale for each of these postures and then employ these postures to resolve five post-war crises. The crises are occasioned by (1) communist party successes in war-torn Europe; (2) Soviet military pressure on Greece and Turkey; (3) the communist coup in Czechoslovakia; (4) the Berlin blockade; and (5) the Soviet military presence in Eastern Europe. Students are asked to decide which defensive posture the United States should adopt in each of the five crises.

Chapter 12: Solutions to Five Crises

This chapter explains the decision American strategists made in each of the five crises discussed previously. Students learn that the Marshall Plan helped Europe recover from the devastation of World War II, that U.S. aid to Greece and Turkey allowed these countries to resist pressure from the Soviet Union, that the United States took no action to reverse the communist coup in Czechoslovakia, that the United States airlifted supplies to Berlin for 11 months until the Soviets reopened land routes into the Allied zones, and that NATO was formed to prevent possible Soviet military advances into Western Europe. Students explain the philosophy represented by the five solutions and then evaluate their effectiveness.

The unit essay assignment asks students to evaluate the relative responsibility of the United States and the Western democracies for the Cold War.

Chapter 13: Gorbachev and the Cold War

This chapter describes recent reforms that are changing economic and political organization in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The problems of the Soviet system are briefly characterized, as is the biographical background of Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev. The chapter recounts Gorbachev's attempts to reverse Soviet stagnation through *perestroika* (political and economic restructuring), *glasnost* (openness), and "new thinking" (arms reduction and accommodation with the Western democracies). The impact of these policies on both Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union is reported. The chapter concludes by asking students whether the United States ought to support or maintain pressure on Gorbachev.

Components of the Program

Two kinds of materials are presented to help teachers use the unit. First are the teacher directions, which include the following information for each chapter: an overview of the content and procedures for that chapter, objectives, an estimate of the time required, a list of materials needed, step-by-step procedures for teaching the lesson, and an assignment for students to complete in preparation for the next chapter.

Each chapter also includes student reading material. The student reading material is presented at the end of the book (see page 39). For cost reasons, the material is printed on both sides of the paper. If you do not have a copy machine that can handle this type of original, you will need to copy one side of each page and insert the copies with the originals to form a complete master set for duplication. We regret any inconvenience this may cause.

CHAPTER 1: THE RISE OF THE DICTATORS

Overview:

This chapter begins with a description of the signing of the Versailles Treaty, followed by a survey of World War I, the Russian Revolution, and the foundations of the communist party's domination of Russia – by 1924 the USSR. Students encounter turbulent post-war Italy and learn about the origins of the fascist movement as a counterrevolutionary response to socialism. The last section of the chapter recounts Adolf Hitler's coming to power. The chapter ends by asking students what policy the leaders of the Western democracies should take toward Stalin, Mussolini, and Hitler.

Students begin the lesson by completing a map exercise; the maps will be used in future lessons and thus should be saved. They then read the chapter and put together positions in favor of either conciliation or confrontation. They present and critique the positions and then focus discussion on the dilemma faced when a principled foreign policy could lead to war.

Objectives: At the conclusion of this chapter, students should be able to:

1. Locate and label the countries of Europe in the 1930s.

2. Tell how the Versailles Treaty contributed to a destabilized Europe in 1919.

3. Describe and compare the rise to power and main policies of Stalin, Mussolini, and Hitler.

4. Explain why the leaders of the Western democracies ought to conciliate or confront Stalin, Mussolini, and Hitler.

Time Required: 1 1/2 to 2 class periods

Materials: Copies of student Chapter 1 and worksheet for all students, several historical atlases

Procedure:

1. Employing the historical atlases as a reference, have students use the worksheet map to locate and label the countries and geographic features listed. Through this in-class exercise, students will become familiar with Europe. These maps will be used in future lessons.

2. After students read Chapter 1, briefly discuss the definition/explanation questions. Possible definitions/explanations are:

- Hall of Mirrors – the hall at the Versailles palace where representatives of the Allied Powers and defeated Germany signed the Versailles Treaty ending World War I on June 28, 1919.
- Francis Ferdinand – the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne whose assassination in 1914 led to the beginning of World War I.
- Fourteen Points – in January 1918, Woodrow Wilson issued his Fourteen Points for World Peace, which called for universal disarmament, international justice, and national self-determination. Central Power politicians mistakenly believed that the Versailles Treaty would be based on this document.
- Provisional Government – on March 12, 1917, political opponents overthrew Tsar Nicholas II. A Provisional Government was to govern Russia until the election of a Constituent Assembly. This government was overthrown by Lenin and the Bolsheviks on November 6, 1917.
- Brest-Litovsk – Lenin's government made peace with Germany on February 28, 1918. According to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and Finland (one-fifth of Russia) became independent states.

- General Secretary – by 1924, Joseph Stalin had risen to the post of General Secretary of the Communist Party of the USSR. This post enabled him to win support in the struggle for leadership of the USSR upon Lenin's death.
- five-year plan – in 1928, Stalin issued the first in a series of plans to develop heavy industry and reorganize and modernize agriculture in the Soviet Union.
- *Fasci di Combattimento* – these Italian combat groups were composed of ex-soldiers, nationalists, and property owners who feared post-war social unrest. Their name came from the latin *fascio*, a bundle of sticks around an axe blade that symbolized Roman authority.
- "place in the sun" – Mussolini tried to satisfy the needs of poor and rich supporters by demanding Italy's right to establish an empire. He hoped that colonies would solve problems of underdevelopment and overpopulation.
- 6 million casualties – Germany suffered 6 million dead and wounded in World War I. These losses, coupled with economic, social, and political instability, led many Germans to feel demoralized in the post-war years.
- 30 billion dollars – at Versailles, the Allied Powers made Germany accept responsibility for starting the war. Among the treaty's harsh terms was this vast sum, which Germany was to pay to the victors for damages caused by the war.
- dramatic oratory – Adolf Hitler had the ability to give very persuasive speeches. This helped him rise to command the National Socialist Party, spread the Nazi message throughout Germany, and garner votes in his political campaigns.
- Jewish conspiracy – beginning in the 1920s, Hitler began to blame all of Germany's problems on an international conspiracy of Jewish people. Only the Nazis, he told the German people, could save Germany from this "menace."
- Enabling Act – Hitler had supporters set fire to the Reichstag in February 1933; he declared German communists responsible. Intimidated legislators then gave Hitler power to make laws himself, power he used to crush all opponents.
- Nuremberg Laws – in 1935 the Nuremberg Laws were passed to persecute and isolate German Jews. Jews were forbidden to vote or marry non-Jews; they were later to lose the right to engage in business and the professions.
- Rhineland – in 1936 German troops reoccupied the Rhineland in defiance of the Versailles Treaty. A rearmed Germany had begun to play a more aggressive role in European politics.

3. To help students prepare to compare and contrast Stalin, Mussolini, and Hitler, draw a chart on the board. Across the top, write *background*, *philosophy*, *goals*, and *tactics*. Down the side, write *Stalin*, *Mussolini*, and *Hitler*. Then, as a class exercise, have students fill in the chart.

4. During the next class period, focus on question 3. Students are to put together positions in favor of either conciliating or confronting Stalin, Mussolini, and/or Hitler. Those who favor conciliation might point out that Stalin seems to focus on developing the USSR, Mussolini heads an impoverished country that hardly constitutes a threat to the Western democracies, and Hitler wishes to overturn the provisions of an unfair treaty. Those in favor of confrontation might point out that Stalin, Mussolini, and Hitler all head dictatorial states that deprive their citizens of basic rights. Moreover, each dictator threatens to spread violence to other countries. Have conciliators and confronters present and critique positions, moving from discussion of pragmatic strategies to the moral dilemma presented by having a principled foreign policy at the risk of staging another world war.

Preparation for Chapter 2:

Point out that the next chapter focuses on a specific crisis that highlights the dilemmas arising when the principles of justice and peace conflict. Students who argued for the conciliation position might be encouraged to prepare a case for the appeasement faction's policy, while confronters might prefer to explore the "stand fast" faction's point of view.

CHAPTER 2: MUNICH: ANATOMY OF A CRISIS

Overview:

This chapter begins by asking how Britain should have responded to Hitler's ultimatum: the Czechs either hand over the Sudetenland by October 1, 1938, or face German invasion. The chapter then provides historical background on the crisis, leading to Mussolini's inviting France, Germany, and Britain to a conference at Munich to resolve the crisis; he pointedly neglected to involve either Czechoslovakia or the USSR in the discussions. The chapter then focuses on opposing views regarding Britain's foreign policy. One school, the appeasement faction headed by Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, believed that Britain should persuade the Czechs to hand over the Sudetenland to Germany because this issue was not worth going to war for. The stand fast faction, with Winston Churchill as spokesman, held that Britain should back the Czechs because capitulation would only strengthen and embolden Hitler.

Students add to the maps begun in the previous chapter. They then prepare for a debate on the issue of appeasement versus standing fast. Following the debate, they read a chapter postscript indicating that the British delegation did indeed agree to German annexation of the Sudetenland, in exchange for Hitler's reassurance that this was his last territorial demand and an agreement to try to come to terms with the British in future disputes. As a result, Czechoslovakia lost significant territory, industry, population, and defenses and was further victimized by Poland and Hungary. In March 1939, Hitler extended German control over the rest of the country and began to threaten Poland over its treatment of German-speakers. On August 23, 1939, Stalin and Hitler signed a non-aggression pack, setting the stage for World War II.

Objectives: At the conclusion of this chapter, students should be able to:

1. Explain the origins of the Sudetenland crisis between Germany and Czechoslovakia.

2. Describe the policies of Germany, Czechoslovakia, the USSR, and France in relation to the Sudeten crisis.

3. Prepare a case for British appeasement or confrontation of Hitler at the Munich Four Power Conference.

Time Required: 1 to 1 1/2 class periods

Materials: Copies of student Chapter 2 for all students; Chapter 1 maps

Procedure:

1. Review the assignment from the previous day by briefly discussing the definition/explanation questions and/or quickly checking that students did them. Possible definitions/explanations are:

- "Black Wednesday" – September 28,. 1939, when the Germany Army mobilized to invade Czechoslovakia in case the Czechs refused to comply with Hitler's ultimatum. In Britain, the armed forces were on alert, air raid shelters were dug, and children were evacuated from London.
- Versailles Treaty – the 1919 treaty created Czechoslovakia out of sections of defeated Austria-Hungary and gave it Hungarian territory on the Danube, Polish coal mines in the north, and the German-speaking Sudetenland mountains as defensible frontiers in the west.
- Eduard Benes – advocate of creation of Czechoslovakia at Versailles. He was president of Czechoslovakia at the time of the Sudetenland crisis.
- Sudetenland – a part of western Czechoslovakia with 3,000,000 inhabitants, the overwhelming majority of whom were ethnic German, unhappy with their national minority status.

- Konrad Henlein – a German-speaking gymnastics teacher and Nazi sympathizer who, starting in 1933, united Sudetenlanders behind the Sudeten Deutsch (German) Party (SDP) against the Czechoslovak government.
- Karlsbad Program – program in which the SDP demanded self-government for ethnic German-speakers and all other national minorities in Czechoslovakia, abandonment of Czech defense treaties, and cooperation between Czechoslovakia and Germany.
- Anschluss – in March 1938, the German Army invaded Austria to force the holding of a referendum on the question of German-Austrian unification. After German officials supervised this election, Austria was incorporated into the Third Reich.
- October 1, 1938 – the date by which Hitler had demanded that the Czechs either surrender the Sudetenland or face a German invasion.
- "digging trenches" – Chamberlain conjured up this image in a September 28, 1939, speech to convey his horror that Britain should be preparing for war over Czechoslovakia.
- Neville Chamberlain – British Prime Minister who thought that he could appease Hitler by allowing him to take over the Sudetenland.
- last territorial demand – Hitler promised that after incorporating the Sudetenland, Germany would cease demanding that neighboring states give up German-speaking territory.
- Winston Churchill – an aristocrat and ex-commander of the British navy, Churchill headed the stand fast faction that urged the Munich delegation to confront Hitler over the Sudetenland.
- 30 divisions – among other formidable defense resources, Czechoslovakia possessed an army of 30 divisions (300,000 men).
- Maginot Line – the fortifications on France's eastern border with Germany, behind which 100 French divisions could be positioned.
- widespread communist revolution – many European statesmen believed that Stalin was attempting to cause a war and to exploit the ensuing instability in order to foment revolution.

2. Have students locate the Sudetenland on their maps. They might label the Maginot Line. Lastly, they should write in the force that the various participants in the Sudeten crisis could bring to bear in terms of aircraft and troops.

3. Review the appeasement and stand fast positions and have students offer evidence from the chapter to support both arguments. Then ask students to select which set of instructions they will prepare for the following day (question 3). On the day of the debate, have the appeasement faction begin by stating several arguments in favor of ceding the Sudetenland to Germany. They might point out the legitimacy of some Sudetenlander requests and the degree to which Benes had already accommodated some of them, the lack of traditional British interests in Czechoslovakia, and the impossibility of directly aiding the Czechs, along with Britain's general state of unpreparedness. The stand fast faction may then make opening statements as to why Britain should back the Czechs to the point of war. They might argue that appeasing Hitler would only encourage him to ask for more, that war with Germany was inevitable and would be easier to fight with Czech and Soviet allies, and that peace purchased at the price of betrayal of a small country was morally tainted. Then an appeasement supporter can choose one stand fast argument to challenge and the rebuttal phase of the debate can commence.

Maintain sufficient decorum so that students are able to listen and respond to each other's reasoning in a respectful manner. If necessary, intervene to facilitate consideration of one argument at a time, allocate equal time to each side, focus issues, and encourage participation by all students. At the end of the debate, each side should make closing arguments that sum up the points raised. For homework, students should read the **Aftermath** and consider how this information affects their views.

Preparation for Chapter 3:

Ask students to read Chapter 3 and prepare questions 1 and 2.

CHAPTER 3: ISOLATIONISTS, INTERNATIONALISTS, AND LEND-LEASE

Overview:

This chapter traces the course of the war in Europe in 1940, highlighting France's surrender and the Battle of Britain. To compound Britain's desperation, the national treasury had nearly run out of money with which to purchase American supplies and arms. In October, Churchill dispatched Lord Lothian to America to speak with President Roosevelt about Britain's needs.

This chapter moves on to explore the dilemmas of whether the United States should lend supplies to Britain. To circumvent isolationist laws, President Roosevelt proposed lending Britain needed war materials through the Lend-Lease Act. Isolationists thought that passage of this act would result in the British-manipulated American entry into the war, whereas internationalists thought that war with Hitler was bound to come and would be more successfully fought now and in alliance with Britain than later and alone. Students debate the issue, taking the roles of isolationists and internationalists.

Objectives: At the conclusion of this chapter, students should be able to:

1. Trace the course of World War II from the invasion of Poland to the Battle of Britain.

2. Recount the historic influence of isolationism in American foreign policy.

3. Make a case for or against passing the Lend-Lease Act, supported by arguments and evidence.

Time Required: 2 class periods (if teacher chooses to use character cards/simulation)

Materials: Copies of student Chapter 3 for all students; Chapter 1 maps

Procedure:

1. Review the assignment from the previous day by briefly discussing the definition/explanation questions and/or quickly checking that students did them. Possible definitions/explanations are:

- Polish Corridor – section of Poland separating East Prussia from the rest of Germany. This territory had been given to Poland by the Versailles Treaty, and Hitler's demand for its return led to the German invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939.
- Ardennes Forest – on May 13, 1940, a Germany army of 43 divisions broke through French lines in the Ardennes Forest in a surprise attack.
- battering ram and blitzkrieg – in the Ardennes attack, seven panzer (armored) divisions formed a battering ram that drove through French colonial troops. Closely supported by the "lightning war" tactics of Luftwaffe bombing and paratrooper seizure of bridges and railroad junctions, German forces split the French and British armies and drove across France to the English Channel.
- Dunkirk – when Hitler called a halt to the panzer column advance, the British mounted an evacuation of the British Expeditionary Corps. Between May 26 and June 4, 1940, 860 boats and ships ferried 338,000 Allied troops from Dunkirk to Britain.
- change in Hitler's battle strategy – during the Battle of Britain, Hitler's original battle strategy had been to destroy the Royal Air Force. Two months into this assault, just as the German airforce was about to achieve its objective, Hitler responded to an R.A.F. attack on Berlin by ordering the Luftwaffe to concentrate its bombing on British cities.
- worst catastrophe – on September 7, 1940, two waves of Luftwaffe bombers, escorted by 648 fighters, attacked London, dropping almost 4 1/2 million pounds of explosives and causing damages unmatched since the Great Fire of 1666.

- England's plight – in the fall of 1940, Britain was being assaulted by Luftwaffe bombs, blockaded by U-boats, and threatened with invasion by the German army.
- Lord Lothian – Britain's ambassador to the United States, who announced in October 1940 that the British Treasury no longer possessed the funds to pay for American arms purchases.
- "entangling alliances" – in his 1796 Farewell Address, George Washington advised American statesmen to avoid permanent alliances that entangle the United States with foreign powers.
- "cash and carry" – according to the McReynolds Neutrality Act of 1937, products sold to belligerent nations had to be paid for in cash and could not be transported in American ships.
- garden hose – trying to get around neutrality prohibitions, President Roosevelt proposed that the United States simply lend Britain military equipment which, he claimed, would be like lending a garden hose to a neighbor whose house was on fire.
- Lend-Lease Act – the Lend-Lease Act, HR Bill 1776, drafted in January 1941, empowered the president to lend "any defense article" to any belligerent country, if the president believed that this would contribute to the defense of the United States.
- isolationists – people who believed that the United States should maintain its tradition of avoiding permanent "entangling" alliances. Specifically, they thought that the Lend-lease Act would drag us into a war in Europe that was against our best interests.
- internationalists – people who thought the United States ought to be more active in world affairs. They supported the Lend-Lease Act because they believed that this way the United States might contribute to the defeat of Hitler before he menaced America.

2. In reviewing the course of World War II from September 1939 to September 1940, ask students to have their maps on their desks. Ask students to describe the course of the war in a whole-class exercise; indicate on a map the division of Poland by Germany and the USSR at the Bug River, the Soviet occupation of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, and the location of the Siegfried Line. Students can then locate, date, and label these events appropriately on their own maps. Ask students about the Battle of France, showing on a large map where the invasions of Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg, the Ardennes breakthrough to Abbeville, and Dunkirk occurred. The students could then copy these campaigns onto their own maps.

3. Assign students to write position papers for an in-class debate on the Lend-Lease bill. Each student should come to class ready to play the part of an isolationist or internationalist. Isolationists might contend that the United States ought not to pass the Lend-Lease Act because America's geography was its best defense and sending arms to Britain would inevitably involve us in war to defend the British Empire. Finally, an America mired in European power rivalries would lose its idealism and freedom of action. Internationalists could counter by arguing that the fall of Britain would leave the United States to stand alone against Germany, which could attack the United States through South America. Giving Britain arms to fight against America's enemies, therefore, was in America's best interest. Furthermore, the United States was the only country in the world that could still stop German aggression.

As an alternative, ask four students to choose a role and prepare a paragraph statement of their character's perspective on whether the Congress should pass the Lend-Lease bill. The rest of the class should prepare to play congressional representatives by writing questions to pose to the debaters. On the day of the debate, have each character present a statement for or against the Lend-Lease bill, with pros and cons alternating. After each statement, congresspersons can ask the presenter questions, second their opinions, or make counter arguments. At the end of class, Congress can vote, one at a time, on the Lend-Lease bill, with each voter explaining his/her position.

Preparation for Chapter 4:

Ask students to read the next chapter and come to class prepared to discuss whether relocating Japanese Americans was a justified response to Japan's aggressions in Asia and its surprise attack on Pearl Harbor.

CHAPTER 4: WORLD WAR II AND JAPANESE-AMERICAN RELOCATION

Overview:

This chapter begins with a description of Japan's invasion of China in 1931 and the "rape of Nanking" six years later. The chapter goes on to review the 1941 debate between the isolationists and the internationalists in Washington and a similar dialogue between the military and the business-oriented factions in Tokyo. The generals, who had made foreign policy in Japan for the preceding ten years, won this round and ordered the attack on Pearl Harbor.

After describing Japan's attack on the U.S. Pacific fleet at Pearl Harbor and the ensuing Japanese conquests in Asia and the South Pacific, the story focuses on U.S. reactions to these events. In addition to chronicling the impressive effort Americans made in less than a year to convert a depression-ridden economy into a military powerhouse, this chapter describes the evacuation of 110,000 Japanese-Americans from their homes in west coast states to relocation camps in desolate interior areas. The chapter depicts the lives of Japanese-Americans in relocation camps and presents arguments for and against their internment. Students are asked to debate the pros and cons of this wartime policy.

Objectives: At the conclusion of this lesson, students should be able to:

1. Describe what happened at Pearl Harbor and explain why Japan attacked there.

2. List four ways people on the home front contributed to the war effort against Japan and Germany.

3. Debate the rationale for interning Japanese Americans during World War II.

Time Required: 1 to 1 1/2 class periods

Materials: Copies of student Chapter 4 and map worksheet for all students

Procedure:

1. Use the identification/explanation questions as a basis for class discussion of the chapter. Some possible answers are given below:

- Manchuria – Chinese province occupied by Japanese in September 1931.
- "rape of Nanking" – Japanese atrocities against innocent Chinese civilians in Nanking, China, in December 1937.
- Indochina – Japanese invasion of Indochina caused President Roosevelt to halt trade of war material with Japan on July 26, 1941. As a result, Japanese leaders resolved to attack the U.S. fleet in Pearl Harbor.
- *Joi* and *Kaikoku* – two factions in Japan, the former oriented toward Japan's military warrior tradition, and the latter composed mostly of the peaceful businessmen seeking markets, not conquests.
- "things are automatically going to happen" – refers to the Japanese secret message that attack would be launched at Pearl Harbor after November 29, 1941, if the United States maintained its trade embargo against Japan.
- Kimmel and Short – General Short and Admiral Kimmel were the military commanders at Pearl Harbor.
- Pearl Harbor and damages done – over 2,400 Americans were killed, 8 battleships sunk or disabled, and 177 planes destroyed.

- attacks after Pearl Harbor – Japan attacked British based in Hong Kong and Malaya and took the Philippines, Indonesia, Borneo, New Guinea, and American island bases, including Wake and Guam.
- relocation camps – where Japanese-Americans were placed far from the west coast or areas where their presence was considered dangerous.
- what could and couldn't be taken to camps – the former included bedding, extra clothes, and eating utensils; the latter were pets and household items such as refrigerators. Those facing relocation were forced to rent, sell, or abandon homes, business, cars, etc.
- Henry McLemore – this newspaper columnist asserted that the removal of 100 percent of Japanese Americans from the west coast was justified because a nation's safety from a potential threat to even one of its soldiers was more important than the rights of members of this minority group.
- Bill of Rights – the U.S. Attorney General argued that any freedom-loving American must care as much for the rights of minorities as his/her own.

2. Next, have students complete the worksheet. They will use the map again in subsequent chapters.

3. The question of whether the United States was justified in interning Japanese-Americans should provide a lively debate. It pits the right of a nation to protect itself against a perceived threat based on race against adherence to the individual rights on which the United States was founded. *Teachers should point out at some time that there was absolutely no evidence of disloyalty by Japanese-Americans*. Furthermore, many of the sons of detainees volunteered to fight on the side of the country that interned their parents, compiling the most heroic war record of any group of Americans.

Preparation for Chapter 5:

Inform students that Chapter 5 follows the course of World War II in Europe. Students should be held responsible for the identification/explanation questions and the map exercise. Furthermore, they can prepare to play the role of British, American, or Soviet generals and describe their country's war effort against the Axis in terms of three of the following: size of forces, suffering of countrymen, effectiveness of strategy, and contribution to ending the war. The specific national roles assigned for this simulation should also be assigned in Chapter 6, where students simulate the Yalta Conference.

CHAPTER 5: WAR IN EUROPE

Overview:

This chapter reviews the strategic situation of the United States at the beginning of 1942, recounting the major questions facing American war planners. The war in North Africa, the advance on Germany through Italy, and the war on the eastern front are all covered.

The final chapter section tells the story of the Normandy invasion and the establishment of the "second front." The chapter ends with Stalin, Churchill, and Roosevelt about to meet at Yalta. In preparation for a simulation of the Yalta Conference, students examine in detail the efforts of the British, Soviets, and Americans in defeating the Germans.

Objectives: At the conclusion of this chapter, students should be able to:

1. Describe the Anglo-American strategy regarding counterattacks against the Germans in Africa, Italy, and France.

2. Describe the course of the German invasion of the USSR.

3. Compare/contrast the war effort against Germany of Britain, America, and the USSR in terms of size of forces, suffering of soldiers and civilians, effectiveness of strategy, and contribution to ending the war.

Time Required: 1-2 class periods

Materials: Copies of student Chapter 5 for all students; student maps; world wall map

Procedure:

1. Review the assignment from the previous day by briefly discussing the definition/explanation questions and/or quickly checking that students did them. Possible definitions/explanations are:

- two questions – in early 1942, U.S. war planners had to resolve two basic strategic questions: Where would the bulk of American armed forces be used? How and when should Germany be attacked?
- "The Desert Fox" – the nickname earned by General Erwin Rommel because of the daring, cunning, and confidence he displayed in North Africa in 1941-43.
- El Alamein – the town in Egypt where Montgomery broke through Afrika Corps lines, forcing Rommel to retreat to Tunisia in November 1942.
- 160,000 Allied soldiers – the number of Anglo-American troops who landed on Sicily's south coast on July 10, 1943 in the largest amphibious assault to that date.
- Marshall Badoglio – overthrew Mussolini in the summer of 1943. When he declared an armistice with the Allies which coincided with the Anglo-American invasion of the Italian peninsula in September of that year, German troops occupied Italy and put Mussolini back into power.
- "soft underbelly" – the Allies invaded Italy in 1943 because they hoped to assault Germany on its supposedly vulnerable southern flank.
- Barbarossa – the code name for Hitler's surprise invasion of the USSR on June 22, 1941, when 190 German and Romanian divisions seized all of European Russia along an 800-mile-long front.
- Stalingrad – the city where the German 6th Army, engaged in vicious street fighting at the end of 1942, was entrapped and destroyed by a Red Army counterattack.

- Kursk – site of a summer 1943 tank battle, in which Hitler hoped but failed to regain the initiative on the eastern front.
- phantom armies – part of the preparation for Operation Overlord was to deceive German generals as to where Allied troops would be coming ashore by using camouflage and false radio messages.
- Normandy – on June 6, 1944, 200,000 American, British, and Canadian troops under the command of Dwight Eisenhower stormed ashore on the northern coast of the Normandy peninsula behind a barrage from thousands of planes and 600 warships.
- Avranches – at the end of July 1944, after a fierce battle of attrition, General Patton's 3rd Army broke through Germany's Normandy defenses, causing a wholesale Wehrmacht withdrawal from France.
- Battle of the Bulge – on December 16, 1944, Hitler began the last German offensive of the war by driving a deep bulge into American lines in the Ardennes; counterattacks and a Soviet offensive in Poland caused the Wehrmacht to retreat.
- Siegfried Line – German defenses along the French border behind which the Wehrmacht retreated in February 1945.

2. While reviewing the student identification terms in question 1, stand at the map and indicate the location of such places as Alexandria, El Alamein, Casablanca, Kasserine Pass, Tunisia, Sicily, Naples, Rome, Florence, Moscow, Urals, Stalingrad, Georgia, the Caucusus, Kursk, Normandy, Avranches, the Ardennes, and the Siegfried Line. The campaigns in Africa, Italy, the USSR, and France may also be indicated. Students may then copy this information on their maps.

3. After reviewing the course of World War II in Europe, students can be asked to look at their answers to chapter question 2. The teacher can simply lead a class discussion of the relative contributions to the defeat of Germany of each of the Allies, based on student homework answers. If students have been assigned by the teacher to represent each of the three countries, they may then be divided into three sets of generals. Each set will then spend five minutes putting together a group position on the four considerations to be dealt with (size of forces, suffering of soldiers and civilians, effectiveness of strategy, and contribution to ending the war). For the remainder of class, each set will use these notes to describe their war effort, argue as to its importance, and belittle the contributions of their allies.

British representatives might cite the Blitz, lonely combat against the Reich in 1940 and 1941 when America was neutral and the USSR was Germany's ally, defeat of Rommel in North Africa, and the ultimate success of the peripheral strategy. Americans can point out that they supplied the majority of the troops and weapons on the western front, that the United States was the driving force behind the Normandy landings and the defeat of the Germans in France, and that U.S. Lend-Lease supplies and weapons kept the USSR and Britain in the war. Lastly, Soviet representatives can emphasize the fact that they fought four German soldiers for every one on the western front, the Red Army's 215 divisions had liberated all of Eastern Europe without direct aid from the Anglo-Americans, and over 25 million Soviets had fallen in the fight against Hitler's legions.

Preparation for Chapter 6:

The class should be divided into three groups, representing the Soviet Union, the United States, and Britain. Each group should prepare arguments to support their national positions in a six-issue simulation of the famous Yalta Conference. These issues are how Germany should be divided, how Poland and Eastern Europe would be governed, whether the USSR would join the United Nations and with how many votes, what concessions in Asia the USSR would be granted for entering the war against Japan, and whether the United States would provide its allies with low-interest loans after the war.

CHAPTER 6: THE YALTA CONFERENCE

Overview:

This chapter provides students with the background they need to reenact the Yalta Conference by playing the roles of American, British, and Soviet leaders. The chapter explains six of the major issues discussed at the conference: the partition of Germany, the future government of Poland, self-determination of Eastern Europe, Japan and the Far East, the United Nations, and postwar aid from the United States. The general thinking of Franklin Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and Joseph Stalin is explained as well as their positions on each of the six issues.

Students are to sit according to the country they "represent" and to choose a student to play the leader. The leader sends student ambassadors to each of the other country groupings. After preliminary negotiations, the ambassadors return to their own countries with advice for their leaders. The final negotiations may take place outside of the classroom among the leaders of each country and trusted aides. A description of the details of the settlement arrived at is provided, along with three different views on whether the Roosevelt administration appeased the Soviets.

Objectives: At the conclusion of this chapter, students should be able to:

1. State the six major issues discussed at the Yalta summit in February 1945.

2. State one country's position on each issue, along with arguments supporting it.

3. Analyze the real solutions to these issues and argue cogently whether the Soviet Union was appeased or the United States did at least as well as could be expected given the geopolitical realities of the time.

Time Required: 1 to 1 1/2 class periods

Materials: Copies of student Chapter 6 for all students.

Procedure:

1. Review the assignment from the previous day by briefly discussing the definition/explanation questions and/or quickly checking that students did them. Possible definitions/explanations are:

- Big Three – Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin, leaders of the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union.
- Yalta – a town on the Black Sea in the USSR where the Big Three met.
- problem of Germany – how to divide Germany among the Allies and whether to allow Germany to be reunited in the future.
- problem of Poland – which political faction should form the postwar government of Poland: the London or the Lublin Poles.
- problem of Eastern Europe – whether there would be free elections in Eastern Europe – including Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia.
- problem of Japan and the Far East – whether the USSR would help the Anglo-Americans against Japan, recognize Chiang Kai-shek's government of China, and receive islands and bases is Asia.
- problem of United Nations – whether the Soviet Union would join an international organization after the war and be satisfied with fewer than 15 votes in the General Assembly.
- problem of aid after the war – whether the United States would provide low-interest loans to help the Soviet Union and the British after the war.

2. Students should come to class with an understanding of the negotiating position of the nation they represent. Have them sit in separate parts of the room according to country. Help each group choose a leader who will have the final say in all negotiations. Give students about 10 minutes to review the reasons for their position on each issue. Have leaders send between two and four student ambassadors to each of the other countries. These diplomats will try to learn the positions of the other countries and seek to persuade them to alter their positions by reasoning and by proposing deals. You will be moving from group to group monitoring progress, answering questions, and stimulating more thinking.

3. After 15 to 20 minutes, each group should reconvene and help leaders figure out what concessions they can wring out of the other delegations. Leaders and aides will then go out of the room to complete their negotiations. In the meantime, have the rest of the class read the results of the Yalta Conference. If there is time, leaders can return to inform classmates of their agreements. Comparisons can then be made between the agreement leaders made and what actually happened.

4. You may wish to continue the discussion of the issues raised in this chapter by having students read the three different views of the Yalta agreement from the traditionalist, revisionist, and conservative perspectives. Students should be instructed to review the Yalta agreement in light of the various positions and come to class prepared to support the statement that most closely represents their view. The traditionalists will emphasize the need to secure Soviet cooperation in the postwar world, the requirement to get help against Japan, and the fact that the United States and Great Britain had little leverage because the Soviets already were in Eastern Europe only 44 miles from Berlin, while the Anglo-Americans were not yet in Germany. The revisionists will point out that the Anglo-Americans secured Soviet agreement to join the United Nations, declare war on Japan, and allow free elections in Poland and Eastern Europe. The conservatives will argue that the Soviets were practically given Poland and Eastern Europe, in addition to unnecessary concessions regarding Japan and the United Nations.

Preparation for Chapter 6:

The next chapter examines the momentous decision to use the atomic bomb in August 1945 to secure Japan's surrender. The chapter provides information needed to argue for or against this decision in the context of the war in the Pacific.

Several students should be assigned to supply background on the Pacific Theatre 1942-45, others to argue in favor of using the bomb, and a third group to oppose its use. The major argument in favor is that using the atomic bomb against a Japanese city would save American (and Japanese) lives because the enemy was committed to fighting to the last man and only the sudden shock of a nuclear device could induce Japan to surrender. The argument against the bomb is that the Home Islands' economy was collapsing, its military was relying on soldiers without guns, and its Emperor was seeking a negotiated peace.

CHAPTER 7: THE DECISION TO DROP THE BOMB

Overview:

This chapter gives students the information they need to argue for or against the decision to use nuclear weapons to hasten the end of World War II. The narrative begins by introducing students to the Manhattan Project and proceeds to describe major battles in the Pacific theater and how Japanese willingness to fight unto death helped convince U.S. military planners that a successful invasion of Japan could cost 1/2 million American lives.

Growing increasingly aware of desperate conditions in his country, Emperor Hirohito worked behind the scenes garnering support for his peace movement and sending an emissary to ask the Soviets either for military support or for their "good offices" in negotiating an honorable end to the war. Meanwhile, a series of discussions in Washington, D.C., involved scientists, high-ranking officials, and military planners. These discussions focused on the issue of using the bomb on civilian/military targets. Those who favored such use believed that only the devastation caused by dropping one or two atomic bombs on an urban area could shock the Japanese into surrender. Opponents thought a demonstration of the bomb's power on a relatively uninhabited area, along with assurances that the Japanese could keep their emperor, would achieve the same effect. Students are expected to discuss this issue in class.

Objectives: At the end of this chapter, students should be able to:

1. Understand that military decisions are also moral decisions.

2. Explain the effects that five different battles had on the decision to use nuclear weapons on civilian/military targets in Japan.

3. Argue whether the United States should or should not have ordered the use of nuclear weapons on civilian/military targets in Japan.

Time Required: 1 to 1 1/2 class periods

Materials: Copies of student Chapter 7 for all students

Procedure:

1. Review the assignment from the previous day by briefly discussing the definition/explanation questions and/or quickly checking that students did them. Possible definitions/explanations are:

- Manhattan Project – scientists and military personnel assigned on December 6, 1941, to develop the world's first nuclear weapons; under the directorship of General Leslie Groves.
- Coral Sea – one of three crucial battles in which the United States regained command of the Pacific theater. Coral Sea was primarily a battle of opposing aircraft.
- Midway – battle won because American intelligence officers had broken the Japanese military code, thereby enabling Admiral Nimitz to avoid a trap set by Japanese Admiral Yamamoto. Before Japan's main fleet arrived, the U.S. bombers sank four (three in a five-minute period) Japanese carriers and won the battle.
- Henderson Field – the airfield on Guadalcanal seized by Marines in August 1942. This attack began a seven-month air, land, and sea battle that ultimately resulted in American seizure of the initiative in the war against Japan.
- leapfrogging – U.S. policy of circumventing Japan's interlocking system of naval and air bases by sailing past first defense island positions, attacking rear supply and garrison islands, and letting advanced bases "wither on the vine."

- Iwo Jima and Okinawa – islands within air strike distance of Japan where Japanese fought to the last man. Iwo Jima is remembered because of a dramatic photograph of U.S. Marines raising the American flag. During a three-month battle in the spring of 1945 at Okinawa, 234 U.S. ships were damaged in air raids, many by *kamikaze* suicide pilots.
- General LeMay – Air Force general who instituted daylight firebombing of Japanese cities. The March 1945 raid on Tokyo killed 88,000 Japanese. Teachers may wish to address the moral question posed by the firebomb raid on Tokyo to set the stage for a debate over using nuclear weapons on civilian/military targets in Japan.
- three-stage defense plan – in 1945 Japanese strategists planned to use kamikaze pilots, a "wall of fire," and human wave attacks to repel American invaders.
- bamboo poles – by 1945, Japan's defenses were such that half-starved young boys and old men were trained to counterattack against American invaders with sharpened bamboo poles.
- blockade – U.S. naval strategists believed Japan would be forced to surrender in six months due to the effect of their blockade.
- Hirohito and Konoye – Japanese Emperor who sent his cousin, Prince Konoye, to the Soviet Union in the summer of 1945 in order to arrange for an honorable surrender to the United States.
- Franck and Szilard – American nuclear physists who wanted the United States to drop a demonstration bomb instead of bombing civilian/military targets.
- Interim Committee – established in the summer of 1945 to decide whether to use nuclear weapons on civilian/military targets in Japan; it rejected the idea of using the bomb on sparsely inhabited areas.
- emissaries – Navy undersecretary Beard thought U.S. emissaries could meet with Japanese representatives, inform them of U.S. nuclear weapons, and negotiate a peace with Japan that would allow the Japanese to keep their emperor.
- tremendous shock – theory of Henry L. Stimson, chair of the Interim Committee, that Japan's leaders could be induced to surrender only if a tremendous shock caused them to believe the United States could destroy their country.

2. Direct students to label and date all of the locations of major battles or confrontations described in this chapter on their maps of the Pacific theater.

3. Conduct a discussion or debate over atomic bombing Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Those arguing for dropping the bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki should point out that Japanese soldiers fought to the last man in defense of Okinawa; Japan planned to repel an invasion (with *kamikaze*, wall of gunfire, and human wave attacks); using the bomb could save as many as 500,000 U.S. lives (some students might take the roles of members of the armed services likely to be involved in the invasion); and nations at war should not be expected to be concerned with saving the lives of enemy civilians. Those opposed to using the bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki should point out that Japan, with its economy all but destroyed, could not have survived much longer without surrendering; Japan's plans to repel invaders (*kamikaze*, wall of gunfire, human wave attacks – and bamboo poles) were totally unrealistic; Japan was known to be seeking an honorable way of ending the war; and the United States was morally obliged to avoid unnecessary injury to innocent civilians.

Preparation for Chapter 8:

The next chapter tells what happened in Japan after the decision to drop the bomb. It asks students to look back on the decision and once more discuss whether the bomb should have been used. Students who changed their minds should be asked to share their reasons. Students who were not influenced by the reading material in this chapter should explain why the added information did not cause them to change their opinion or why it made them even firmer in their conviction.

CHAPTER 8: THE BOMB, PART II

Overview

This short chapter begins with a quotation from President Truman's ultimatum that Japan must either surrender unconditionally or face "utter destruction." A description of the flight of the *Enola Gay* follows, along with a general account of the destruction caused by the bomb. The narrative then focuses on the agonizing death of a single Japanese child, Issaku Watanabe, as his grief-stricken mother vainly tried to alleviate his suffering.

On August 7, at the very time that stunned Japanese government officials attempted to learn exactly what had happened in Hiroshima, Prince Konoye was informed by the Soviets that the USSR would declare war on Japan in seven hours. On August 8, 1945, the Soviet Union invaded Manchuria, encountering little resistance from Japanese troops. The same day, the United States dropped an atomic bomb on Nagasaki, killing 39,000. On the 15th, the Emperor decided to call for an end to the war and read a prepared statement over the radio ordering his subjects to surrender. Some 5 million Japanese soldiers throughout Asia and on islands in the Pacific Ocean laid down their arms. At the same time, diehard military leaders, intent on continuing to wage the war, attempted unsuccessfully to sabotage the battleship carrying General MacArthur to Tokyo to receive Japan's surrender.

Objectives: At the conclusion of this chapter, students should be able to:

1. Describe the damage done to Hiroshima by the atomic bomb.

2. Tell what happened to Issaku Watanabe from the flash of the bomb to the moment of his death.

3. Explain whether and why the information in this chapter influenced their thinking on the issue of dropping the bomb on a Japanese city, as discussed in the previous chapter.

Time Required: 1 class period

Materials: Copies of student Chapter 8 for all students

Procedure:

1. Review the assignment from the previous day by briefly discussing the definition/explanation questions and/or quickly checking that students did them. Possible definitions/explanations are:

- Tinian – island in the Pacific where bomb was prepared for use and from which *Enola Gay* took off.
- *Little Boy* – ironic name given to bomb because of its great size and 5-ton weight.
- Potsdam Declaration – Anglo-American warning to Japan to unconditionally surrender immediately or face "utter destruction," issued at Potsdam Conference in late July 1945.
- August 6, 1945, 8:15 a.m. – exact time the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima.
- number killed and wounded in Hiroshima – about 71,000 were killed and 68,000 seriously wounded.
- heat of the blast – the blast was so hot it melted the eyes of people who looked at the explosion.
- three things that happened to Issaku Watanabe – lost his best friend, head inflated like a balloon, found his way home but could not be helped by his mother, taken to a reception center, developed high fever, died.
- multiply by 71,379 times – this multiplication could give students an idea of the suffering caused by the bomb.

- Prince Konoye – Emperor Hirohito's emissary, who was told on August 8, 1945, that Soviets would declare war on Japan in 7 hours.
- Nagasaki – second bomb on Nagasaki killed 39,000 on August 9.
- how the war ended – shortly after Emperor Hirohito asked the Japanese to lay down their arms in a radio speech on August 14, 1945, hostilities in Asia ceased.
- fate of the Emperor – the Emperor was allowed to maintain a role in Japan's political life after the war. He died in 1989.

2. Ask students to discuss what effect the information in this chapter had on their thinking regarding use of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima. Possible points of controversy include whether the graphic depiction of the suffering of one child would tend to obscure information in this unit concerning suffering caused by the Japanese. Conversely, the suffering of one child might only awake in us an awareness of how cruel war can be. Another issue is whether dropping the bomb was really necessary when the Japanese were seeking a negotiated surrender using the Soviet Union as intermediary. Perhaps the destruction of Hiroshima was necessary, but what about the bombing of Nagasaki? Finally, students should consider whether the militarist plot to subvert the peace process really showed how fanatic the Japanese were, making not one, but both bombs, a virtual necessity.

3. End class by having students write and read to the class statements of their own opinions. These need not be argued, except perhaps for clarification. Students should be encouraged to listen to their classmates' statements.

Preparation for Chapter 9:

Point out that the next chapter raises the issues of how much the United States should trust the Soviet Union not to develop its own arsenal of nuclear weapons and whether the United States should give up its lead in this field. Students who were opposed to using the bomb at Hiroshima should be asked to prepare a case for the creation of a super-agency under U.N. auspices to examine all stockpiles of nuclear weapons as well as uranium mines and to control all future development of nuclear energy for war and peace. Tell students they will be asked whether the United States should make such a proposal and what safeguards would ensure that the USSR upholds its part of the agreement.

CHAPTER 9: BAN THE BOMB? THE IMPASSE OVER NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

Overview:

This chapter presents the intriguing possibility that the United States and the Soviet Union could have achieved an effective halt to the nuclear arms race before it even began. It first asks students to consider whether the United States, in 1946 ostensibly the sole possessor of atomic bombs for the forthcoming 5 to 10 years, should share its nuclear secrets with the Soviet Union. The terms proposed for this unprecedented concession included permission to search anywhere in the world, and especially in the Soviet Union, for suspected nuclear materials and weapons. This chapter draws on quotes from many of the statesmen who participated in the cabinet meeting that addressed whether the United States should make this offer. Students are asked to analyze these quotations in order to decide whether such a proposal should be made.

The chapter also presents the famous Baruch Plan and the Soviet counterproposal; the narrative points out the differences between the two proposals in 1946 and two years later. During the two years of haggling over the terms of this weapons treaty, the United States engaged in extensive tests of nuclear weapons and the Soviet Union worked feverishly to develop its own atomic bomb. In May 1948 negotiations broke off, and, one year later, the Soviets detonated their first nuclear device.

Objectives: At the conclusion of this chapter, students should be able to:

1. Describe the Baruch plan and present two arguments either for or against it.

2. Explain how the Soviet plan differed from the U.S. plan.

3. State a position on the one remaining difference between the U.S. and Soviet nuclear plan and argue whether this difference was too great to prevent formal acceptance of the treaty.

Time Required: 1 class period

Materials: Copies of student Chapter 9 for all students

Procedure:

1. Review the assignment from the previous day by briefly discussing the definition/explanation questions and/or quickly checking that students did them. Possible definitions/explanations are:

- Henry Stimson – secretary of war who first proposed that the United States give up its supremacy in nuclear technology and surrender control to the United Nations. Stimson was not fundamentally concerned about the inevitable Soviet acquisition of nuclear technology, but rather about their willingness to work peacefully in the family of nations.
- Henry Wallace – former vice president who wanted the United States to maintain close collaboration with the USSR in matters of science, agriculture, etc.
- Clinton Anderson – secretary of agriculture who claimed that the bomb and the knowledge to produce it belonged to the American people and should not be given away.
- Vannevar Bush – president's scientific advisor who argued for exchange of scientific research on nuclear fission because withholding this information from the Soviet Union meant withholding it from our own scientists. Moreover, the U.S. proposal was for the exchange of scientific research on nuclear fission, but not the technology needed to make nuclear weapons.
- James Byrnes – secretary of state who predicted the Soviets would never allow us to inspect their bomb-producing factories and laboratories.

- James Forrestal – secretary of the navy who noted that the Japanese broke naval agreements with the United States before World War II and the Soviets (with oriental thinking) could not be trusted. (Remind students of the racist basis of other decisions during the war.)

2. Review the Baruch Treaty. The Baruch Plan was the formal U.S. proposal for a staged procedure for eliminating nuclear weapons and for peaceful development of nuclear energy under control of the United Nations. First, an international agency would be set up under the United Nations to control the mining, research, and leasing for nonmilitary use of nuclear materials and technology. Further stipulations were made for unlimited inspections and punishment for violators. Finally, the United States refused to surrender its own nuclear weapons until all other steps for control and inspection were completed.

3. Next, ask three students to present arguments for the Baruch Plan. You might ask one student to make Wallace's argument; another Bush's; and a third Stimson's. The three arguments might be combined into one presentation as follows:

> The Soviet Union was to be given nuclear secrets only after systems of disarmament and control were established. Since the Soviets would eventually discover how to make nuclear weapons, it would be best to allow that discovery to be made in an atmosphere of trust, so that nuclear research would be used for peaceful purposes, and not for an arms race.

4. Next, ask three students to present arguments against the Baruch Plan. You might ask one student to present Anderson's arguments; another Byrnes's; and a third Forrestal's. You might wish to have students combine their presentations somewhat as follows:

> The USSR is not to be trusted because its thinking is "Oriental." Japan and Hitler had broken agreements they made with the United States and other Western powers prior to World War II. Furthermore, the United States had spend a great deal of money making the first atomic bomb, and the secret belongs to the American people, who don't want it given to the Soviets.

5. Note the major differences between the Soviet and the U.S. proposals were that the first step in implementing the Soviet plan would be for the United States to dismantle its nuclear weapons and turn over nuclear research to the United Nations; and that the USSR and other major powers would retain a veto over inspection of nuclear weapons plants, as well as a veto over punishment to nations violating the nuclear agreement.

6. At the end of the negotiations in 1948, the USSR had come to accept international inspections of nuclear weapons and other essential aspects of the U.S. plan. However, the Soviets demanded a veto on punishment for violations of the nuclear disarmament plan. Lead a discussion on whether the United States should have made the punishment veto concession to the Soviets.

Those opposing this concession by the United States might refer to the argument that the Soviet Union cannot be trusted and that any concession on the part of the United States might be construed as appeasement. Students in favor of making this last concession, in addition to previous arguments, might point to the need to establish trust, balancing the uncertainties in comprehensive inspections against the dangers of an uncontrolled arms race.

Preparation for Chapter 10:

The next chapter examines an issue related to the debate over the Baruch Plan – who started the Cold War. Materials in the chapter cover some 18 different events; student are expected to use five to argue one of three positions – traditionalist, revisionist, or conservative. An advanced class can review the positions and find events that support them, while an average or low achieving class might need to learn a number of the events and be taught to analyze the different interpretations before engaging in discussion of the issues raised by this chapter.

CHAPTER 10: FROM WARTIME ALLIES TO COLD WAR ENEMIES

Overview:

This chapter traces the events that transformed the United States and the Soviet Union from wartime allies into Cold War enemies. The chapter commences by positing three different interpretations of responsibility for the Cold War – the first put forth by traditionalist historians, the second by revisionists, and the third by conservatives. The chronology of events begins in February 1944 with the United States and Britain establishing a pro-West government in Italy without consulting the Soviet Union.

Numerous events over the following two years are covered, culminating in February 1946 when Stalin gave a speech blaming capitalism for political repression and economic crisis. Winston Churchill's retort, in March 1946, coined the term "iron curtain" to describe the Soviet Union's establishment of Eastern European satellite states. The narrative ends by posing the question of whether the United States and the West European democracies played as important a role as the Soviet Union in breaking up the Grand Alliance.

Objectives: At the conclusion of this chapter, students should be able to:

1. State the problem raised in this chapter and identify the three different schools of interpretation of the Cold War.

2. Cite and explain five different events contributing to breaking up the Grand Alliance.

3. Using the aforementioned events, argue for the traditionalist, revisionist, or conservative interpretations of responsibility for breaking up the Grand Alliance, or explain why they believe that none of these schools offers a suitable explanation.

Time Required: 1 to 2 class periods

Materials: Copies of student Chapter 10 for all students

Procedure:

1. Review the assignment from the previous day by briefly discussing the definition/explanation questions and/or quickly checking that students did them. Possible definitions/explanations are:

- three different schools of thought – the traditionalists believe that the United States behaved in a reasonable manner and that Soviet aggression and suspicion were responsible for breaking up the Grand Alliance; the revisionists argue that the United States and the West European democracies share much of the blame because they refused to recognize the USSR's legitimate wish for a defensive sphere of influence; and the conservatives claim the United States should have taken a firmer stance from the beginning in countering Soviet aggression.
- sphere of influence – argument that each major power has the right to control events in its immediate area in order to protect vital security interests.
- forming the Italian government – in February 1944, Britain and the United States gave the Soviets no role in forming the new Italian government; consequently, the Soviets could argue the United States had no business interfering in its sphere of interest, Eastern Europe.
- Polish Home Army – Stalin allowed Germany a free hand in putting down a revolt by the Polish Home Army in August 1944 because he did not want to contend with an independent military force in Poland after the war.

- revolt in Athens – starting on December 3, 1944, Britain helped clear communist guerrillas out of Athens for six weeks, while the Soviets neither raised formal objections nor gave aid to the guerrillas.
- seating the Lublin Poles at the United Nations – because the United States and Britain felt betrayed by Stalin's imposition of the Lublin government on Poland in April 1945, they refused to allow Poland a seat in the General Assembly.
- Syria, Lebanon, and Vietnam – three French colonies before World War II. France lost control of them during the war and, beginning in the spring of 1945, used force to reoccupy them. Revisionists have used this as evidence that the United States and the West European democracies held the USSR to a higher standard of behavior than they observed when it came to their colonies.
- US/B troop withdrawal – of some 400 miles out of Central Europe in July 1945 in keeping with the Yalta Agreement. This indicated that the Anglo-Americans kept their part of the bargain.
- change in reparations from Germany – amount of money reduced from 20 billion dollars to what Germany could pay at Potsdam in the summer of 1945; the Anglo-Americans did not want the Soviet Union to bleed Germany dry.
- what US/B saw Soviets doing in Eastern Europe – the Soviets were establishing satellite states, nationalizing industries, redistributing land, and, as in the USSR, depriving people of their basic freedoms.
- Iron Curtain speech – using the image of lowering an "iron curtain" to depict Soviet activities in Eastern Europe, Winston Churchill coined a new term and declared the beginning of the Cold War.

2. Review students' lists of events that support one of the three schools of thought on the origin of the Cold War. Have students share their understanding of each event and how it supports the chosen school of interpretation. Allow for discussions, debates, and/or heated arguments if they arise from this activity. Select between five to seven events to discuss in depth, showing a relationship between each incident and the events that preceded it. Ask students to look at events from both the Soviet and American perspectives.

3. Following the assignment given in question 3, if possible, identify students who really believe the position assigned to them. Give each side about five minutes to state its case and permit each one minute to refute arguments made by the other side. Allow students in the audience to raise issues with the debaters. In the last five to ten minutes of class, have students in the audience explain who they believe was primarily responsible for breaking up the Grand Alliance and provide supporting arguments.

Preparation for Chapter 11:

Tell students that the next issue to decide is how the United States should respond to Soviet actions in Europe. They will be reading about three different U.S. strategies – sphere of influence/isolationism, liberation and massive retaliation, or containment. Have students review each of these strategies and then read two of the first four crises. Next, have them pick one of the three solutions stated with each crisis. They should come to class prepared to argue as advocates of sphere of influence, containment, or liberation/massive retaliation as a means of resolving two of the crises. About one-fourth of the class should be prepared to argue on war-torn Europe or Greece and Turkey; about one-half should be asked to present their position on the Berlin blockade; the remainder should discuss the coup in Czechoslovakia and Soviet military pressure in Europe.

CHAPTER 11: YEARS OF DECISION

Overview:

This chapter begins by presenting three American attitudes toward dealing with the Soviet Union in 1946-49 – neo-isolationism or sphere of interest; massive retaliation and liberation; and containment. After reading explanations of these three positions, students are introduced to five major foreign policy crises in Europe that required U.S. responses. These are the threat of famine and despair in Europe, which could have led to voters choosing communist governments in France and Italy; Soviet military pressure on Greece and Turkey; the coup in Czechoslovakia; the Berlin blockade; and Soviet military superiority in Eastern Europe. The description of each crisis is followed by a set of three alternative solutions for U.S. policy-makers. Each of the three alternatives is construed to reflect the views of either the sphere of influence, retaliation and liberation, or containment school of thoughts. Students are expected to decide which course of action the United States should pursue in at least two of the foreign policy crises. The ensuing chapter will explain which foreign policy alternative the United States actually employed in each of these crises.

Objectives: At the conclusion of this chapter, students should be able to:

1. Explain the three alternative strategies for responding to unfriendly acts by the Soviet Union in Europe – sphere of influence, massive retaliation and liberation, and containment.

2. Describe at least three foreign policy crises that occurred between 1946 and 1949.

3. Present a clear and factual argument for responses to at least two of the crises.

Time Required: 1 to 1 1/2 class periods

Materials: Copies of student Chapter 11 for all students

Procedure:

1. Review the assignment from the previous day by briefly discussing the definition/explanation questions and/or quickly checking that students did them. Possible definition/explanations are:

- sphere of influence – the belief articulated during the 1940s that the United States should return to its traditional foreign policy characterized by keeping out of Europe's affairs and being concerned primarily with hemispheric defense.
- Henry Wallace – ex-U.S. vice president under Roosevelt who advocated the sphere of influence position, counseling that the United States ought to look for ways of recognizing the needs of and building cooperation with the USSR.
- "land reform" – Wallace stated that the United States need not agree with fundamental Soviet policies for redistributing wealth in countries under its control, but ought to grant the Soviet Union the equal right to socialize its sector in the same way as the United States tried to make its own democratic.
- "school yard bullies" – Wallace made the analogy that getting tough with the Soviet Union would not help change its policies any more than a similar response would work with school yard bullies.
- John Foster Dulles – U.S. secretary of state under President Eisenhower; he advocated massive retaliation and liberation policies as the only viable means of resisting Soviet aggression.
- "containment unsound" – Dulles referred to containment as unsound because it continually put the United States on the defensive; he argued that a purely defensive policy could not win against an aggressive policy.

- liberation – Dulles thought that the United States should take the offensive against the Soviet Union by liberating people under Soviet control.
- massive retaliation – Dulles argued that the USSR would be tempted to attack where the United States and its allies were weak. Thus, America ought to be ready to support local defenses with the threat of massive (implicitly, nuclear) retaliation.
- George Kennan – ambassador to the USSR who held that the Soviets were reasonable people who would be ultimately deterred from aggression by steadfast U.S. counterpressure.
- "adroit and vigilant" – the key to containment, Kennan argued, was applying adroit and vigilant counterforce corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy.
- containment – Kennan contended that his policy did not mean blustering public statements against the Soviets, who would respond negatively to histrionics but not to realities.
- gradual mellowing – Kennan foresaw that the counterpressures from the United States would eventually lead to a moderation of Soviet policies.
- five major crises – the five crises are war-torn Europe, military pressure on Greece and Turkey, coup in Czechoslovakia, the Berlin blockade, and Soviet military pressure in Europe.

2. Divide the class into cooperative learning groups of four students each. Tell each group to investigate at least two crises. Stress that students must work collaboratively, discuss and select an alternative policy response for each crisis, and produce two position papers for which they will share group credit. Each group should decide who will act in such roles as a summarizer (who restates major points of contention or resolution to ascertain that everyone understands group discourse), recorder (who writes down group decisions), researcher (who makes sure that position papers employ accurate information), and organizer (who keeps the group focused on the specific task at hand). During group work time, the teacher can monitor student collaboration and make sure that groups are wrestling with the basic issues involved in each crisis. The following issues should be raised (to focus student attention on these issues, teachers may wish to concisely note them on the chalkboard):

- Students discussing the war-torn Europe crisis should decide whether the United States need for prosperous European allies capable of contributing to their own defenses is worth the expenditure of many billions of dollars.
- Students discussing Greece and Turkey should be aware that these countries were in great danger of falling under communist domination and that, if this happened, the Soviet Union would become a naval power in the Mediterranean. Students should question whether the United States ought to spend money to support friendly but undemocratic countries.
- Students discussing the coup in Czechoslovakia should be asked what the United States could do in a case of internal subversion that presents the United States with a fait accompli.
- Students discussing the Berlin blockade should understand the geography of the four occupation zones. If there is time, they should be helped to understand the complex issues involving reparations and interzonal monetary cooperation. At the very least, students *should discuss whether West Berlin was worth risking a war* with the Soviet Union, how the risk could be minimized, and whether the United States should employ nuclear blackmail.
- Students discussing Soviet military threats to West Europe should be aware that the U.S. army in Europe was only 10 percent of the size of the Soviet army units either in or close to Eastern Europe. They should also be aware that the United States was the only country that possessed nuclear weapons at the time.

3. Groups may present and discuss their positions at the end of class.

Preparation for Chapter 12:

Chapter 12 reveals the resolution of each of the five crises. Students should be asked to read the chapter, answer the identification questions, and prepare to evaluate each of the five solutions.

CHAPTER 12: SOLUTIONS TO FIVE CRISES

Overview:

This chapter explains the solutions to the five crises, covering the time frame from 1945 to 1950, with only brief references to events after 1950. Students compare the actual solutions with those they developed in the previous chapter and speculate on the impact of these decisions on subsequent events.

The unit essay assignment following the chapter asks students how much responsibility the United States and its post-war allies share with the USSR for the Cold War. Students are required to frame their answers by considering three of four basic questions. The first concerns whether by signing the Munich Agreement with Hitler, Britain and France intentionally directed German aggression eastward in order to pit Nazism against communism. Second, students are to evaluate the Yalta Agreement, determining whether Soviet actions in Eastern Europe ought to be considered an empire-building betrayal of naive Grand Alliance partners or a defensive implementation of legitimate security needs. Third, students confront U.S. nuclear strategy, exploring the necessity of bombing Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the extent of good faith manifested by the United States in negotiations on the Baruch Plan. Last, students decide whether the United States behaved constructively and properly in three of the five post-war European crises.

Objectives: At the conclusion of this chapter, students should be able to:

1. Describe the solution to each of the five crises discussed in the previous chapter.

2. State why they think U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union between 1945 and 1950 was or was not wise and generally correct.

3. Find information from at least five chapters in the unit to support their contentions concerning U.S. responsibility for the Cold War.

4. Write an essay with an introduction, main body, and conclusion, focusing on whether the United States and its allies share much of the responsibility for starting the Cold War.

Time Required: 2 class periods (or more if you plan to do step-by-step essay research and writing in class)

Materials: Copies of student Chapter 12 and "Essay Question for the Unit" for all students

Procedure:

1. Review the assignment from the previous day by briefly discussing the definition/explanation questions and/or quickly checking that students did them. Possible definitions/explanations are:

- Marshall Plan – plan introduced by Truman's Secretary of State on June 7, 1947, it was intended to repair damage caused by World War II, revive national economies, and insure the existence of "free institutions" in Western Europe.
- Italian elections – U.S. policymakers feared the Italian communist party would win the 1948 election, but it only received 31 percent of the vote. Many observers believed the Marshall Plan was partially responsible for the failure of Italian communists to attract more voters.
- contrast between Germanies – prosperity in West Germany and relative poverty in East Germany were indicators of the success of the Marshall Plan. By 1950, most of the Marshall Plan countries had surpassed their pre-war production levels.
- Truman Doctrine – 1947 aid package for Greece and Turkey, which totalled $400,000,000; slated to help Greece and Turkey overcome indirect and direct Soviet pressure.

- "if we falter" – Truman warned, in his March 1947 speech to Congress, "we may endanger the peace of the world." He was referring to U.S. resolve in resisting Soviet aggression against Greece and Turkey.
- outcome in Greece and Turkey – bolstered by U.S. aid, Greece won the civil war with communist forces, and Turkey resisted Soviet demands for bases and territories.
- Jan Masaryk – Czechoslovakian foreign minister whose 1948 death was followed by communist takeover of his country. (It has been widely suspected, but not proved, that Masaryk was pushed from the third floor window of his office and was not a suicide as the communists in Czechoslovakia claimed.)
- Klement Gottwald – communist party chief in Czechoslovakia who nationalized industry, collectivized agriculture, and jailed his political opponents.
- Alexander Dubcek – Czech leader in 1968 whose attempt to liberalize Czech society was suppressed by the Soviet Union. The United States under President Johnson refrained from taking military action to resist Soviet suppression of Czech liberalism.
- airlift – U.S. solution to the Berlin blockade was to fly up to 1071 planes a day to supply the city of 2,500,000 for 11 months, ending in May 1949. Soviets finally backed down and allowed free access to West Berlin through East Germany.
- formation of West Germany – in 1949, the British, French, and American occupation zones of both Germany and Berlin were formed into the Federal Republic of Germany.
- NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization, constituted by 11 nations of West Europe, as well as Greece, Turkey, Iceland, Canada, and the United States. Founded in April 1949. Member nations were pledged to protect one another.

2. Lead students in a general discussion of the outcome of each crisis; have them review the alternatives in each case, comment on the choices selected by U.S. policymakers, and state whether the West was as successful as it could have been under the circumstances. The following points should come out in discussions:

- War-torn Europe - The solution to the problem was the Marshall Plan (containment). Four years after its implementation, the countries aided by this program improved production to pre-war levels. Today, all nations aided by the Marshall Plan are stable democracies with healthy economies and staunch allies of the United States.
- The Truman Doctrine - The U.S. response to Soviet military pressure in Greece and Turkey (containment) was an aid package totaling $400,000,000. Within two years, the Greek government succeeded in supressing the communist rebellion in their country, and Turkey managed to resist Soviet demands for bases and territory. Both countries are members of NATO.
- Coup in Czechoslovakia – The United States did nothing (sphere of influence) to prevent a full-scale communist coup in Czechoslovakia. Despite a brief respite from oppressive communist rule in 1968, Czechoslovakia remained a Soviet satellite state under communist rule until 1990.
- The Berlin Blockade – The U.S. chose to fly over the Berlin blockade (containment) and supplied West Berlin by air for 11 months. The Soviets lifted the blockade in May 1949. The Federal Republic of Germany, consisting of the former U.S., French, and British occupational zones, was founded the same year.
- NATO - The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was formed in April 1949, binding 13 European nations, the United States, Canada, and Iceland into a military alliance to deter (contain) communist expansion into Western Europe. The Soviet Union and its allies have not attacked any members of this defensive alliance.

3. Read the "Essay Question for the Unit" worksheet with students. Explain that students can choose one of the following statements as the thesis for the essay:

- The USSR was primarily responsible for starting the Cold War.
- The USSR and the United States and its allies share equal responsibility for starting the Cold War.
- The United States and its allies were primarily responsible for starting the Cold War.

4. Make sure that everyone knows that the essay should have a thesis statement and foreshadowing of arguments in the first paragraph, a main body with at least three paragraphs that explore the three questions to be considered, and a conclusion that restates the thesis, sums up the major arguments, and tells in general why this topic is significant.

5. Go over the four questions/cases that are to serve as arguments to support the main choice of thesis. Make certain that students know which chapters contain pertinent information for which cases. Ask students to review their position papers and homework for each of these cases (question 1 = chapters 1 and 2; question 2 = chapters 6 and 10; question 3 = chapters 7, 8, and 9; and question 4 = chapters 11 and 12). Ask students to choose three questions to research. Students ought to reread the appropriate chapters and write notes on these questions. Check student notes and offer individual conferencing to clarify, encourage, and refocus.

6. Ask students to outline their essays in accordance with the three-part, five-paragraph format provided in the worksheet. If students are less practiced at essay writing, check their outlines before assigning them to write. The teacher might ask for submission of a first draft, which may then be corrected and returned to the students with suggestions for revision. Or students may be divided into editorial groups of two or three in order to read and critique each other's drafts before being asked to produce a final draft. If the latter technique is used, provide students with a list of criteria for essay form, style, and content to serve as the basis for editing. Criteria might include the assigned essay format; recommendations concerning, for instance, use of evidence, logic, and analogy; and a reminder to check for factual acccuracy.

7. Allow students as much class time as needed for them to begin to work productively on this assignment. Thereafter, give them two or three days free from other homework to complete the essay.

Preparations for Chapter 13:

Chapter 13, which is optional, provides information on changes in the USSR and Eastern Europe in the latter part of 1989 and early 1990. With the fast pace of events in this part of the world, teachers will want to provide students with reliable current sources of information. If you plan to use Chapter 13, assign students to read the chapter and answer the identification questions.

CHAPTER 13: GORBACHEV AND THE COLD WAR

Overview:

This chapter explores reform in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe under the policies of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. The chapter begins with a portrayal of the stagnation of the Soviet system in the 1980s. Gorbachev is introduced, and his three main policies – *perestroika* (restructuring of the economy and government), *glasnost* (freer exchange of information and criticism), and "new thinking" (arms cutbacks and accommodations with the West) – are described. The chapter depicts how Eastern European regimes were transformed in response to Gorbachev's encouragement of reform and abandonment of the Brezhnev Doctrine. Gorbachev's difficulties with the independence-minded Baltic Republics, ethnic dissension between Armenians and Azerbaijanis, and Communist Party resistance to economic and political reform are outlined. The chapter ends by raising the question of whether the United States ought to provide military, financial, and technological aid to Gorbachev.

Objectives: At the conclusion of this chapter, students should be able to:

1. Define and give examples of *perestroika*, *glasnost*, and "new thinking" in the USSR.

2. Describe unanticipated changes caused by these policies in the USSR and Eastern Europe.

3. Present arguments as to why the United States should or should not give military, technological, and financial support to Gorbachev's reforms.

Time Required: 1 class period

Materials: Copies of student Chapter 13 for all students

Procedure:

1. Review the assignment from the previous day by briefly discussing the definition/explanation answers and/or quickly checking that students did them. Possible definitions/explanations are:

- "deeply rooted difficulties" – refers to the problems that beset the Soviet Union, including slow economic growth, corruption, and cynicism.
- Soviet standard of living – was falling further and further behind that of the West, accompanied by food shortages, shoddy goods, inefficiency, and discontent.
- Mikhail Gorbachev – Soviet leader who succeeded Konstantin Chernenko as Communist Party General Secretary in 1985 and became aware of how far behind the West the Soviet Union was lagging economically.
- ruinous arms race – Gorbachev came to think of the expensive arms race and global rivalry between the United States and the USSR as ruinous to the Soviet economy.
- *perestroika* – restructuring the Soviet economy by decentralizing decision-making, legalizing cooperative businesses, and allowing peasants to lease land for private cultivation and reforming the Soviet government through purging corrupt Communist Party members and permitting multiple candidate elections.
- *glasnost* – make known what's been hidden; often meant that the media and citizens are encouraged to expose corrupt and inefficient activities of government officials.
- Sakharov – Nobel Prize winner and famous dissident whom Gorbachev invited to become active in Soviet politics.
- "new thinking" – defusing rivalry with the United States and reducing expenditures for weapons and for fomenting revolutions in Third World countries such as Afghanistan.

- astronomically expensive – refers to Gorbachev's belief that a continued arms race would bankrupt the Soviet Union.
- Brezhnev doctrine – belief that the USSR had the right to send troops into Warsaw Pact nations whenever "socialism seemed to be at risk."
- six former communist countries in Eastern Europe – refers to events in 1989-90 that changed the economic and political systems of Poland, Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania.
- formerly independent countries – the Soviet Socialist Republics of Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania were independent countries between 1918 and 1940 and currently threaten to secede from the Soviet Union.
- ethnic hostilities – taking advantage of government permission for more openess, ethnic minorities have resumed age-old conflicts such as the territorial battling between Azerbaijanis and Armenians.
- success or failure of *perestroika* – many of Gorbachev's reforms, such as economic decentralization, are unsuccessful so far; consumers are worse off than before, while workers fear loss of their benefits under communism, such as guaranteed employment.

2. After completing the identification questions, ask students to describe Gorbachev's reforms. Then ask students how the U.S. should respond to the opportunities provided by Gorbachev's reforms. One part of the class may be asked to prepare to argue for cooperation and the other for maintaining pressure on the USSR. These two arguments are summarized below:

The case for cooperation with Gorbachev is that he seems to be making the Soviet Union more democratic and free-market-oriented, while reducing the number of dangerous nuclear weapons. Therefore, the United States should sell Gorbachev high technology to help the Soviets retool their industry and offer the USSR financial aid in hopes that this will enable Gorbachev to create a more decentralized, consumer-driven, capitalist-like economic system. This will help Gorbachev to stay in power to continue his democratizaton of the USSR, set the stage for better relations between the two superpowers, and allow the United States to reduce its expenditures on arms and armies.

The case for maintaining pressure on Gorbachev is that his reforms were largely brought about by the U.S. military build-up of the 1980s. In essence, the arms race has exposed the essential inefficiency, corruption, and injustice of the Soviet system. Basically, Gorbachev cannot reform the USSR economy and government enough to bring about meaningful democratic free-market-oriented change, because his power is founded on the dictatorial control of the Communist Party over Soviet society. Gorbachev's main objective, then, is not to spread democracy, or the free market system, but rather to reform communism, so that it might compete with the West more effiectively. Thus, the United States should maintain pressure through big military budgets, no technological trade, and no financial aid, thereby encouraging Soviet citizens in the long run to totally replace the communist sytem with a free-market democracy.

Students who were uncommitted may be asked to judge which arguments are the best and why they agree with them. Other points to cover in the discussion may refer to George Kennan's argument that the Soviet Union would change if its attempts to gain additional territories were thwarted by persistent counterpressures. Is that what led to Gorbachev's reforms and his new approach to the West? Or did the aggressive American military build-up during the 1980s cause a rollback of communism, as John Foster Dulles had recommended? Or are we now at an historic juncture when the far-ranging cooperation with the Soviet Union that Henry Wallace counseled is at last possible?

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In *The Struggle for the Mastery of Europe* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), A.J.P. Taylor provides general background on the causes of World War I; Barbara Tuchman's *The Guns of August* (New York: Macmillan, 1962) affords a detailed description of the making of the initial stalemate. James L. Stokesbury's *A Short History of World War I* (New York: William Morrow, 1981) is a lively compendium of recent scholarship about that war, while William R. Griffith's *The Great War* (Wayne, NJ: Avery Publishing Group, 1986) offers strategic and tactical battle accounts. Charles L. Mee's *The End of Order: Versailles 1919* (New York: Dutton, 1980) relates the history of the writing of the Versailles Treaty.

Two contrasting day-by-day depictions of the Russian Revolution can be found in Leon Trotsky's *The Russian Revolution* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1959) and Robert V. Daniel's *Red October* (New York: Scribner's, 1967). Donald W. Treadgold's *Twentieth Century Russia* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966) is a useful overview of the Soviet Union in the 1920s and 30s, while Louis Fisher's *The Life of Lenin* (New York: Harper Colophon, 1964), Isaac Deutscher's *The Prophet Unarmed, 1921-1929* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), and Adam Ulam's *Stalin, The Man and His Era* (Boston: Beacon Books, 1989) focus on the lives of significant Soviet politicians of this period. Richard Tucker's *Political Culture and Leadership in Soviet Russia from Lenin to Gorbachev* (New York: Norton, 1987) and Robert Conquest's *The Great Terror* (New York: MacMillan, 1968) yield significant information on the consolidation of communist dictatorship in the USSR, and Franz Borkenau's *World Communism - A History of the Communist International* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962) traces the impact of Soviet politics on the communist parties throughout the world.

There are many accounts of the development of Fascism and National Socialism. Perhaps Ernst Nolte's classic *Three Faces of Fascism* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963) is still the best general analysis of the European fascist phenomenon between the wars. A good general portrait of Mussolini's movement is offered in Alexander De Grand's *Italian Fascism* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1989). Adrian Littleton's *The Seizure of Power* (New York: Scribner's, 1973) covers the establishment of Mussolini's regime, and Denis Mack-Smith's *Italy: A Modern History* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1959) considers the personality of Mussolini and the dynamics of the Fascist movement within the greater context of Italian history. Alan Bullock's *Hitler: A Study in Tyranny* (New York: Harper and Row, 1962) depicts Hitler's rise to power, as does Robert Payne's *The Life and Death of Adolf Hitler* (New York: Popular Library, 1973). Hermann Rauschning's *The Revolution of Nihilism* (New York: Alliance Book Corporation, 1939) is still a compelling examination of National Socialist ideology. An anthology that Nathanael Greene edited, *Fascism* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1968), presents pertinent excerpts from many of the above works.

Chapter 2: Munich: Anatomy of a Crisis

This chapter draws information from sources representing several perspectives on the crisis. The Sudeten/German position is aptly defended in Wenzel Jaksch and Kurt Glazer's *Europe's Road to Potsdam* (New York: 1963). Henri Nogueres, a French journalist, excoriates French policy in *Munich: "A Peace For Our Times"* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1965), while Sir John W. Wheeler-Bennett performs the same operation on British appeasement in *Munich - Prologue to Tragedy* (New York: Viking, 1963). Keith Eubank, on the contrary, spiritedly defends Chamberlain's policy in *Munich* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1963). Many interesting documents related to the crisis are to be found in editor Francis Loewenheim's *Peace or Appeasement?* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), and Telford Taylor engages in a massive reevaluation of the Munich crisis in *Munich: The Price of Peace* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1979).

Chapter 3: Isolationists, Internationalists, and Lend-Lease

As an overview of the war, B.H. Liddell Hart's *History of the Second World War* (New York: Putnam's, 1971) is indispensable, as is John Keegan's *The Second World War* (New York: Viking, 1989). A more specific account of Germany's attack on Poland is rendered in Nicholas Bethell's *The War Hitler Won* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972), while the French debacle is analyzed in Marc Bloch's memorable *Strange Defeat* (New York: Norton 1968). As an insider's somewhat self-serving account of the early European conflict, Winston Churchill's *The Second World War* (London: Cassell, 1948-54) is recommended. A recent publication that is certain to become a classic work on the Luftwaffe assault on the British Isles is *The Battle of Britain*, by Richard Hough and Denis Richards (New York: Norton, 1989).

A context for the Lend-Lease controversy is provided by Robert Dalleck's *Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979). Isolationist opposition to American entry into World War II is explored in Wayne S. Cole's *America First: The Battle Against Intervention, 1940-41* (Madison: Wisconsin University Press, 1953) and *Charles A. Lindbergh and the Battle Against American Intervention in World War II* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1974). Warren F. Kimball offers a monograph specifically focused on the controversy in *The Most Unsordid Act: Lend Lease, 1939-1941* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1969).

Chapter 4: World War II and Japanese-American Relocation

As background on Japan's rise as a world power, W.G. Beasley's *The Modern History of Japan* (New York: Praeger, 1967) is recommended, as is John Toland's *The Rising Sun* (New York: Random House, 1970). Herbert Feis provides important information on the Japan-United States diplomatic relationship in *The Road to Pearl Harbor* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1950). Perhaps no one has as exhaustively researched the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor itself as George W. Prange and associates, whose *At Dawn We Slept* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1981) is the first in a trilogy, including *Pearl Harbor* and *December 7, 1941*, on that pivotal event. In addition, Walter Lord's *Day of Infamy* (New York: Bantam Books, 1958) is a popular and highly readable, if not always historically accurate account of the Pearl Harbor attack.

Many books have been written about the relocation of Japanese-Americans during World War II. Richard Drinnon's *Keeper of Concentration Camps: Dillon S. Myer and American Racism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987) is particularly searing. E.H. Spicer's *Impounded People: Japanese Americans in the Relocation Centers* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946) and Alan R. Bosworth's *America's Concentration Camps* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1967) also tell this story.

Chapter 5: War in Europe

For an overview of the desert struggle, see W.G.F. Jackson's *The Battle for North Africa, 1940-43* (New York: Mason Charter, 1975). Wolf Heckman's *Rommel's War in Africa* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1981) surveys the field of battle from the German general's perspective, while Ronald Lewin's *Montgomery as Military Commander* (New York: Stein and Day, 1971) focuses on the British general's view of the desert war. Frederick Majdalany's *The Battle of El Alamein, Fortress in the Sand* (New York: Lippincott, 1965) portrays the climactic clash between the forces these two generals commanded. G.A. Shepperd's *The Italian Campaign, 1943-45* (New York: Praeger, 1968) follows the Anglo-American invasion of Italy from Sicily to the foothills of the Alps, and F.W. Deakin's *The Brutal Friendship* (New York: Harper and Row, 1962) chronicles the collapse of Mussolini's fascist regime under internal dissension and Allied blows.

Alexander Werth's *Russia at War, 1941-45* (London: Barrie and Rockcliff, 1964) presents a panoramic sweep of the struggle in the East. More particularly, Bryan I. Fugate's *Operation Barbarossa* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1984) describes the initial Axis advance into the USSR, while William Craig's *Enemy at the Gates* (New York: Reader's Digest Press, 1973) tells the tale of the first decisive Soviet victory over the Wehrmacht.

The strategy and planning of the D Day landings are well depicted in Anthony Cave Brown's *Bodyguard of Lies* (Toronto: Bantam Books, 1978). John Keegan offers soldiers' perspectives of different stages of the Normandy campaign in *Six Armies in Normandy* (New York: Viking Press, 1982). Finally, the temporary Allied reversal of the Battle of the Bulge is related by Charles B. MacDonald in *The Time for Trumpets* (New York: William Morrow, 1985).

Chapter 6: The Yalta Conference

Athan Theoharis' *The Yalta Myth* (St. Louis: University of Missouri Press, 1970) provides a blow-by-blow description of the conference; in *Decisions at Yalta* (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1986) Richard D. Buhite painstakingly reviews the agreement reached. Diane Shaver Clemens' *Yalta* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970) uses the tools of political science to analyze the negotiations and resolutions of the conference. She also raises an interesting and not often considered question, whether the U.S. lived up to all the commitments it made at the conference. Teachers who would prefer a less extensive review of the conference should consult Richard Fenno's *The Yalta Conference* (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, 1955 and 1972). Fenno's volume contains documents relating to the conference, provides background information, and relates favorable and critical assessments of the conference by notable historians. A less complete but very useful symposium is available in Daniel M. Smith's *Major Problems in American Diplomatic History* (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, 1964). Accounts of the Yalta Conference by conservative, anti-communist historians were authored by Chester Wilmot in *The Struggle for Europe* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1952) and William H. Chamberlain in *America's Second Crusade* (New York: Henry Regnery Company, 1950). Accounts by orthodox and leftist revisionists can be found in books by the Kolkos, Herbert Feis, and John Lewis Gaddis cited in Chapters 9 and 10.

Chapters 7 and 8: The Decision to Drop the Bomb and The Bomb, Part II

Two volumes stand out as general histories of the struggle between Japan and the Allies: John Costello's *The Pacific War* (London: Collins, 1981) and Ronald H. Spector's *Eagle Against the Sun* (New York: Macmillan, 1985). Samuel Eliot Morrison's *The Two Ocean War* (Boston: Little Brown, 1963) contains concise accounts of the major naval battles in the Pacific. There also exists a rich literature on specific battles, such as Robert E. Lee's *Victory at Guadalcanal* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1981) and Richard Wheeler's *Iwo* (New York: Lippincott and Crowell, 1980). John W. Dower's *War Without Mercy* (New York: Pantheon, 1986) examines the disturbing role race played in the conduct of both Japan's and America's war effort. Leon V. Sigal's *Fighting to a Finish* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988) explores American and Japanese decision-making leading up to Japan's surrender.

Many authors have investigated the development of the atomic bomb and its use against Japan. Richard Rhodes' *The Making of the Atomic Bomb* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986) is probably the most detailed depiction of the Manhattan Project. Additionally, Peter Wyden has written a history of the making and use of the atomic bomb that is rich in oral history in *Day One* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984). Two semi-official histories are Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson Jr.'s *A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission*, Volume I: *The New World, 1939-46* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1962) and Margaret Gowing's *Britain and Atomic Energy, 1939-45* (London: Macmillan, 1964). For a presentation of the revisionist's critique of Truman's decision, see Gar Alperovitz's *Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam* (New York: Viking Penguin, 1985) and Martin J. Sherwin's *A World Destroyed: Hiroshima and the Origins of the Arms Race* (New York: Random House, 1987). Their views are not shared by traditionalist Herbert Feis in *The Atomic Bomb and the End of the War* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966). Richard W. Fogg and George F. Pollock (eds.) in *The Limits of War: National Policy and World Conscience* (Middletown, CT: American Education Publications, 1970) offer an accessible survey of thought about nuclear diplomacy. The religious dimension of nuclear stratregy is presented by Paul Ramsey in *The Limits of Nuclear War: Thinking About the Do-Able and the Undo-Able* (New York: The Council on Religion and International Affairs, 1963). For a description of the damage done to Hiroshima, see the Pacific Research Society's *The Day Man Lost* (Tokyo: Kodansha International Ltd., 1972). John Hershey's *Hiroshima* (New York: Bantam Books, 1985). Robert J. Lifton's *Death in Life: Survivors of Hiroshima* (New York: Vantage

Books, 1970), and lastly Charles W. Bailey and Fletcher Knebel's *No High Ground* (New York: Harper and Row, 1960).

Chapter 9: Ban the Bomb? The Impasse Over Nuclear Disarmament

The Baruch Plan is discussed in Bernard Baruch's *Baruch, The Public Years* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960) and in David Lilienthal's *Journals*. Volume II: *The Atomic Energy Years, 1945-1950* (New York: Harper and Row, 1964). An opposing view to the official U.S. account can be found in P.M.S. Blackett's *Fear, War, and the Bomb* (New York: Whittlesey House, 1949) and Bernard B. Bechhoefer's *Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control* (Washington: Brookings Institute, 1961). Gabriel and Joyce Kolko in *The Limits of Power, The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-54* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972) argue that neither the U.S. government nor Baruch wanted the talks on the Brauch Plan to succeed. Also see the previously cited work by Hewlett and Anderson.

Chapter 10: From Wartime Allies to Cold War Enemies

A great deal has been written on the breakdown of the Grand Alliance from three different points of view: the anti-communist case that the United States and Britain emboldened the Soviets by failing to stand up to them; the orthodox-traditionalist case that the United States did what it could to assuage the fears of the Soviet Union, but that the Soviets did not keep their word and thus were responsible for the collapse of the Grand Alliance; and the revisionist case that the United States and the Western democracies, driven by ulterior economic and geopolitical motives, alienated the Soviets. The anti-communist position is ably stated by William H. Chamberlain and Chester Wilmot in their previously cited work. The orthodox-traditionalist case is made by Herbert Feis in *From Trust to Terror: The Onset of the Cold War, 1945-1950* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1970). Walter LaFeber's *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1966* (New York: John Wiley and Sons Inc., 1968) adopts a mildly revisionist view. Other revisionist interpretations include William A. Williams' *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (New York: Delta, 1972), Gabriel and Joyce Kolko's work, Daniel H. Yergin's *The Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977), and D.F. Fleming's *The Cold War and Its Origins* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1961). Robert J. Maddox's *The New Left and the Origins of the Cold War* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1973) launches an attack on several of these revisionist historians by documenting what he claims are their pervasive misuses of source materials. Finally, John Lewis Gaddis' *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-47* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972) takes a revisionist position on economic issues but argues that other factors were of equal import in causing the Cold War.

Chapters 11 and 12: Years of Decision and Solutions to Five Crises

Sources for the views expressed by Henry Wallace on sphere of influence, by George F. Kennan on containment, and by John Foster Dulles on massive retaliation can be found respectively in John Morton Blum's *The Price of Vision: The Diary of Henry Wallace, 1942-46* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973); an article by Kennan (but published under the pseudonym Mr. X) in *Foreign Affairs* XXV (July 1947) entitled "The Sources of Soviet Conduct"; and an article in *Life Magazine* XXII (May 19, 1952), entitled "A Policy of Boldness." An excellent explanation of both Kennan's and Dulles' thinking is presented by John Lewis Gaddis in *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American Security Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982). Henry Wallace's thoughts on U.S. global strategy may be examined in greater detail in Samuel J. Walker's *Henry Wallace and American Foreign Policy* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1976). For further information on Kennan, see Walter Hixson's *George F. Kennan - Cold War Iconoclast* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987). John Foster Dulles set forth his position on relations with the USSR in *War or Peace* (New York: Macmillan, 1950).

Previously cited works by Feis, Fleming, and the Kolkos touch on the five crises discussed in this chapter. It would be particularly interesting for teachers to compare Feis and the Kolkos on the 1948 coup in Czechoslovakia. Harry S. Truman's *Memoirs*, Volume I: *Years of Decision* (New York: Doubleday, 1955) and Volume II: *Years of Trial and Hope* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1956), are particularly informative as to Truman's thinking about these crises. Theodore White's *Fire in the Ashes* (New York: Sloane, 1953) is good on the need for the Marshall Plan, while Michael Hogan's *The Mar-*

shall Plan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) provides a detailed account of this program. Joseph M. Jones, *Fifteen Weeks* (New York: Viking, 1955) is an excellent study of policies leading to the Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine. A more focused exploration of the development of the Truman Doctrine can be found in Howard Jones' *A New Kind of War: America's Global Strategy and the Truman Doctrine in Greece* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989). In *The Anatomy of Communist Takeovers*, edited by Thomas T. Hammond (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975), Pavel Tigrid describes "The Prague Coup of 1948." Lucius Clay's *Decision in Germany* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1950) and Ann and John Tusa's *The Berlin Blockade* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1988) are two of a number of good books on the confrontation over Berlin.

Chapter 13: Gorbachev and the Cold War

This chapter is primarily the product of research in such journals as *The Washington Quarterly*, *Foreign Affairs*, and *Daedalus*. However, some extraordinary recent scholarship on Gorbachev's reforms and their impact is also available in hardcover. For an overview of Gorbachev's reforms, Basile Kerblay's *Gorbachev's Russia* (New York: Pantheon, 1989) is useful, as is Robert O. Crummey's *Reform in Russia and the USSR* (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1989). Essential background to the recent transformation in Eastern Europe is available in Wesley Shoemaker's *The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, 1989* (Washington, DC: Stryker Post Publications, 1989). Mikhail Gorbachev himself shares some admittedly formative thoughts on this reforms in *Perestroika* (New York: Harper and Row, 1987). Lastly, the implications to U.S. foreign policy of Gorbachev's reforms are explored in editor William G. Miller's *Toward a More Civil Society? The USSR Under Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev* (New York: Harper and Row, 1989) and *The New Detente: Rethinking East-West Relations*, edited by Mark Kaldor, Gerard Holden, and Richard Falk (New York: The United Nations University, 1989).

CHAPTER 1: THE RISE OF THE DICTATORS

Light reflected off the mirrored wall along which the victorious Allied heads of state sat. More than a thousand diplomats, soldiers, secretaries, and reporters filled the vast hall. It was mid afternoon, June 28, 1919, at the Palace of Versailles, just outside Paris. President Wilson of the United States, Prime Minister Lloyd George of Britain, and Premier Clemenceau of France waited for the German representatives to arrive.

At 2:45, Dr. Hermann Muller and Dr. Johannes Bell entered the Hall of Mirrors. Muller and Bell listened tensely to the aged Clemenceau's reminders about Germany's obligations. Then they stepped forward to sign the treaty on the small table in the center of the room. As the Allied representatives lined up to put their own signatures on the document, cannon salutes and cheering crowds would be heard. World War I was finally over!

Woodrow Wilson

Many hoped the Treaty of Versailles would bring a lasting peace. Yet, in less than 15 years, the treaty's flaws would contribute to the rise of militant dictators in the heart of Europe. The question posed by this chapter is: How should the Western democracies – the United States, Britain, and France – respond to this challenge?

The Flawed Peace

World War I – or the Great War as it was known at the time – had begun in August 1914. Territorial rivalry, militarism, national pride, and secret alliances had poisoned relations among Europe's most powerful nations. Thus, when Archduke Francis Ferdinand, heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, was assassinated, national leaders responded aggressively. Their miscalculations quickly led to a continental struggle that pitted Germany, Turkey, Bulgaria, and Austria-Hungry (the Central Powers) against France, Russia, Britain, and, finally, Italy and the United States (the Allied Powers).

During four years of brutal warfare in Europe, Asia, and Africa, 30 million soldiers were killed or wounded and hundreds of billions of dollars were spent. By the fall of 1918, Austria-Hungary was in a state of revolutionary disintegration. Moreover, the German army could no longer simultaneously defeat Allied attacks in the field and put down unrest in the streets. The German Kaiser (emperor) gave up his throne; on November 11, 1918, Germany asked the Allies for an armistice, or end to the war.

There was, however, much cause of unhappiness with the peace agreed to at Versailles. The Central Powers had been led to believe that the peace terms would be based on President Wilson's Fourteen Points for World Peace. This January 1918 proposal called for universal disarmament, international justice, and the self-determination of national peoples. In fact, however, the treaty imposed on

the new German democratic government at Versailles did not reflect the principles of the Fourteen Points. Rather, Germany alone was blamed for the war and punished accordingly.

Among other nations angry at the treaty's terms were Italy and Russia. Despite heavy wartime losses and large debts, Italy was denied both significant territorial gains and colonies. The Russian government was not even invited to Versailles.

World War I had smashed the philosophical, political, and territorial stability of Europe, and the inequitable Treaty of Versailles simply was an inadequate means of repairing the damage. In short order, Russia, Italy, and Germany, the biggest losers at Versailles, were in the hands of dictators who threatened Europe's peace.

Revolutionary Russia

The Russian Empire was the first state of the old order to be undermined by the war. Military defeat, economic hardship, and government mismanagement sowed discontent throughout Russia during the winter of 1916. Political opponents of Tsar Nicholas II took advantage of widespread strikes and mutinies. On March 12, 1917, they overthrew the monarchy. A Constituent (constitution-writing) Assembly was to be elected in the fall to consider long-delayed reforms, such as land redistribution. Meanwhile, the Provisional Government, led by lawyer Alexander Kerensky, who became prime minister in July, held the reins of power in Petrograd and resisted pressure to take Russia out of World War I.

Many Russians believed that social and political reform should be enacted right away. The national council of worker and soldier organizations (the Petrograd Soviet) thought that the Provisional Government ought to end the war immediately. A veteran revolutionary, Vladimir Illych Lenin, returned to Russia in April 1917. His April Theses sought to capitalize on impatience with the Provisional Government. He advocated giving peace to Russia, land to the peasants, control of factories to workers, independence to the nationalities, and political power to the soviets. Lenin headed the Bolshevik (Majority Socialist) Party, a dedicated group of professional revolutionaries. The Bolsheviks exploited the general discontent to undermine the authority of the Provisional Government. On November 6, 1917, Lenin's supporters were able to seize control of Petrograd almost without bloodshed.

Lenin immediately went to work to consolidate Bolshevik control of Russia, renamed the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. He issued decrees that nationalized land, banks, and factories. On March 15, 1918, Lenin's government signed a treaty with Germany. According to the harsh terms of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and Finland (one-fifth of Russia) became independent states. Supported by the Allied Powers, enemies of the Bolshevik (now the Communist) Party began a long civil war to unseat Lenin. The communist government struck back by suppressing all other parties, murdering the Tsar, and founding a secret police force to terrorize opponents. Lenin also set up the Communist International (Comintern), a worldwide organization of parties that worked for socialist revolution.

Stalin, one of Lenin's lieutenants, was born Joseph Dzhugashvili in 1879 in Caucasian Georgia. Through ruthless determination, he had risen to the post of General Secretary of the Communist Party by the time of Lenin's death in 1924. Lenin never named a successor to head the USSR, and Stalin lost no time in using his party influence to advance his cause. By 1929, he succeeded in expelling most of the old Bolshevik leaders from the Communist Party. As sponsor of the Comintern, Stalin helped promote his supporters within the international communist movement. Through state-controlled media, Stalin reinforced his authority with propaganda that glorified his personal achievements and character. The party, the army, the government, and ordinary citizens were subject to purges: literally millions were arrested for offenses against the state, tried with little fairness, and executed or deported to labor camps.

Stalin justified his methods by claiming that the Soviet Union had only a limited time to prepare for invasion by hostile capitalist nations. Thus, in 1928 he launched a series of five-year plans. These were nationally organized efforts to modernize agriculture and develop heavy industry. New dams, canals,

coal mines, steel mills, and factories were established throughout the USSR to provide for the national defense. Peasants were forced to join collective farms that used mechanization in order to increase production. In the meantime, Soviet diplomats labored to fashion defensive alliances for the USSR. National communist parties actively supported this Soviet foreign policy by seeking to form political coalitions with democratic parties. Mistrusting communist motives, however, many Western politicians were reluctant to cooperate.

Italy Under Mussolini

World War I had a contradictory effect on Italy. Although Italy had fought on the victors' side, Italians felt defeated by the Treaty of Versailles. Despite Italy's heavy casualties, the Allies had failed to deliver on agreements made earlier. Italy was denied promised territory on the coast of Yugoslavia. Consequently, many nationalist Italians became disillusioned with their wartime democratic political leadership.

In 1919, demobilization of Italy's army and the sudden collapse of military purchasing contributed to a postwar recession, or economic downturn. With prices and unemployment at unprecedented heights, the situation of the average worker was desperate. Inspired by the success of the Bolshevik Revolution, employees staged sit-down strikes in factories, and peasants seized many great estates. Fearing social revolution, employers backed anti-socialist squads, composed of ex-soldiers, nationalists, and property owners. These squads suppressed the unrest by attacking union meetings, burning radical presses, and threatening dissident workers and their supporters. They called themselves *Fasci di Combattimento* (Combat Groups). This name came from the Latin word *fascio*, the bundle of sticks with an ax blade that had been a Roman symbol of authority.

Benito Mussolini, an ex-socialist, was a founder of the Fascist movement. Born in 1883, the son of a socialist blacksmith, Mussolini grew up within the socialist movement. His ambition and opportunism had won him editorship of *Avanti*, the main newspaper of Italian socialism, before his 30th birthday. In 1914, Mussolini's backing of Italian intervention in the war on the Allied side brought about his ouster from his socialist party posts.

Ever resourceful, Mussolini turned to nationalists and Allied agents for money to finance a new pro-intervention newspaper. Claiming that Fascism was the way of the 20th century, Mussolini in 1919 became a spokesman for anti-revolutionary Italian nationalism. He railed against Allied false promises concerning Fiume and the Yugoslavian coastal islands. He offered a nationalist alternative to Soviet-inspired communist revolution. After years of street warfare against socialists and democrats alike, Mussolini led a march on Rome. In November 1922, he was granted dictatorial power to "restore order."

Although Mussolini promised Italians the best of governments, only the wealthy, the connected, and the military thrived under Fascist rule. Still, to retain power, Mussolini had to offer some hope to the poor, as well as a goal for Fascist activists. He met this political and economic need by demanding a "place in the sun" for his country. Italy's problems of overpopulation and underdevelopment would be solved, he claimed, when the Italian military conquered a new Roman Empire. After establishing dictatorial control of Italy in the 1920s, Mussolini turned toward this goal. December 1934 saw the beginning of the Italian campaign to annex Ethiopia. In 1936, Italy sent troops to help military and conservative forces overthrow the Spanish Republic. In 1937, Mussolini visited the Italian colony of Libya to encourage Moslems to take up arms in French- and British-dominated Arab countries. Thus, to maintain the momentum of fascism and to gain access to colonial markets and resources, Mussolini seemed bent on wars of empire.

Germany and National Socialism

Germany had been the biggest loser in World War I. The German armed forces had suffered almost 6 million casualties, and the country was on the verge of starvation as a result of the Allied blockade. By 1919, workers were revolting in Berlin and Munich. Most Germans were infuriated with the Versailles Treaty. By signing the treaty, Germany lost its air force, surrendered most of its navy and merchant marine to Britain, and agreed to maintain a tiny army. Germany also gave up land to the new

state of Poland and to France. Britain and Japan claimed its colonies in Africa and Asia. The Saar basin was to be occupied by France and the Rhineland would be demilitarized for 15 years. In addition, Germany had accepted responsibility for starting the war and was to pay 30 billion dollars in reparations.

For Adolf Hitler, in contrast, World War I had been a time of great opportunity. Born in Linz, Austria, into the family of a customs official, Hitler failed to realize his youthful ambition to enter art school. Alternately beaten by his domineering father and fussed over by his sentimental mother, Hitler blamed others for his problems. In his early adulthood, he lived a directionless life, working as a day laborer in Vienna. When World War I was declared, Hitler's fortunes changed. He joined the German Army and served as an infantry corporal in the trenches in France, where he won an Iron Cross. At war's end, Hitler worked with German army intelligence in Munich. In that capacity, he was sent to investigate a meeting of the National Socialist (Nazi) German Worker Party. Instead, he became a Nazi party member, discovering his ability to tap into an audience's fears and hopes through dramatic oratory.

To many Germans, Hitler had a compelling message. He told veterans that they had not lost the war: rather they had been stabbed in the back by the "November criminals" who overthrew the Kaiser and established the German Republic. He informed middle-class people, worried about financial instability, that Jewish bankers and businessmen were responsible for their economic woes and ought to be expelled from Germany. Factory owners were assured an end to their labor problems by violent Nazi suppression of "Bolshevik-inspired" unionists. German patriots were promised not only the regaining of all "lost territory," but also the conquest of "living space" in the east. Always Hitler hit upon his main theme – that all of Germany's problems were attributable to an international Jewish conspiracy. Only Hitler and the Nazis could save the Fatherland.

On November 8, 1923, Hitler attempted to overthrow the Bavarian state government in Munich. His coup failed when police opened fire on his followers. Hitler emerged from less than a year in prison with a startlingly frank book, *Mein Kampf* (My Struggle), in which he laid out his philosophy and plan of action. He also had resolved not to repeat his mistake of attempting a premature rebellion. Instead, he would destroy democracy by democratic means, winning over voters in order to install a Nazi government.

During the relatively prosperous years of 1924-1929, Hitler was unable to obtain his objective. Once the Great Depression hit Germany in 1930, however, many Germans were drawn to National Socialism. Still, the Nazis never won a majority in any national election. Conservative politicians, nonetheless, supported Hitler's elevation to the office of chancellor (prime minister) on January 30th, 1933, thinking they could control him. They were sorely mistaken.

In short order, Hitler and the Nazis consolidated their power. In February 1933, Nazi agents secretly set fire to the Reichstag (Germany's Congress) building and blamed German communists for the deed. Constitutional rights then were suspended, and Hitler was granted the authority to make laws by the Enabling Act. By 1934, the Nazi revolution was complete. All German state governments had been abolished. The civil service was rapidly purged of all anti-Nazis. The National Socialist Party was declared the only legal political party in Germany. Independent unions were forced to join the Nazi Labor Front, and concentration camps were built for Hitler's opponents. In 1935, the Nuremberg Laws persecuted and isolated German Jews. Jews were deprived of their right to vote and were forbidden to marry non-Jews. Soon, they would lose their right to engage in law, medicine, and business in general.

Also in 1935, Hitler denounced the Versailles arms limits, and Germany began a campaign to rebuild its military forces. German factories mass-produced planes, tanks, and ships. Hitler started to draft young men for military service. This campaign began to pay off one year later, when German troops reoccupied the Rhineland in defiance of the Versailles Treaty. In 1936, the new German air force was dispatched as "volunteers" to Spain to back conservatives in that country's Civil War. By 1937, then, Hitler held nearly absolute power in Germany and seemed poised for international confrontation to revoke the Versailles settlement and, perhaps, seek other objectives as well.

Dilemma for the Western Democracies

The rise of Stalin, Mussolini, and Hitler created serious problems for the leaders of the Western democracies. It became increasingly evident that these dictators were preparing to challenge the status quo in Europe. Would it be wise to be conciliatory and yield to those claims of the dictators that seemed just? Or would compromise only whet their appetites for conquest and disruption? Should the democracies instead band together and respond aggressively to every challenge? Or would this policy serve only to force the democracies into senseless wars in defense of distant lands and "undeserving" people? That was the decision that faced British, French, and American politicians in 1937.

Chapter Questions

1. Identify or define and briefly tell the importance to this chapter of each of the following:
    - Hall of Mirrors
    - Francis Ferdinand
    - Fourteen Points
    - Provisional Government
    - Brest-Litovsk
    - General Secretary
    - five-year plan
    - *Fasci di Combattimento*
    - "place in the sun"
    - 6 million casualties
    - 30 billion dollars
    - dramatic oratory
    - Jewish conspiracy
    - Enabling Act
    - Nuremberg Laws
    - Rhineland
2. Compare and contrast two of the three dictators discussed in the chapter in terms of background, philosophy, goals, and tactics.
3. Imagine that it is 1937 and you are a British, French, or American leader. What should you do about the rise of the Communist USSR, Fascist Italy, and National Socialist Germany in 1937? Advocate a strategy and give reasons why yours is the best course.

EUROPE IN THE 1930s

On the map below, locate and label the following places:

Albania
Algeria
Austria
Belgium
Bulgaria
Czechoslovakia
Denmark
Egypt
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Great Britain (including Northern Ireland)
Greece
Hungary
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Latvia
Lebanon
Libya
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Morocco
Netherlands
Norway
Palestine
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Syria
Tunisia
Turkey
USSR
Yugoslavia

Arctic Ocean
Atlantic Ocean
Baltic Sea
Black Sea
Bosporus
English Channel
Mediterranean Sea
North Sea

Alps
Apennines
Atlas Mountains
Balkan Mountains
Caucasus Mountains
Kasserine Pass
Sudeten Mountains
Ural Mountains

Ardennes Forest

CHAPTER 2: MUNICH: ANATOMY OF A CRISIS

September 28, 1938, "Black Wednesday," dawned on a frightened Europe. Since the spring, Adolf Hitler had spoken often about the Sudetenland, the western part of Czechoslovakia. Many of the 3 million German-speaking people who lived there had complained that they were being badly mistreated by the Czechs and Slovaks. Cooperating closely with Sudeten Nazis, Hitler, at first, simply demanded that the Czech government give the German-speakers within their borders political autonomy (self-government). Now he had upped the ante. If the Czechs did not hand the Sudetenland to him by October 1, 1938, he would order his well-armed and trained soldiers to attack Czechoslovakia, destroy its army, and seize the Sudetenland.

Since France had a treaty to defend the Czechs and the British had a treaty with France, war could break out over all of Europe on October 1, 1938. Moreover, this war could give the USSR an excuse to bring its armies into central Europe. The USSR had a treaty with Czechoslovakia to defend it against an attack by Germany. Thus, if Britain decided to back the French and their Czech allies, an unpredictable and potentially ruinous war could break out immediately. If Britain backed away from confronting Hitler over the Sudetenland, his plan to use the threat of war to win concessions and territory would have succeeded. What should Britain do?

Background to the Crisis

The clash between Germany and Czechoslovakia over the Sudetenland had its origins in the Versailles Treaty of 1919. For 300 years, both the Czech and Slovak peoples had lived under the control of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. During World War I, many Czech and Slovak nationalists had fought with the Allies against Austria-Hungary. Thus, when the Austro-Hungarian Empire was broken up by the Allies at Versailles, Eduard Benes was there to make sure that the Czech and Slovak peoples were rewarded with their own country.

Benes wanted the new state of Czechoslovakia to be as independent as possible. Thus, to provide Czechoslovakia with access to the Danube River trade route, Benes insisted that stretches of Hungary be added to his new country in the south. Czechoslovakian industry's fuel demands were met by claiming Polish coal mines to the north. Because Czechoslovakia needed a defensible Western frontier, Benes arranged for the annexation of the German-speaking Sudeten Mountain region.



The Strategic Location of the Sudetenland

The 3,000,000 Sudetenlanders – 15 percent of the Czechoslovak population – had from the 1920s expressed unhappiness with their situation. Once the dominant group in Austria-Hungary, they did not like their minority status and felt the government favored the Czechs and Slovaks. At first, their complaints were ineffective because the Sudeten Germans gave their support to many different political parties. With the rise of Adolf Hitler in Germany in 1933, however, the Sudeten Germany Party (SDP) began to use Nazi finances, methods, and ideology to unite the majority of German-speakers in the region. Konrad Henlein, a gymnastics instructor, led the SDP in its campaign against the Czech government. His Karlsbad Program called for self-government for German-speakers and all other minorities, abandonment of all Czechoslovak defense treaties, and Czech cooperation with the German Reich. President Benes refused to negotiate with Henlein and tried to suppress SDP propaganda and activities as a threat to the existence of Czechoslovakia.

Hitler Intervenes

In *Mein Kampf*, Adolf Hitler wrote about his hatred of the Versailles Treaty and his ambition to unite all Germans under his leadership. Indeed, many statesmen agreed that Germany had been unfairly treated at Versailles and were sympathetic to Nazi complaints about the division of former German land among other nations. Upon coming to power in Germany, Hitler had embarked on an ambitious program to rearm Germany and revise the Versailles settlement. In 1936, his troops had marched into the demilitarized Rhineland province of Germany on the French border. In March 1938, he had sent the German army into Austria to force the holding of an election on German-Austrian unification. This election, administered by Nazi officials, finalized the Anschluss, Austria's inclusion in the Third Reich. Now in May 1938, Hitler began to demand that Czechoslovakia accept the SDP's Karlsbad Program or face German intervention. In September, Hitler increased the severity of the crisis by telling Premier Benes that he no longer trusted the Czechoslovak government's intentions. Now, as protector of the German people, he told Benes to turn the Sudetenlands over to Germany or face the consequences.

Facing a German deadline of October 1, 1938, Benes agreed to grant limited self-rule to the Sudetenland. However, his government refused to comply with German conditions: that Czechoslovakia hand the Sudetenland over to the Reich and drop all its treaties with powers hostile to Germany. Benes noted that Hitler's mistreatment of German Jews gave him little moral right to criticize Czech policy toward the minority Sudetenlanders.

Fearful of German expansion, the USSR promised the Czechs its support. Because Poland and Romania refused to permit the Red Army to cross their territory, however, that support could only come from the Soviet air force. On the one hand, France had to face the possibility of going to war with Germany with no hope of directly aiding its Czech ally six hundred miles away. On the other hand, should the French government not back up Czechoslovakia, France would lose the kingpin of its anti-German alliance system in Eastern Europe.

The French would certainly not consider war with Germany without the backing of their British allies. Yet this meant that Britain might be dragged into a war over Czechoslovakia, a country with which it had neither political nor trade ties. Thus, as the Germany Army mobilized on September 28, the British military was on alert, civilians dug air raid shelters, and children were evacuated from London. Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain expressed the nation's fearfulness and sense of unreality in a radio address that began, "How horrible, how fantastic, how incredible it is that we should be digging trenches and trying on gas masks because of a quarrel in a far-away country between people of whom we know nothing."

Preparations for Munich

Then Mussolini proposed a last-minute conference in Munich. He, Hitler, Daladier of France, and Chamberlain of Britain were to meet on September 29 to try to solve the crisis. Conspicuously excluded were Stalin of the USSR and Czech President Benes. At the conference, the position of Britain was of key importance. France's backing of Czechoslovakia in a war against Germany essentially hinged on maintenance of the Anglo-French alliance. Therefore, the instructions of the British delegation would in effect determine the results of the conference.

Two schools of strategic thought debated these instructions. Chamberlain, a Manchester businessman before he went into politics, believed he could come to terms with Hitler. His appeasement faction would advise the delegation to avoid war by persuading the Czechs to give the Sudetenland, which was after all German, to the Reich. Chamberlain argued that President Benes had already agreed to most of the SDP's, and Germany's, terms. In fact, Hitler promised that the Sudetenland would be his last territorial demand in Europe.

The son of an aristocratic family and ex-commander of the Navy, Winston Churchill headed the stand-fast faction. He wanted the delegation to offer full backing to France and urged Czechoslovakia to stand up to Germany. Hitler's actions over the past five years indicated that war with Germany was, sooner or later, inevitable. By backing Czechoslovakia now, Britain had the advantage of fighting for a good cause, with willing allies.

The question was: Which faction should give the instructions to the British delegation to the Munich Conference?

Appeasement vs. Standing Fast

In deciding which set of instructions to give the Munich delegation, British statesmen had to consider the strategic situation in Europe. In terms of raw strength, opposing sides would appear to be about equal. Czechoslovakia had an army of 30 divisions (1 division = 10,000 soldiers), an advanced weapons industry in the Sudetenland (the Skoda works), and a 1500-plane airforce. France could field 100 divisions behind its fortified border (the Maginot Line) with Germany. Because of geography, however, none of these troops would be able to directly reinforce the Czechs. Britain could immediately promise France no more than 150 planes, two non-motorized divisions, and support of the Royal Navy. Against this force, Germany could muster a standing army of 40 divisions, the most modern and well-equipped in Europe, with triple that number of reserves. Because of the distrust of Poland and Romania, which would not permit Red Army troops to cross their territories, the best the USSR could offer Benes was the use of 1000 Soviet planes and pilots.

The strategic importance of Czechoslovakia to Britain hinged on more than military statistics. The British government had no traditional relationship or ties with Czechoslovakia, but the British armed forces were responsible for defending both Britain and its worldwide empire. France was Britain's main ally against Germany, and the fortifications in the Sudeten Mountains of Czechoslovakia were the key strong point in the French alliance system opposing Germany in the east. Indeed, the Germany Army General Staff estimated that it would take three months to smash these fortifications.

British, French, and German statesmen all believed that the USSR was not above trying to cause a war in Western Europe that would lead to widespread communist revolution. Likewise, statesmen feared that once the Red Army entered central Europe, it would never leave. Conversely, the Soviet Union was eager to make alliances to limit German expansionism. Yet Stalin was beginning to fear that France and Britain were willing to appease Hitler in order to encourage him to advance on the USSR. Some advised Stalin to make his own best deal with Hitler.

For Appeasement

However much we may sympathize with a small nation confronted by a big and powerful neighbor, we cannot in all circumstances undertake to involve the whole British Empire in a war simply on her account. If we have to fight, it must be on a larger issue than that.[1]

Prime Minister Chamberlain

For Standing Fast

There is a price at which peace of any kind can generally be preserved, for the most militant aggressor will hardly resort to actual war, if he can secure his most outrageous aims by mere threat....To buy off the bully by capitulation [giving in] to his demands leaves might still triumphant over right....To some of us, peace so secured seems more immoral than war.[2]

G.M. Gathorne-Hardy

Chapter Questions

1. Identify or define and briefly tell the importance to this chapter of each of the following:
    - "Black Wednesday"
    - Versailles Treaty
    - Eduard Benes
    - Sudetenland
    - Konrad Henlein
    - Karlsbad Program
    - Anschluss
    - October 1, 1938
    - "digging trenches"
    - Neville Chamberlain
    - last territorial demand
    - Winston Churchill
    - 30 divisions
    - Maginot Line
    - widespread communist revolution
2. Describe the issue creating conflict between Germany and Czechoslovakia.
3. Prepare instructions for the British delegation to the Munich Four-Power Conference. Give at least three reasons to support your instructions, which may be either of the following:
    - The British delegation should appease Hitler by permitting Germany to annex the Sudetenland.
    - The British delegation should stand fast against Hitler by backing the French, Soviets, and Czechs to the point of declaring war against Germany.

Sources

1. Francis L. Loewenheim, *Peace or Appeasement* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), p. 56.
2. G.M. Gathorne-Hardy, *A Short History of International Affairs 1920-1934* (London: Oxford University Press, 1934), p. 342.

Aftermath

The advocates of appeasement made British policy at the Four-Power Conference in Munich. The French and British delegations did indeed agree to the annexation of the Sudetenland by Germany. In exchange for this gift, Hitler promised that this was his last territorial demand in Europe. He also signed a treaty with Chamberlain, in which he pledged to "remove possible sources of differences and thus contribute to assure the peace of Europe." On his return to Britain, Chamberlain was met at the airport by cheering crowds. Waving this agreement, he claimed to have brought back from Germany "peace in our times."

The stand-fast faction in Britain was bitterly disappointed. "There is no merit in putting off a war for a year," wrote Churchill, "if, when it comes, it is a far worse war or one much harder to win." He contended that in appeasing Hitler, Britain had allowed Germany to rearm, gain air superiority, build the Siegfried line in the Rhineland, unify with Austria, and now take over the strategic Sudetenlands. By 1938 the balance of power, Churchill pointed out, had been allowed to tip in Germany's favor.

The Czechs were given no choice in the matter. They were told to pull their forces out of the Sudetenland, which was promptly occupied by German troops. Overnight, Czechoslovakia lost 15 percent of its land area, 20 percent of its population, and 75 percent of its industry. No sooner had Hitler's troops taken control of the Sudeten fortifications than Hungary and Poland grabbed the choice pieces of Czechoslovakia that they desired. Within months, Czechoslovakia was reduced to a chaotic and defenseless state, one-half its original size. Motivated by a desire to reverse the deteriorating conditions in Czechoslovakia, or so he claimed, Hitler extended German control over the rest of the country in March 1939. Thus, six months after the Munich Four-Power Conference, Czechoslovakia had ceased to exist.

Now Hitler began to complain about the conditions of the German speakers in western Poland. Humiliated by Hitler's untrustworthy behavior, Chamberlain hastened to sign an unconditional defense treaty with Poland. On August 23, 1939, Hitler and Stalin forged a non-aggression pact that secretly made plans for a division of conquests in Eastern Europe. The stage was set for the beginning of World War II.

CHAPTER 3: ISOLATIONISTS, INTERNATIONALISTS, AND LEND-LEASE

In the previous chapter we saw that, between 1936 and March 1939, Germany had taken the Rhineland, Austria, and most of Czechoslovakia without firing a shot. In the summer of 1939, Hitler began to demand that Poland return to Germany territory given to Poland under the Versailles Treaty. This region, the Polish Corridor, separated East Prussia from the rest of Germany. When the Poles refused, Hitler launched an awesome attack on Poland on September 1, 1939. Cut off from allies and outnumbered 3 to 1 by German troops, the Poles surrendered in less than four weeks. Unable to help Poland directly, Britain and France nevertheless declared war on Germany. The British Expeditionary Corps and the French Army manned defensive positions on Germany's borders.

Hitler appeased the Soviet Union in the east by the secret agreements in the Non-Aggression Pact, which gave Stalin a free hand in Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and eastern Poland. This pact, which was linked to Stalin's absence at the Munich Conference, was significant to Hitler's success. Hitler secured Germany's northern flank by conquering Denmark and Norway in April 1940. Meanwhile, behind the Siegfried (defensive) Line, German generals concentrated the Wehrmacht's (the German army) strength for a massive blow against British and French positions.

After this battle, the United States became the only country in the world that could rescue Britain and its Empire. British pleas for American aid sparked a lively national debate over U.S. foreign policy. This chapter asks: Should the United States give up the security of 3,000 miles of ocean in order to help save Britain from Hitler's Germany?

The Fall of France

On May 10, 1940, the German army made the first maneuver in the Battle of France by invading neutral Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg. The Allied armies on the French-Belgium border hurried north to aid the embattled neutrals. But as one Germany army was confronting the Allies in Holland, another prepared to break through Allied lines to the east. In the Ardennes Forest on May 13, 43 German divisions lined up behind a battering ram of 7 panzer (armored or tank) divisions. They smashed through French colonial troops and forded the Meuse River. Within hours, a 50-mile-long column of German tanks and troop trucks was racing across northern France, closely supported by Stuka dive bombers.

The Allies were taken completely by surprise. Their front lines collapsed, as dug-in Allied divisions were encircled from the rear or forced to retreat. Expecting a replay of World War I warfare, Allied generals had committed all their armored divisions to front-line positions. As a result, they had only cavalry and infantry to counter-attack against German tanks that broke through their defenses. The Germans were simply moving too fast for Allied generals. Employing blitzkrieg (lightning war) tactics, German paratroopers landed behind Allied lines, seizing bridgeheads and other strategic choke points such as railroad junctions. Terror and confusion were further spread by the Luftwaffe, the German air force. German planes routinely machine-gunned civilian refugees to tie up Allied supply routes.

With breakneck speed, the Germans drove west, reaching the English Channel at Abbeville on May 20th. The entire British army and a French army, a total of 35 divisions, were thereby cut off in Belgium from the main French force. Their backs were to the sea.

At this point, Hitler could have destroyed the surrounded Allied armies in Belgium by cutting off their escape route to the English Channel. Instead, he called a halt to his panzer column advance. The British seized on this opportunity to pull their army back to Dunkirk. There, between May 26 and June 4, 1940, the Allies evacuated 338,000 British and French troops across the channel to safety; 860 boats and ships carried out this escape, assisted by bad weather and a temporary halt in Luftwaffe raids.

The Luftwaffe had 998 heavy bombers, 316 dive bombers, and 1,056 fighters on airfields within range of Britain. The RAF (Royal Air Force) had only 640 fighters. At the end of July 1940, Hitler's air

war against the RAF began. For two perilous months, the battle raged, with the Luftwaffe launching around-the-clock attacks on RAF aircraft, airfields, and radar installations. Then, in response to British Bomber Command attacks on Berlin, Hitler changed his strategy. Just as the German air force was winning the battle to destroy the RAF, Hitler ordered the Luftwaffe to bomb British cities.

September 7, 1940 witnessed the first massive raid against London by 300 Luftwaffe bombers escorted by 648 fighters. That same night, a second wave of attackers bombed London. In all, 4,400,000 pounds of explosives were dropped on Britain's capital that day – the worst catastrophe to hit the city since the Great Fire of 1666. Subsequent German air raids reduced large parts of London and other British cities to blackened rubble. The bombing did not break the spirit of the British people, however.

In the autumn of 1940, the Luftwaffe "Blitz" continued to pound British cities. German submarines, called U-boats, sank increasing numbers of ships transporting arms and food to the besieged island. Wehrmacht soldiers, singing "We March Against England," trooped into channel ports. At this point, the British realized, only the United States could save them.

Britain's Plight

By the fall of 1940, Britain possessed fewer than 1,000 field artillery and anti-tank guns and fewer than 260 tanks. These weapons could only equip two divisions to defend the British Isles. The German invading force was expected to be 20 times larger. The RAF now numbered less than half the size of the Luftwaffe. And the Royal Navy consisted of but 100 destroyers, aircraft carriers, and battleships. This force was overextended in trying both to shield Britain from the German army and keep worldwide supply routes open.

Meanwhile, the British treasury was as empty as Mother Hubbard's famed cupboard. By October 1940, only $2 billion remained in the treasury. This amount was already slated for partial payment for an order of $5 billion worth of arms and supplies from the United States. Without a U.S. loan, the British had no way of buying the supplies absolutely essential to their defense. As British Ambassador Lord Lothian told New York reporters, "Well, boys, Britain's broke. It's your money we want." However, Britain was running up against an old American tradition, isolationism.

America's Quandry

In his 1796 Farewell Address, George Washington advised Americans to avoid "entangling alliances." This policy had been followed for 120 years. During this time, the United States grew and prospered without becoming overly involved in overseas wars.

Many Americans believed that the United States was dragged into World War I in 1917 by acting as Britain's arms supplier, transporter, and banker. Over 160,000 U.S. casualties and the unpopular Treaty of Versailles, however, turned many Americans against participation in international politics.

Isolationist legislators tried to avoid a similar U.S. military engagement in the 1930s by passing neutrality legislation. These laws, like the McReynolds Neutrality Act of 1937, specifically required the U.S. to follow a policy of "cash and carry" for products sold to nations at war. The purchaser of equipment had to pay in cash and carry the supplies in its own ships. The British lacked the ships and the money to meet these requirements.

To get around the restrictions of such neutrality legislation, President Roosevelt devised a clever ploy. He would simply lend Britain war materials. Britain would not have to return the materials until the war was over. Roosevelt made a simple analogy to explain this concept to the American people. He reduced Britain's problem with Germany to a situation of a neighbor whose house was on fire:

> If he can take my garden hose and connect it up with his hydrant, I may help put out the fire. Now what do I do in such a crisis? I don't say to him before the operation, "Neighbor, my garden hose cost me $15.00. You have to pay me $15.00 for it!" I don't want $15.00. I want my garden hose back after the fire is over.

The Lend-Lease Act, HR Bill 1776, an *act to further promote the defense of the United States*, was drafted in January 1941. It would give the President the power to "sell, transfer title to, exchange, lend, and otherwise dispose of any defense article to any country whose defense the President deems [believes] vital to the defense of the United States."

Roosevelt's plan to lend Britain arms and supplies split the country into opposing camps. Internationalists thought that the Lend-Lease Act would enable the president to lend Britain the arms to defeat Hitler before Germany became a danger to America. Thus, the British, and not Americans, would do the fighting to stop Hitler. Isolationists countered by asking the president what would happen to the lender's house if his neighbor lost his hose in trying, and failing, to put out the fire. They declared that the Atlantic Ocean, not the English Channel, was America's real line of defense against Germany.

Chapter Questions

1. Identify or define and briefly tell the importance to this chapter of each of the following:
    - Polish Corridor
    - Ardennes Forest
    - battering ram and blitzkrieg
    - Dunkirk
    - change in Hitler's battle strategy
    - worst catastrophe
    - England's plight
    - Lord Lothian
    - "entangling alliances"
    - "cash and carry"
    - garden hose
    - Lend-Lease Act
    - isolationists
    - internationalists
2. Describe the course of World War II from September 1939 to September 1940. Write your description from the British perspective.
3. Use the garden hose as an example to argue for the isolationist or internationalist position on the Lend-Lease Act. Bring in information from the chapter to support your argument.
4. Read the following views of isolationists or internationalists. Explain why you agree with the arguments of one side; explain the reasons you disagree with the otherside.

Internationalists for the Lend-Lease Act:

Arsenal of Democracy

> The people of Europe who are defending themselves do not ask us to do their fighting. They ask us for the implements of war which will enable them to fight for their liberty and our security. Emphatically we must get those weapons to them in sufficient volume and quickly enough so that we and our children will be saved the agony and suffering of war which others have to endure....We must be the great arsenal of democracy.[1]
>
> President Franklin Roosevelt

In the Jungles of Central and South America

Grant Hitler the gigantic prestige of a victory over Britain, and who can doubt that the first result on our side of the ocean would be the prompt appearance of imitation Nazi regimes [governments] in a half-dozen Latin American nations, forced to be on the winning side, begging for favors, clamoring for the admission to the Axis [Germany and Italy]. What shall we do? Make war upon these neighbors; send armies to fight in the jungles of Central and South America; run the risk of outraging native sentiment and turning the whole continent against us? Or shall we sit tight while the area of Nazi influence draws ever closer to the Panama Canal and a spreading checkerboard of Nazi airfields provides ports of call for German planes that may choose to bomb our cities?[2]

Editorial in *The New York Times*

Isolationists Against the Lend-Lease Act:

England's Balance of Power

We are divided because we are asked to fight over issues that are Europe's and not our own – issues that Europe created by her own short-sightedness. We are divided because many of us do not wish to fight again for England's balance of power or for her domination of India, Mesopotamia, and Egypt, or for the Polish Corridor or for another treaty like Versailles. We are divided because we do not want to cross an ocean to fight on a foreign continent for foreign causes against an entire world combined against us.[3]

Charles Lindbergh

They and Not We

We must turn our eyes and our faith back to our own country before it is too late. And when we do this a different vista opens before us. Practically every difficulty we would face in invading Europe becomes an asset to us in defending America. Our enemy, and not we, would have the problem of transporting millions of troops across the ocean and landing them on a hostile shore. They, and not we, would have to furnish the convoys to transport guns and trucks and munitions and fuel across three thousand miles of water. Our battleships and submarines would be fighting close to their home bases; we would then do the bombing from the air and the torpedoing at sea. If any part of an enemy convoy should ever pass our navy and our air force, they would still be faced with the guns of our coast artillery and behind them the divisions of our army.[4]

Charles Lindbergh, New York

Sources

1. *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt* (New York: Macmillan, 1943), p. 640.
2. *The New York Times* (April 30, 1941), p. 18.
3. Charles Lindbergh, *An Autobiography of Values* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1977), p. 194.
4. Text of a speech appearing in *The New York Times* (April 24, 1941), p. 12.

ROLES FOR LEND-LEASE SIMULATION

Arthur Hays Sulzberger

Son of a prominent Jewish family from New York City, you served in France with the U.S. Army in 1918. At war's end, you returned to New York and worked at the *Times* in various capacities for over a decade. You took control of the paper in 1935 and directed its editorial policies. You are a steadfast supporter of President Roosevelt's foreign policy, in part because you were horrified by reports of Nazi persecution of German Jews. You advocated Lend-Lease aid Britain's lonely struggle against Nazi tyranny, because you felt Britain deserved help from a fellow democracy. You believed that America's mission in the world was to nurture and spread the idea of democracy. You felt that the United States may be attacked by way of South and Central America. The best way to protect American freedoms, you believe, is through international agreements that give the United States allies so it will never have to stand alone against a foreign power bent on world conquest.

Philip Henry Kerr, the 11th Marquise of Lothian

Born into an aristocratic family, you went to the finest British schools, where you developed a thoughtful, critical mind, a lucid writing style, and an abiding interest in American history and culture. Your judgment and ability earned you many leadership posts in the British government of South Africa and India and you soon became a key political advisor to a series of prime ministers.

As an aide to Lloyd George, you wrote sections of the Versailles Treaty and helped found the League of Nations. After the war, you worked in a variety of capacities and served as Britain's ambassador to Washington from 1938 to 1940. You believe that American aid to Britain is essential because Hitler has to be challenged by those who believe in international justice. Moreover, if Britain falls into German hands because of lack of weapons, the United States would be the next target of Nazi aggression. You point out to Americans that if Hitler invades Britain, the United States will no longer enjoy the protection offered by the Royal Navy's command of the seas. If Lend-Lease were approved, you assure Americans that their arms and supplies would help defend Britain, thereby protecting the United States.

Major Charles A. Lindbergh

You are the son of an immigrant Swedish liberal who opposed the "money trust" that supposedly led America into World War I. A serious young man, you left college to pursue a career in aviation. In 1927 you became the first man to fly alone across the Atlantic Ocean in your plane, "The Spirit of St. Louis." Overnight, the world press transformed you into "Lucky Lindy," the Lone Eagle and a renowned hero. Your idyllic life was shattered in 1935 with the kidnap-murder of your son and the drawn-out trial and conviction of the accused kidnaper. In your search for personal solitude after these events, you traveled all over Europe in 1936-39. Your visits to Germany convinced you of the invincibility of the Luftwaffe, and your contact with British statesmen persuaded you that Britain was only interested in preserving its empire and was at least as responsible as Germany for World War II. You believe the Lend-Lease Act would involve the United States in a European war in defense of British interests. Furthermore, Lend-Lease would stretch out a stalemated struggle that will end in a negotiated peace anyway. This would needlessly antagonize Germany. You advise America to invest its money in improving U.S. coastal defenses rather than waste it by trying to save Britain.

Doctor Hans Heinrich Dieckhoff

A professional diplomat in the German Foreign Office, your long professional career stretched over 25 years, from service in Tokyo before World War I to an ambassadorship to Washington. You are not a Nazi, but rather a professional diplomat with a commitment to good German-American relations. Though you were withdrawn for consultation in Berlin in 1939, you still wish to advise America not to pass the Lend-Lease bill. The present war, you believe, has been caused by the unjust Versailles Peace Treaty. A negotiated settlement with England will soon remove the reasons for conflict between Germany and Britain. Lend-Lease aid could only prolong death and destruction while risking a needless confrontation between America and Germany. There simply is no compelling national need for involving the United States in a losing effort, which would drive Germany into a closer alliance with Japan and risk a worldwide war.

CHAPTER 4: WORLD WAR II AND JAPANESE-AMERICAN RELOCATION

Japan's invasion of China began September 19, 1931. Japanese military planners pretended that they were simply responding to attacks on Japanese property by "bandits" in Manchuria, a province in China. By 6:30 a.m., three battalions of Japanese troops had taken most of the city of Mukden. This "incident" began a 14-year-long attempt by Japan to conquer China.

Within a few days, the Japanese took control of all 693 miles of Manchuria's railroad and then the cities along the tracks. After six years of preparations in Manchuria and along China's northeast coast, the Japanese stood ready to move on Peking, China's old capital. In July 1937, the Chinese Nationalist Army under General Chiang Kai-shek retreated before the better-equipped Japanese. At Shanghai, in November 1937, the Chinese fought a spirited but losing battle. This unexpected and united resistance provoked the Japanese into an all-out attack on the new Chinese capital, the infamous "rape of Nanking."

After driving Chinese soldiers out of the city in December 1937, Japanese armed forces killed an estimated 100,000 Nanking civilians. Japanese soldiers committed almost every atrocity imaginable. They bashed heads of babies against walls, bayoneted children, burned men alive, and strafed civilians from planes. This massacre went on for about two weeks, ending shortly after Christmas day, 1937.

All of these events were reported in U.S. newspapers. The Roosevelt administration protested Japanese aggression and gave financial assistance to China. Intent on forcing Chiang to agree to Japanese economic control of China, Japan paid scant attention to foreign scoldings. Moreover, America continued to sell aviation gas and scrap metal to Japan.

Internationalists and Isolationists

From 1937 to 1941, Japan advanced southward in China, attempting to cut Chiang's government off from foreign arms shipments. When the Japanese moved to cut off Chinese supply routes in northern French Indochina in June 1940, President Roosevelt was faced with conflicting advice from members of his cabinet. Internationalists were for strong retaliation, which in this case meant depriving Japan of the scrap metal and aviation gasoline used to fuel its war machine. Other advisors, isolationists, believed that Japan would invade most of Asia if the U.S. denied its supply of gas and metal. They advised no interruption of trade with Japan, continuing negotiations, and no threats.

While this debate was going on in Roosevelt's cabinet, a similar discussion took place within the Imperial government of Japan. One group, known as the *Joi* (expel the barbarians) faction, supported by the Japanese army, wanted to continue the conquest of southeast Asia. Another group, the *Kaikoku* (open the country) faction, wanted peaceful trade with the West. These politicians, backed by businessmen, were willing to retreat from Indochina and China in order to continue trading with the United States.

"Things Are Automatically Going to Happen"

While the opposing factions in Japan were fighting for control over foreign policy, negotiations between the United States and Japan concerning China and Indochina continued. When Japanese troops took over airfields in southern Indochina, internationalist advisors persuaded President Roosevelt to halt all trade with Japan on July 26, 1941. Since this action deprived the Japanese of their main oil supply, they immediately began negotiations to restore U.S.-Japanese trade. But Japanese policymakers were unwilling to comply with America's demand that Japan stop its aggression against China. As the diplomats talked, a Japanese fleet of six aircraft carriers was speeding toward Hawaii. The deadline for the diplomats was set at November 29, 1941. After that, as a coded Japanese cable related, "things are automatically going to happen."

The secret date for launching the attack passed with no notable concessions from the United States. The Japanese fleet continued to approach Hawaii from the northwest, skirting normal shipping

lanes. To maintain the element of surprise, the fleet sailed in radio silence without lights, and no telltale garbage was dropped overboard.

Eight American battleships in Pearl Harbor were docked one next to the other. None hung the protective netting used to deflect torpedoes. On surrounding airfields, U.S. planes were lined up wing-tip to wing-tip in order to prevent sabotage. Ammunition was under lock and key. Blips reported by a radar operator were thought to be American B-17s coming in from California. A naval duty officer questioned the sighting of a miniature sub at the mouth of the harbor. Military commanders, General Short and Admiral Kimmel, were getting ready for their Sunday morning golf game.

Up until 7:54 a.m., December 7, 1941, no one seriously suspected anything. One minute later, the entire American base was under attack, as 360 Japanese planes swooped down completely unopposed. Torpedo and dive bombers attacked eight U.S. battleships and ten other vessels. Other Japanese planes bombed and strafed U.S. aircraft on the ground, as frantic U.S. fliers tried to get airborne. When the day was done, over 2,400 Americans were dead, eight battleships were sunk or disabled, and 177 planes were destroyed. The Japanese lost only 29 planes and 100 men.

Follow-Up Conquests

The attack on Pearl Harbor was part of a calculated risk. Britain was fighting for its life against Germany. The rest of Europe was in the hands of the Axis. In June, Hitler had invaded the Soviet Union, despite their previous agreement. The Soviet Union was now fighting Germany at the gates of Moscow. The Japanese gambled that they could knock out the U.S. navy and so discourage Americans that they would not have the resolve to wage successful war against Japan. However, the Japanese failed to destroy both the U.S. aircraft carrier fleet, which had been out on maneuvers, and American fighting spirit.

Japan lost no time after Pearl Harbor in carrying out its plan of conquest. American forces in the Philippines were attacked the same day, as were British bases in Hong Kong and Malaya. Within weeks, the Japanese took Thailand, Burma, Singapore, the Dutch East Indies [Indonesia], Borneo, and parts of New Guinea. Many islands in the South Pacific, including Wake, Rabaul, and Guam, also fell into Japanese hands. Lacking the battleships and aircraft destroyed at Pearl Harbor, the United States could do little to prevent these conquests.

On December 8, 1941, President Franklin Roosevelt addressed the angry and shocked people of America. The President said that December 7 was a day that would live in infamy and concluded that a state of war already existed between the United States and Japan. The Senate and House quickly voted to declare war.

The Home Front

If Pearl Harbor helped Americans in any way, it taught them they could not avoid war by trying to remain neutral. The American people supported their president over the next 3 1/2 years when he asked them to make sacrifices in order to win the war. Eight million Americans contributed by serving in the armed forces; 322,000 died. Civilians helped by planting victory gardens, collecting paper and scrap metal for recycling, and working long hours in defense plants. All were limited by food and gasoline ration cards. Young men prepared to be drafted right after high school. Women volunteered for the WACS (Women's Army Corps) and the WAVES (Women Accepted for Volunteer Emergency Service).

For the American economy, the war meant a complete end of the Great Depression. By the time the war was over, the United States had produced 274,000 planes, 85,000 ships, and 100,000 tanks or armed vehicles. This not only met needs for our armed forces, but served as an "arsenal for democracy" for our allies.

Relocation of Japanese-Americans

All Americans had good reason to be proud of their country's war effort. But there is one chapter in that story that has become very controversial. Shortly after the attack on Pearl Harbor, Congress passed a very unusual law. The law required the War Department to move some 112,000 Japanese-Americans who lived in the west coast states further inland. Impetus for this law came from whites living on the Pacific coast in areas with relatively large numbers of Japanese-Americans. These Japanese-Americans were discriminated against by whites who felt threatened by their different culture, strange language, and economic success due to their willingness to work harder and live on less than their white neighbors. After December 7, white fears were heightened by rumors, such as one printed in the *San Francisco Chronicle* in early 1942. In this article, Hawaii's Japanese-Americans were accused of intentionally blocking the roads to Pearl Harbor with their "wheezing jalopies," during the air raid.

Between March and May, Japanese-Americans were told that they had to "relocate" to one of many camps throughout the interior of the United States. They were given a week to sell their cars, homes, and businesses and report to local detention centers for further orders.

> Western Defense Command and Fourth Army
> Wartime Civil Control Administration
>
> INSTRUCTIONS TO ALL PERSONS OF JAPANESE ANCESTRY
>
> All of that portion of the County of Alameda, State of California, within that boundary, etc.
>
> Pursuant to the provisions of Civilian Exclusion Order No. 27 – dated April 30, 1942, all persons of Japanese ancestry, both alien and non-alien, will be evacuated from the above area by 12 o'clock, noon, Thursday, May 7, 1942.

The Japanese-Americans were ordered to take as much needed bedding, extra clothes, and household items as they could carry. Pets had to be left behind. Nor were the Japanese-Americans allowed to bring such household items as refrigerators, washing machines, and stoves. These were to be stored by the government at the owner's risk. Other property, such as cars and trucks, was hurriedly sold by the owners in the week between the removal order and the date to report. Houses and farms that could not be sold or rented stood idle until foreclosure (takeover for nonpayment of taxes or mortgages).

Japanese-Americans were transported from detention centers to relocation camps, where most of them remained until the war ended. Those who volunteered to fight for the United States were released. Some young men refused to enlist because they resented the way the government treated them. Others were allowed to move to the midwest to work in defense plants. Most Japanese-Americans, however, were forced to stay in relocation camps. Entire families had to live in single rooms with thin partitions to separate family areas. They ate in cafeterias, like those used to feed soldiers. The relocation camps were surrounded by barbed wire with sentries standing in watch towers to prevent escapes. The camps themselves were in remote, semi-desert areas far from the west coast.

The U.S. government tried to close these camps and resettle the Japanese-Americans several times from 1943-1945. Opposition was so strong, however, that it was not until January 1945 that the last camp was closed. When finally released from relocation camps, many Japanese-Americans found that they no longer owned the homes, businesses, and farms they had left. The estimated value of their lost property was $350,000,000.

Arguments for and Against the Camps

Anyone speaking for the relocation camps of the 1940s remembered Nanking and Pearl Harbor. Those who opposed detaining Japanese Americans solely on the basis of race spoke out against detention. Advocates of relocation pointed out that ethnic ties had caused the Sudetenlanders, for instance, to collaborate with fellow Germans against their countrymen. Would not the Japanese-Americans behave the same way, as they allegedly had at Pearl Harbor? Moreover, most Japanese-Americans lived in California, the region of the United States most vulnerable to Japanese invasion. Some commentators suggested that the very lack of sabotage so far indicated that Japanese-Americans were planning for a major campaign later on. Critics of Japanese-American relocation thought that it was unfair to force someone to go to a camp solely on the basis of his/her ancestry. Indeed, people of German and Italian ancestry were not being moved away from the equally menaced east coast. Moreover, no Japanese-Americans had, as yet, been convicted of sabotage or treason.

The following are arguments on both sides of the issue.

From Newspaper Columnist Henry McLemore

I am for immediate removal of every Japanese on the West Coast to a point deep in the interior. Sure, this would work an unjustified hardship on 80 percent or 90 percent of the California Japanese. But the remaining 10 or 20 percent have it in their power to do damage – great damage to the American people. They are a serious menace and you can't tell me that an individual's rights have any business being placed above a nation's safety.

If making 1,000,000 innocent Japanese uncomfortable would prevent one scheming Japanese from costing the life of an American boy, then let 1,000,000 innocents suffer.[1]

From the Attorney General of the United States

Every man who cares about freedom, about government by law – must fight for it for the other man with whom he disagrees – with the same passion of insistence as he claims for his own rights. If we care about democracy, we must care about it as a reality for others as well as for ourselves; yes, for aliens, for Germans, for Italians, for Japanese – For the Bill of Rights protects not only American citizens but all human beings who live on our American soil, under our American flag.[2]

Chapter Questions

1. Identify or define and briefly tell the importance to this chapter of each of the following:
    - Manchuria
    - "rape of Nanking"
    - Indochina
    - *Joi* and *Kaikoku*
    - "Things are automatically going to happen"
    - Kimmel and Short
    - Pearl Harbor and damages done
    - attacks after Pearl Harbor
    - relocation camps
    - what could and could not be taken to camps
    - Henry McLemore

- Bill of Rights

2. Do you think that Japan's attacks on China and the United States and evidence of subversion by Japanese-Americans discussed in this chapter justified the internment of 110,000 Japanese-Americans in relocation camps?

Sources

1. DeAnne Sobul, ed., *Encounters with America's History* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972), pp. 140-141.

2. E.H. Spicer, *Impounded People: Japanese Americans in the Relocation Centers* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1946), pp. 9-10.

THE PACIFIC THEATER

On the map below, locate and label the following places:

Australia
China
– Manchuria
Borneo
Burma
Dutch East Indies (Indonesia)
French Indochina
Hong Kong
Japan (Home Islands)
India
Korea
Malaya
Outer Mongolia
Philippines
Siam (Thailand)
United States
USSR

Coral Sea
Indian Ocean
Philippine Sea
Pacific Ocean
Sea of Japan
South China Sea
Yellow Sea

Fiji
Guam
Guadalcanal
Hawaiian Islands
Iow Jima
Kurile Islands
Midway Island
Okinawa
Sakhalin Peninsula
Solomon Islands
Tinian
Wake Island

Trace the Japanese path of conquest from 1931 to 1942 by labelling invaded areas with the year of attack.



CHAPTER 5: WAR IN EUROPE

By 1942, much of the world had fallen under the control of the Axis powers. Capitalizing on its December 7 attacks, Japan occupied practically the entire western Pacific. Germany dominated continental Europe, and Italy possessed conquests in the Balkans and north Africa. In contrast, the Grand Alliance of the United States, USSR, and Britain was at bay. Britain was under air attack and threatened with a cut-off of Middle Eastern oil. Most of the European USSR was occupied by German invaders. Still licking wounds inflicted on December 7, 1941, the United States was in retreat before the Japanese offensive in the Pacific.

At war with Germany and Italy as well as Japan, U.S. leaders had to decide two basic questions. First, where should the bulk of America's armed forces be used – in Europe or the Pacific? Early in 1942, President Roosevelt opted for a "Germany first" policy. Second, America's war planners had to determine how to wage war in Europe. Should the British and U.S. forces begin the struggle in Europe with an immediate frontal assault on Germany? Or should the Allies launch a long series of attacks along the edges of Hitler's empire in order to disperse German troops. Stalin and Roosevelt called for a landing as soon as possible to divert German troops from battle in the USSR. Churchill, mindful of British losses in the trenches during World War I, argued against premature invasion to free France. Was it also possible, Stalin wondered, that Churchill wanted the Soviets to do the brunt of the fighting against Germany, far away from the Western democracies?

War in the Desert

The question of how to attack Germany was also settled in 1942. Churchill got Roosevelt to agree to Anglo-American operations in North Africa. The struggle there had begun on June 10, 1940, when Mussolini declared war on Britain and attacked British forces in Egypt. The British responded by driving Italian troops back into Libya. With the British on the verge of snuffing out all Italian resistance in February 1941, Hitler came to Mussolini's rescue by sending General Erwin Rommel to Africa. Rommel's daring, cunning, and confident leadership were to earn him the nickname "The Desert Fox." Commanding the crack Afrika Corps, Rommel found many ways to trick the commanders of larger British units. For instance, Rommel once deceived a British opponent into surrendering to a smaller contingent of German troops by dragging brush behind his tanks. This fooled the British into believing Rommel was getting reinforcements. Using such tactics, along with speed and good intelligence, Rommel compelled the British to retreat 350 miles toward Alexandria, Egypt. Only lack of supplies and a German setback at Alam Halfa in the summer of 1942 prevented a complete British collapse.

In November 1942, the tide of battle turned against Rommel. After building up a vastly superior tank corps, British General Bernard Montgomery managed to break through Rommel's lines at El Alamein on November 4, 1942. On November 8, American troops landed at Casablanca and moved on Tunisia and Rommel's rear positions. In February 1943, reinforced with fresh troops, Rommel cleverly wheeled west to defeat the inexperienced Americans at Kasserine Pass, but his subsequent attempt to break Montgomery's lines in the east failed. Now the Allied forces came at Rommel from both the east and the west. They captured nearly 1/2 million enemy soldiers in Tunisia. With North Africa in their hands, the Anglo-Americans decided to invade Italy through Sicily. This would put the Allies in a position to attack Germany by way of the Italian peninsula, thought to be the "soft underbelly" of Europe. Accordingly, Allied planners once again postponed an invasion of France across the English Channel.

Sicily and Italy

On July 10, 1943, in history's largest amphibious operation, 160,000 British and American soldiers landed on Sicily's south coast. Lacking defensive artillery, the Italians put up only token resistance although German reinforcements were able to delay the Allied conquest of Sicily for a month. Meanwhile, the Italian government headed by Mussolini was overthrown. A new government under Marshal Badoglio promptly began to negotiate an armistice with the Anglo-Americans. When Badoglio announced this armistice in September 1943, German troops occupied Italy, placed Mussolini back in power, and set up defensive positions.

The Allied Offensive in Europe, 1942-1945

In the Italian campaign, American and British generals faced a series of German defensive lines that took full advantage of the rivers, alleys, and mountains that crisscrossed the peninsula. In addition, Montgomery's cautious style of generalship always seemed to give the Germans the chance to fall back to new entrenched positions. Consequently, it took the Anglo-Americans eight months to advance the hundred miles from Naples to Rome. They were not able to push the Germans back to Florence until August 1944. In fact, when the war in Europe ended in May 1945, parts of Italy were still in German hands. Europe's "soft underbelly" had proven to be rock-hard.

Operation Barbarossa

On June 22, 1941, the Wehrmacht and other Axis forces were unleashed on the Soviet Union, Germany's unsuspecting ally, along a 200-mile-long front. Ever the restless gambler, Hitler was impatient with the stalemate against Britain. He was also fearful that Stalin might attack Germany, while his armies were preoccupied in the west. On the first day of battle, the German Luftwaffe destroyed most of the Soviet air force on the ground. With air superiority thus assured, 190 German, Italian, Hungarian, Finnish, and Romanian divisions smashed across the Soviet frontier from the Arctic Ocean to the Black Sea. German bombing and the confusion of Soviet authorities broke down military lines of command and supply. Using 19 panzer (tanks and armed vehicles) divisions in long lanking maneuvers, the Wehrmacht cut off and surrounded large elements of the Red Army. In these great battles of encirclement, the German army beat 200 Soviet divisions and captured 1 1/2 million prisons by mid-August. (Most of these Soviet POWs later died in German concentration camps.) A six-week halt in the German advance to permit capture of the Ukraine, a secondary objective, gave Stalin time to reorganize Soviet defenses. Still, on December 2, German tankers in the outskirts of Moscow caught sight of the onion-domed Kremlin towers.

War in Russia

By the end of 1941, German troops had occupied most of European Russia. The battle front extended from the gates of Leningrad in the north through the outskirts of Moscow to the Black Sea in the south. Then the coldest winter in 100 years, troop exhaustion, and supply shortages caused the German advance to slow to a halt. Suddenly, Stalin threw his Siberian reserves into a whirlwind winter offensive against German lines before Moscow. In fighting from December 1941 to May 1942, the Red Army was able to create a protective zone around Moscow. In addition, the Luftwaffe lost hundreds of planes and air superiority in the east in attempting to support hard-pressed German infantry.

In the summer of 1942, Hitler ordered his generals to resume offensive operations, but on a new front. His plan was to attack in the south, across the Don River. This offensive had two objectives. One army was to drive south into the Caucasus Mountains and take the oil fields in Georgia. The other army was to seize Stalingrad as a base for a future attack on Moscow and as the northern flank of the Caucasus expedition. By August 23, 1942, General Paulus's 6th Army reached the Volga 30 miles north of Stalingrad.

At this point, traffic on the Volga could have been halted and Stalingrad put under siege. But eager for the glory of taking Stalin's namesake city, Hitler sent Paulus's tanks into street warfare in Stalingrad. On the first day of the attack, Luftwaffe air raids killed 40,000 Stalingrad residents, 10 percent of the city's population. The Volga bobbed with the bodies of civilians strafed as they fled the city by boat. Determined worker militia and Red Army assault groups fought Wehrmacht soldiers house by house in hand-to-hand combat. Soviet anti-tank guns, sent from new factories east of the Urals, took a toll in German tanks. Axis reserves were chewed up in relentless battle in ruined factories and apartment buildings. In the words of one German Stalingrad veteran, "Dogs flee howling from this hell. Rocks break under this strain. Only men survive."

Then on November 19, 1942, Soviet Marshall Zhukov attacked German lines north and south of Stalingrad. Surprise was complete, as Soviet tank columns smashed through lightly held defenses to encircle the 6th Army at Stalingrad and threaten the northern flank of the Caucasus offensive. German generals had to decide whether to permit the 6th Army to fight its way out of the trap, or to leave it in place to cover the retreat of the Caucasus invasion. Hitler chose the latter, and the southern expedition

fled northwest to safety. The price was sacrifice of the 270,000 men of the 6th Army. What remained of this force surrendered to the Red Army on February 2, 1943.

After the fall of Stalingrad, desperate Germans retreated to shorten their front and their overextended supply lines. The flanks of the advancing Red Army were exposed in frontline bulges, called salients, such as the one at Kursk. Hitler hoped to regain the offensive by pinching off the Kursk salient from the north and south. The Soviets received advance warning of German plans and hardened their defenses with deep mine fields and anti-tank guns. German forces launched their attack on July 5, 1943, spearheaded by virtually all the panzer units in the East. This attack stalled against Soviet defenses with little penetration. Finally, on August 3, the Red Army struck back and in a battle involving 8,000 tanks threw the Germans back across the Dnieper.

After the Battle of Kursk, the Germans were on the defensive in the USSR. The Red Army fielded more and better tanks, artillery, and rifles, all flowing from factories in the Urals. Lend-Lease trucks provided sufficient transportation for Red Army troops. Allied bombing of Germany deprived Hitler's armies of tanks and ammunition. Again and again, Soviet tank divisions cut through German positions, slashing supply and communication lines and surrounding pockets of prisoners. German generals were not aided in their attempts to repel Red Army attacks by Hitler's insistence that every position be held to the last man. This wasted troops and sapped German counter-offensives. Thus, with each Red Army attack, Germany and its Axis allies reeled back. First, they surrendered the European USSR, then Poland, then Romania and Bulgaria. In February 1945, virtually all of eastern Europe was in Soviet hands. The Red Army's 215 divisions had pushed the Wehrmacht back to the borders of the Reich, but the cost of victory had been high: 1700 destroyed cities and towns in the USSR and 25 million Soviet dead.

Operation Overlord

At the end of 1943, the Allies finally agreed upon a cross-Channel attack on Germany by way of France. This decision, made at the Teheran Conference, pleased Stalin because it would cause Germany to transfer soldiers from the USSR to France. Overlord, as this operation was called, had actually been in preparation for a long time. Since British intelligence had gained access to German coded messages in 1939, Allied generals knew the troop strength of the units defending the Normandy beaches. German spies in England had been turned into double agents who sent false information back to their handlers. Phantom armies were created through camouflage and false radio messages. This confused German generals as to the target area for the main invasion. Dummy paratroop divisions, radar blinding devices, and loud speakers that played the sounds of a mock invasion were all part of the "wizard war" to fool German defenders. A network of French saboteurs, RAF air supply, and British commandos was set up to attack the German rear.

Thanks to these preparations, the Anglo-American invasion fleet of 6,100 ships was able to achieve complete surprise at Normandy on June 6, 1944. Paratroopers took over roads leading to the beaches early in the day. Then behind shelling from 600 warships, 150,000 men – American, British, and Canadian troops – under command of U.S. General Dwight Eisenhower, stormed ashore. Bombardment from 14,000 Allied bomber and fighter sorties (flights) kept German heads down, permitting the invaders to move into coastal defenses. Portable harbors were towed across the Channel to assist in offloading supplies and tanks as the Allied beachheads linked up and deepened.

The German strategy to drive the invaders back into the sea was thus defeated. Why was Normandy's commander, the famed Rommel, so decisively beaten? First, because of inferior weather forecasting, German generals had left their posts, thinking that the seas were too rough for a landing. Second, Allied deceptions, such as false radio instructions to Luftwaffe pilots, misdirected counterattacks. Third and most important, Hitler believed planted intelligence reports that Normandy was a diversion for a second, bigger invasion. As a result, he refused to release tank reserves for Normandy combat until the end of July.

By mid-July the Allied build-up in Normandy was so strong that these reserves could no longer make the critical difference. Montgomery's 2nd Army of 250,000 men with 1500 tanks simply ground up German manpower and armor in grueling battle. The fact that the Red Army engaged three out of four available German soldiers was of great help to the Anglo-American cause. By the time General Omar Bradley attacked the southern end of the German line at Avranche, the last Wehrmacht reserves had already been committed to battle. Thus, on July 31, when General Patton's tanks poured through the Avranches gap, they had before them only the open plains of France.

In face of the Allied breakout of over 2,200,000 troops, the Wehrmacht pulled back to German border defenses. In December, as the Anglo-American forces massed for the final assault on Germany, Hitler made one last desperate gamble. Secretly, he moved all available Wehrmacht troops into position in the Ardennes Forest, as he had four and a half years before. On December 16, under cover of cloudy weather, German soldiers attacked U.S. Army units and drove a deep bulge into American lines (hence the name the Battle of the Bulge). Once they recovered from their surprise, Allied troops fought back bravely. They stopped the intended German drive to the Channel. Better weather allowed the Allies to bomb German positions, while British and American armies counterattacked. Meanwhile, a Soviet offensive in Poland drained Wehrmacht reinforcements. By February, the demoralized Germans had been pushed back to the Siegfried Line. The Allies once again stood at the east and west borders of Germany, this time with mighty armies and the initiative.

Chapter Questions

1. Identify or define and briefly show the importance to this chapter of each of the following:
    - two questions
    - "The Desert Fox"
    - El Alamein
    - 160,000 Allied soldiers
    - Marshall Badoglio
    - "soft underbelly"
    - Barbarossa
    - Stalingrad
    - Kursk
    - phantom armies
    - Normandy
    - Avranches
    - Battle of the Bulge
    - Siegfried Line
2. Assuming the role of a British, American, or Soviet general, describe your country's war effort against the Axis in terms of three of the following:
    - Size of forces
    - Suffering of soldiers and civilians
    - Effectiveness of strategy
    - Contribution to ending the war

CHAPTER 6: THE YALTA CONFERENCE

While the outcome of the Battle of the Bulge was being contested, U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill were preparing to meet with Marshall Joseph Stalin of the USSR. The three leaders were scheduled to confer on Soviet territory, at the Black Sea resort town of Yalta, in early February 1945.

Franklin D. Roosevelt

The Big Three, as they were called, had met before, in Teheran, Iran. At that meeting, Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin had mainly discussed the war to defeat the Axis. This time, the leaders of the Grand Alliance met to determine the nature of the post-Axis peace. They would redraw the world map and decide the boundary lines of countries in Europe and Asia. Specifically, they would reach crucial decisions on Germany, Poland, Eastern Europe, Japan, and the United Nations.

This chapter provides information to enable your class to reenact the Yalta Conference. Each of you will play the part of an advisor to one of the most powerful people in the world – Franklin Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, or Joseph Stalin. The class will actually make decisions on issues that were discussed by these world leaders. Your job will be to get the best possible deal for your country. At the same time, you must maintain the wartime alliance essential to defeat Germany and Japan. The important issues you will have to resolve are summarized below.

Problems Addressed at the Yalta Conference

1. Germany

With the armies of Britain, the United States, and the USSR at the borders of the Reich, the future of the German state had to be discussed. Some diplomats thought Germany should be permanently divided among the victorious Allies, so Germany could never again disrupt the peace of the world as it did in 1914 and 1939. Others were in favor of temporary occupation of Germany until a more democratic German state could be established. The issue of Germany paying its victims for loss of life and property caused by the war was also to be considered.

Possible solutions:

a. Divide Germany *permanently* among the Allies, and make it pay $20 billion (over 300 billion 1988 dollars) for damages done during the war; 80 percent of that money would go to the USSR.

b. Divide Germany *temporarily* into three occupation zones among the Allies. Allow these three zones to be reunited through democratic elections. Allow reparations not to exceed $10 billion (150 billion 1988 dollars).

c. Same as "b" but give France part of the British and American zones, and adjust reparations to Germany's ability to pay.

2. Poland

Poland had two governments. The communist government friendly with the USSR was known as the "Lublin Poles." The other government, which had gone into exile in Britain after the German conquest in 1939, was called the "London Poles." They considered themselves the lawful leaders of Poland. The Soviet Union also wanted territory in East Poland to act as a buffer against future invasions by Germany.

Possible solutions:

a. Let the Lublin Poles organize the Polish government; the Soviet Union would get eastern Poland. In order to make up for its loss to the USSR, the most eastern parts of Germany would be given to Poland.

b. Let the London Poles return to Poland and hold free elections as soon as possible. All groups in Poland would be able to vote in these elections. People in eastern Poland would decide by elections whether to belong to Poland or the Soviet Union.

c. Hold free elections in Poland under the supervision of American, British, and Soviet observers. All groups would be allowed to vote. The USSR can have part of east Poland, and Poland would get part of east Germany.

3. Self-Government and Eastern Europe

Key to the issue of the future of Eastern Europe was who would form governments in countries of Eastern Europe freed from German control by the Soviet Union. Discussion about establishing democratic governments in the British, U.S., and French colonies might be permitted.

Possible solutions:

a. Let the USSR form the governments of Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, etc. These governments would give land to poor farmers, stop exploitation of workers by wealthy property owners, and maintain friendly relations with the Soviet Union.

b. Let each liberated area in Europe, Asia, and Africa be governed in a manner best suited for the people living there, as determined by their liberators.

c. Hold free elections in all Eastern European countries and in all colonies to determine their future political systems.

4. Japan and the Far East

The issue here was whether the Soviet Union would help the United States in its war against Japan and what the Soviets would want in return for that assistance. U.S. and British leaders also feared that Stalin would shift his support from Chaing Kai-shek's nationalist government of China to Mao Zedong's communist revolutionaries.

Possible solutions:

a. The Soviet Union would fight against Japan if and when doing so was in its interest. The USSR would declare itself to have a right to occupy Manchuria and Korea and would recognize the Communist party under Mao Zedong as the rightful ruler of China.

b. The Soviet Union would declare war against Japan within three months of Germany's surrender and would announce its support for the Nationalist leader, Chiang Kai-shek. In exchange, the USSR

would get one-half of the Sakhalin Peninsula, military access to Port Arthur, and partial control of railroads in Manchuria (a province of China).

c. The Soviet Union would go to war against Japan immediately, not ask for any territory, and announce its support of Chiang Kai-shek.

5. The United Nations

The question was whether an organization similar to the League of Nations would be formed to settle disputes between countries peacefully.

Possible solutions:

a. The USSR would participate in the United Nations, but with a vote for each of its 16 socialist republics (provinces) in the General Assembly. The United States and Britain would have one vote in the United Nations. (Note: Most of the U.N. countries would probably be anti-communist.)

b. The Soviet Union would join the United Nations with no special privileges. Every country in the United Nations would have one vote.

c. The USSR would join the United Nations with the power of vetoing any important action in the U.N. Security Council. The United States, Britain, France, and Nationalist China would also have veto power in the Security Council.

6. U.S. Aid After World War II

Twenty five million Soviets were killed during World War II; most other nations also suffered great hardships during the war. Of the major countries involved in the war, only the United States was wealthier and stronger after it ended.

Possible solutions:

a. The United States would lend the Soviet Union $6 billion at an interest rate of 2 3/8 percent without any conditions.

b. The United States would lend money to help Britain and the USSR recover from World War II, as long as they lived up to their treaty commitments.

c. The Soviet Union and Britain would ask for no more U.S. assistance until each had repaid one half of its Lend-Lease aid.

Positions on the Issues

The United States: Franklin Roosevelt

Background and general outlook: Like President Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt was an idealist. Roosevelt wanted to make the world a better place for all people, not just Americans. Even before the United States declared war on Germany, Roosevelt met with Winston Churchill and drew up the *Atlantic Charter*. This document pledged the United States and Britain to support the rights of people everywhere to elect their own leaders and live in peace.

The principles of the Atlantic Charter and the hope of creating an atmosphere of trust with the Soviets were uppermost in Roosevelt's mind when he arrived at Yalta. He thought it most important to get Stalin to apply the principles of the Charter to Germany, Poland, and Eastern Europe. Roosevelt hoped to get the Soviets to join the United Nations, which was pledged to support the principles of the Charter. Roosevelt thought the United States should not push the Soviets too hard on difficult issues.

He did not want to reawaken the fears and suspicions of the Soviets toward the non-communist world. Roosevelt also wanted the Soviet Union to help the United States invade Japan. If such an invasion were necessary, Soviet aid could save many American lives.

Specific interests:

Germany – (b or c) Roosevelt's belief in democratic principles brought him to the view that Germany should eventually be allowed to reunite through free elections. But Germany should temporarily be divided among the victorious Allies.

Poland – (c) Roosevelt wanted a free, democratic, and united Poland. He was especially interested in free elections in Poland because many Polish-Americans voted for the Democratic Party in the United States.

Eastern Europe – (c) Roosevelt wanted the people of Eastern Europe to choose their own leaders by democratic and free elections. He also believed that the United States should maintain friendly and trusting relations with the Soviet Union.

Japan – (b or c) Roosevelt wanted to end World War II quickly, with a minimum loss of American lives. Military leaders estimated American losses of half a million soldiers in an invasion of Japan. To avoid these staggering losses, Roosevelt wanted the Soviets to enter the war against Japan as soon as possible. In order to get this support, Roosevelt might restore one-half of the Sakhalin Peninsula to the USSR and give it control over Port Arthur. The United States also wanted the Soviets to recognize the nationalist government under Chiang Kai-shek and not to help the communists under Mao Zedong take over China.

United Nations – (c) Roosevelt saw the United Nations as the world's best hope for world peace. He needed Soviet cooperation in the United Nations because this organization could not work well without participation by all major world powers. Recalling the difficulty Woodrow Wilson had in getting Senate approval for the League of Nations, Roosevelt considered giving all major countries the right to veto decisions of the United Nations.

U.S. Aid – (c) Many in the United States pressured Roosevelt to collect on the Lend-Lease loans given to the USSR and Britain during the war. Still, Roosevelt was willing to lend money to the Soviets if they accepted the principles of the Atlantic Charter and acted in accordance with these principles. Attempts on the USSR's part to support communist revolutions anywhere in the world would end any chance of the Soviets getting help from the United States.

Great Britain: Winston Churchill

Background and general outlook: Like all great British leaders, Churchill was more of a realist than an idealist. As an island nation, Britain was constantly endangered by wars on the European continent.

Churchill's most immediate worry was how to maintain a balance of power in Europe. He feared that the Soviet Union would take control of Eastern Europe after the war. His main hope for maintaining a balance of power was to form an alliance with a reunited Germany, France, and the United States. He made many attempts during and after the war to achieve this goal. Churchill had even suggested that the Anglo-Americans attack Germany by way of the Balkans to cut the Soviets off before they entered Eastern Europe.

The British were almost obsessed (overly concerned) with keeping their colonies (including India, Burma, Nigeria). Churchill believed that non-whites in the Empire were not ready for self-government. He once said he did not become Prime Minister in order to preside over the downfall of the British Empire.

Specific interests:

Germany – (c or b) Germany played a key role in Churchill's thinking. He wanted it reunited as soon as possible and made into an ally against the Soviet Union. Churchill thought the Soviet Union would pose a greater threat to peace in Europe than a defeated Germany, once Nazis were out of politics and in jail. Churchill wanted France to have an occupation zone because this would make France a stronger ally. He also did not want to allow the USSR to take whatever it wanted from its part of Germany. That would weaken Germany, and Britain wanted a strong Germany as an ally.

Poland – (b) Churchill wanted to restore what he thought was the rightful government of Poland. This government consisted of the Polish leaders (known as the "London Poles") who had fled when Germany invaded Poland in 1939. As soon as the German army left Poland, Churchill wanted the London Poles to organize the next Polish government. He did not trust the communist "Lublin Poles" and thought they were puppets whose strings were pulled by the USSR. Furthermore, Churchill opposed giving the Soviets any territory that belonged to Poland.

Eastern Europe – (b) Churchill wanted countries in Eastern Europe, mostly occupied by Soviet troops, to become independent countries once more. He hoped to achieve this goal through U.S.- and British-supervised elections in Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and other Eastern European nations. Churchill also believed that Britain should have full say over the government of former colonies (like Burma and Malaya) it reconquered from Japan.

Japan and the Far East – (c) Churchill would appreciate Soviet help in the Far East, if it were not bought at the price of many concessions that would make the Soviets more powerful and more threatening to British Asian interests in the future.

United Nations – (b) Churchill did not share Roosevelt's idealistic vision for a new democratic world order based on this international organization. He had nothing against the United Nations, however, especially if the many colonies in the British Empire, such as India and Kenya, were represented. He did not want to give the Soviet Union too much power in this organization.

U.S. Aid – (b) Churchill would appreciate as much aid as the United States would be willing to grant Britain. He was not directly opposed to lending money to the USSR, but approved of any means available to control the actions of the Soviets.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics – Joseph Stalin

Background and general outlook: Stalin and most of the Soviet people would never forget that they had been invaded twice in 25 years by Germany. Nor would they forget the 20 million people killed during World War II (compared to 332,000 Americans), far more than any other country. Furthermore, the Soviet leadership liked to point out that they fought 80 percent of all the German soldiers in World War II. The Soviets thought that the capitalist (non-communist) countries were out to destroy the Soviet Union – that is why they helped counterrevolutionaries in the Russian Civil War, failed to make a pre-war alliance against Hitler, encouraged Hitler to take Czechoslovakia, and delayed for two years opening up a "second front" in France.

Soviet negotiators also believed in their system. They thought that what they called "socialism" was a much fairer way to share and produce wealth than the free enterprise system. Under that system, which they called capitalism, the Soviets claimed that property owners get rich by taking advantage of workers. Soviet communists believed it was only a matter of time before all of the capitalist governments would be overthrown by workers.

Specific interests:

Germany – (a) Stalin thought that Germany should be permanently divided under the supervision of Britain, the USSR, and the United States. Furthermore, the Soviets wanted the right to take $20 bil-

lion (300 billion 1990 dollars) from what was left of Germany to repay the Soviets for their losses during World War II.

Poland – (a) Stalin called for a friendly, socialist government installed in Poland under the leadership of a group known as the Lublin Poles. He opposed a role in Poland's future for the London Poles, whom he regarded as puppets of Winston Churchill. Stalin also wanted parts of eastern Poland added to the USSR to provide a buffer area to absorb a possible attack from Germany in the future.

Eastern Europe – (a) Stalin believed that, since the Soviet Union had driven the German Army out of Eastern Europe, it should be allowed to decide how these countries would be governed. These countries would also serve as buffer states to protect the USSR from future attacks. He noticed that the United States and Britain had established a government in Italy without consulting the Soviet Union. Stalin thought Roosevelt and Churchill were hypocritical to insist on free elections in Eastern Europe when Britain did not grant free elections in its colonies and the United States denied the vote to Southern blacks.

Japan and the Far East – (a) Stalin thought of regaining land taken from Russia by Japan in 1905 – the Kurile Islands, the South Sakhalin Peninsula, and Port Arthur. In addition, Stalin wanted control of railroads in Manchuria (part of China) and an occupation zone in Japan. He also considered giving support to communist leader Mao Zedung as the rightful ruler of China. If the United States wanted the USSR to help invade Japan after the losses the USSR suffered against Germany, Stalin could bargain for most or all of the above.

United Nations – (a) Stalin suspected the United Nations would be used as an instrument to embarrass or attack the Soviet Union. But Stalin was willing to join the United Nations if the Soviets were given 15 votes in the General Assembly (one for every Soviet republic) and/or veto power in the Security Council.

U.S. Aid – (a) The USSR desperately needed money to rebuild an economy devastated by four terrible years of warfare. Stalin was willing to accept help from the United States as long as there were no strings attached.

Chapter Questions:

1. Identify or define and briefly tell the importance to the rest of this chapter of each of the following:
   - Big Three
   - Yalta
   - Problem at Yalta of each of the following: Germany, Poland, Eastern Europe, Japan and the Far East, United Nations, aid after the war
2. Make as strong a position as you can to support your country's position on four of the issues discussed in the chapter.
3. Sit with the other students representing your country. Talk with your group to be sure you all understand each issue and can argue for your country's position. Then elect a leader who will send several (up to three) students to each of the other two countries. The job of each diplomat is to get an idea of the concessions the other countries are willing to make. Be sure to argue for and explain the logic and fairness of your country's proposals. Then return to your group and report to your leader.

   The leaders will go outside of the class with one advisor each to complete the negotiations in the hall. When the leaders return, examine the similarities and differences between the actual agreements and those reached by leaders outside of the classroom. You may wish to discuss whether too much was given to the Soviets at Yalta or whether the USSR got less than they should have been given.

Results of the Yalta Conference

Germany was temporarily divided into four occupation zones, with the French zone taken out of those of the United States and Britain. Berlin, in the eastern (Soviet) zone, was also divided temporarily among the same four nations. Austria and its capital city, Vienna, were similarly divided.

Poland was to be administered by a coalition government, which would then hold free elections under Allied supervision. In addition, much of eastern Poland was given to the Soviet Union; Poland in turn was given eastern portions of Germany.

The USSR pledged to hold free elections in the Eastern European countries that had been liberated by the Red Army – Romania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary.

The Soviet Union promised to enter the war against Japan within three months of Hitler's defeat; it recognized Chiang Kai-shek as the legitimate ruler of China. In exchange, the Soviets received the southern Sakhalin Peninsula, the Kurile Islands, and Port Arthur.

The Soviets joined the United Nations; they were given three votes in the General Assembly and (along with the United States, Britain, nationalist China, and France) veto power in the Security Council.

Nothing was decided about postwar loans.

Attitudes About the Yalta Conference

With the advantage of hindsight, many Americans charged President Roosevelt with negotiating an agreement with the Soviet Union which, like the Munich Accord, surrendered territory in exchange for empty promises. Roosevelt Democrats defended themselves by pointing to numerous Soviet concessions. Many historians of the period have argued that the Yalta Agreement was the best pact the United States and Britain could have hoped for, given the situation at the time. Read the following statements and decide which best characterizes the Yalta Agreement.

> The real issue...is not what Stalin would or could have taken, but what he was given the right to take. This agreement provided Stalin with moral cloak for his aggressive designs in Asia, and, more important, with almost a legal title at the Peace Conference to the territories and privileges which he demanded.[1]
>
> Chester Wilmot

> The record... shows clearly that the Soviet Union made greater concessions at Yalta to the United States and Great Britain than were made the Soviets. The agreements reached...were, on the whole, a diplomatic triumph for the United States and Britain.[2]
>
> Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.

> Aside from such things as the restoration of Russian sovereignty in Sakhalin or the Kuriles, the Western allies conceded nothing that Russia had not already taken or could not have taken.[3]
>
> Henry Steele Commager

Sources

1. Chester Wilmot, *The Struggle for Europe* (New York: Harper and Row, 1959); quoted in Richard Fenno, Jr., *The Yalta Conference* (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company, 1972), p. 76.

2. Edward R. Stettinius, *Roosevelt and the Russians* (Garden City, NY: 1949), p. 295; quoted in Richard Fenno, *op. cit.* p. xiii.

3. Henry Steele Commager, "Was Yalta a Calamity? A Debate," *New York Times Magazine* (August 3, 1952), p. 49; quoted in Richard Fenno, *op. cit.*, p. xiii.

CHAPTER 7: THE DECISION TO DROP THE BOMB

On December 6, 1941, President Franklin Roosevelt met with a small group of scientists to announce an earth-shattering decision. He told them to go ahead with experiments directed at making an atomic bomb. The very next day Japanese planes all but sank the U.S. Pacific fleet at Pearl Harbor. This act of aggression thrust the United States into a war with Japan and Germany. It also gave U.S. scientists one more reason to make a bomb that could destroy an entire city in a single blast. The Manhattan Project, as the effort to make the atomic bomb was called, was put under the direction of General Leslie Groves. This effort proceeded much as planned, costing $2 billion and employing thousands of people. The project was so secret that nobody even told Vice-President Harry Truman about it.

Harry S Truman

President Roosevelt died on April 12, 1945, shortly before scientists were ready to test the bomb. President Truman was informed of the plans to build the bomb after his first cabinet meeting. A few months later, he would have to make a decision whether to use it. His decision was so controversial that people are still debating it today. This chapter will give you the facts and insights needed to participate in this ongoing argument.

War Against Japan

Although President Roosevelt officially committed the United States to a "Germany first" policy, he decided that the first blow should fall on Japan. Thus, on April 18, 1942, Colonel James Doolittle led a squadron of sixteen B-25 bombers in a daring air raid of Tokyo. They took off from the aircraft carrier *USS Hornet*, bombed Tokyo on the full light of day, and landed in nationalist-controlled China.

Destroying little of military importance, the Doolittle raid did, however, have two important results. It gave a needed boost to American morale. It also caused Japan to make a fateful change in strategy. Japanese officials had already planned to take New Guinea as an airbase for attacks on Australia. They also had determined to seize the Solomon Island chain down to Fiji to cut U.S.-Australia sea routes.

Now Japanese leaders decided to attack east as well. In an effort to prevent future air raids, they attempted to lure the remaining U.S. carriers to destruction at Midway Island. Japan's mistake was to plan three separate operations at the same time. This limited the forces Japan could commit to any one of them. The 1942 division of Japan's armed might, as we shall see, had fateful consequences for all three offensives.

Three American Victories

In the first of the three fateful battles, an American fleet intercepted Japanese invaders heading for Port Moresby, New Guinea, on May 4, 1942. Over four days, more than 250 aircraft bombed, strafed, and torpedoed their targets. This was the first naval engagement in history in which opposing fleets never caught sight of one another. At the Battle of the Coral Sea, U.S. and Japanese fleets suffered

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roughly equal losses. However, the United States prevented the Japanese invasion of New Guinea, and the United States was much faster than Japan at repairing damaged ships and building new ones.

In June 1942, Admiral Yamamoto, the architect of Pearl Harbor, set in motion a plan to trap and destroy the remaining U.S. carriers at Midway. Yamamoto's plan was to send one naval force to pretend to invade the Aleutian islands, and then to stage an air raid on Midway. Yamamoto hoped to cause the U.S. carriers to steam to the rescue of the Midway garrison, leaving behind slower support ships. At Midway the American carriers would then be ambushed by a third Japanese fleet of battleships. Outnumbering the Americans, Yamamoto expected to blast the American fleet out of the water.

U.S. Admiral Nimitz had access to decoded Japanese messages and was not fooled by Yamamoto. Therefore, he sent all available U.S. carriers, including the *Yorktown*, to await the Japanese at Midway. His plan was to destroy the Japanese decoy carriers before Yamamoto's main battle force arrived. On June 4, U.S. dive and torpedo bombers located the Japanese carriers at Midway. Planes protecting the Japanese carriers dived to shoot down low-flying U.S. torpedo planes. Luck now intervened. At that very moment, a squadron of U.S. bombers caught sight of the Japanese carriers and swooped down from 19,000 feet. In five fiery minutes they sank three of the four enemy carriers. (The fourth was found and sunk later the next day.) The Japanese navy had temporarily lost its sword arm.

After such a crushing defeat, the Japanese desperately needed to regain the upper hand. In contrast to Midway, the struggle for the Solomon Islands lasted seven months. Its result, however, was no less decisive. In August 1942, U.S. marines landed on Guadalcanal in the Solomons to prevent Japanese occupiers from building an airfield. If completed, the airfield could launch attacks against U.S. and Australian shipping. The 12,000 marines drove the Japanese into the jungles around the airstrip now called Henderson Field. This led to a major land, air, and sea struggle. Time after time, the Japanese ferried invasion forces down the narrow waters between the two chains of the Solomons to attack Guadalcanal. Each time, they were beaten back by U.S. ships, planes, and troops. Finally, on February 7, 1943, the Imperial Navy admitted defeat and pulled out the last of the Japanese Guadalcanal defenders. Japanese naval, aircraft, and troop losses had been both larger than those of the United States and far more difficult to replace. The tide in the Pacific had definitely turned in favor of the United States!

Offensive in the Pacific

With Japan on the defensive, U.S. planners decided to adopt a two-pronged strategy for the American offensive. General MacArthur would command the land attack on the Japanese Home Islands from the southwest. He would come by way of New Guinea and the Philippines. This would allow him to keep the "I shall return" promise, given when he was forced to leave the Philippines early in 1942. Meanwhile, Admiral Nimitz would oversee a naval advance on Japan from the east through the open waters of the Central Pacific. Here the United States could exploit its growing fleet of fast carriers to support amphibious (sea-land) troop attacks. Americans evolved a tactic to defeat Japan's system of interlocking naval and air bases. The United States would simply "leapfrog" around strongly held enemy islands. The bypassed base would thereby be cut off from its source of supplies and left to "wither on the vine." In this way, American forces were able to advance on two fronts. Meanwhile, a U.S. submarine blockade and aerial bombardment of the Home Islands reduced the Japanese ability to wage war.

In October 1944, American forces began to drive the Japanese out of the Philippines. There they found that U.S. prisoners, left behind in the 1942 defeat, had been grossly mistreated by their Japanese jailers. In February 1945, U.S. Marines landed in Iwo Jima. In the bloody battle that followed, most of the 23,000 Japanese defenders chose to fight to the death rather than surrender. The Americans needed Iwo Jima, 750 miles from Tokyo, as a refueling airfield for bomber raids on Japan. The U.S. victory at Iwo Jima was commemorated by the magnificent photograph of U.S. Marines raising the American flag over the island. On April 1, U.S. Marines and Army units stormed ashore on Okinawa, the last of a series of stepping stones to Japan. It took three months for the U.S. to conquer

this island. While the Japanese fought for every foot of Okinawa, the United States sank what was left of the Japanese navy. In this fighting, over 280 U.S. ships were damaged or sunk in air raids. The most effective weapons the Japanese used were 2,000 planes loaded with explosives and captained by suicide (*Kamikaze* or Holy Wind) pilots.

High-altitude bombing of Japan began in November 1944. Missions were flown at night in order to assure the safety of the bombers. Because of the distance and the darkness, these raids were not very successful. Then in May 1945, General Curtis LeMay changed the whole nature of air raids against Japan. Without bothering to get permission from his superiors, he ordered his bomber crews to fly their missions by night and close to the ground. Attacking with incendiary (fire-producing) bombs, this first low-level raid burned 16 square miles of Tokyo. It killed 88,000 and left 250,000 homeless. The U.S. Army Air Corps generals in Washington was pleased with the results of this raid and made plans for more to come.

Defense of the Homeland

After Okinawa, the Japanese prepared to defend their homeland. Japanese planners lacked sufficient planes to prevent bombing raids, adequate ships to intercept an invasion fleet, and enough soldiers to defeat the Americans once they landed. Nevertheless, they designed a defense plan with three stages:

1. 4,000 Japanese *Kamikaze* pilots would fly planes loaded with explosives into U.S. invasion ships.

2. A wall of gunfire would mow down the invaders as they landed.

3. Human wave attacks would drive surviving Americans into the sea.

Conditions in Japan

Japanese leaders who made plans for fighting off U.S. forces knew little about how the average Japanese stayed alive from day to day. Most Japanese cities had been destroyed by incendiary bomb raids such as the one on Tokyo. Civilians who survived spent night after sleepless night in crowded air raid shelters. The Japanese population suffered from shortages of rice and other food. Even the potatoes planted to improve their meager diet were being made into aviation gasoline.

To bolster their armed force, the Japanese drafted 15-year-old boys; these teenagers served in local defense units with their grandfathers. Only one in ten soldiers had a gun, and many of these weapons were of an ancient, muzzle-loading design. Civilians were asked to cut bamboo and fashion spears to attack heavily-armed U.S. invaders. Weakened by hunger, these boys and old men could barely knock over straw puppets when they trained with their sharpened bamboo poles.

Japan's economic life was grinding to a halt in the spring of 1945. Japan lacked coal and iron as well as any reliable means of transportation. Production of ships and planes practically ceased altogether. The aircraft that the Home Islands possessed were no match for superior American fighters, and Japanese airfields often were virtually unprotected from American bombers.

Japan depended completely on the outside world for the food, raw materials, and fuel needed to continue the war and feed its population, but the U.S. Navy had all but blockaded Japan, sealing it off from sources of supplies. Meanwhile, 5 million Japanese soldiers in Asia had no way of coming home to defend the Home Islands.

The Movement to End the War

Many Japanese citizens must have suspected that their country had little chance in the face of the coming American invasion, but even the most peace-loving did not dare to speak out against the war. Spies and informers reported "defeatist" talk to the authorities. Even in the highest circles of govern-

ment, no one openly argued that Japan ought to accept the Allied demand for unconditional surrender. Political assassinations had long been used by those in power against opponents.

Still, there were many high-ranking opponents of the war; they had a strong sponsor, Emperor Hirohito himself. Although removed from the decision-making process of government, the Emperor was able to work behind the scenes. Through court officials, he was able to investigate the true state of Japan's war effort. After consulting privately with a group of former prime ministers, the Emperor became convinced that he himself had to intervene to end the Japanese people's unnecessary suffering.

The Emperor used his court and political privileges to help develop a peace plan. The peace faction (those who were trying to end the war) would talk with diplomats from the neutral USSR. Perhaps the USSR could be persuaded to enter the war on Japan's side. If that failed, the Soviets could be asked to arrange an "honorable" peace with the United States on some other terms than unconditional surrender.

Arguments About Using the Bomb

Not all the scientists who assisted in making the atomic bomb wanted to see it used. The faction opposed to dropping the bomb on a Japanese city was led by two scientists, James Franck and Leo Szilard. At the time they joined the Manhattan Project, Franck and Szilard thought the Germans were working on a similar project and might be the first to invent an atomic bomb. The German attempt to produce nuclear weapons failed completely. What was left of this effort fell into Allied hands in May 1945 with Germany's surrender.

As President Harry Truman began the process of deciding whether to use the bomb against Japan, he appointed a group, the Interim Committee, to advise him. It was made up of various military officers, scientists, and state department officials connected with the project. Almost from the beginning, Interim Committee members seemed to lean toward using the bomb against a Japanese city. They argued that large civilian casualties were already being produced by conventional air raids. Voter war-weariness, anticipated Japan invasion bloodshed, and potential post-war problems with the Soviets were also mentioned as reasons to drop the bomb on a Japanese city.

Franck and Szilard issued their own report ahead of the Interim Committee. It read in part:

> The military advantages and savings of American lives achieved by the sudden use of atomic bombs against Japan may be outweighed by the ensuing [resulting] loss of confidence [in the United States] and by a wave of repulsion sweeping over the rest of the world.
>
> From this point of view, a demonstration of the new weapon might best be made before the eyes of representatives of all the United Nations, on the desert or on a barren [uninhabited] island. The best possible atmosphere [surroundings] for achieving an international agreement could be achieved if America could say to the world, "You see what sort of weapon we had but did not use. We were ready to renounce [give up] its use in the future if other nations join us in this renunciation and agree to put nuclear weapons under efficient international control."[1]

A panel of scientists appointed by the Interim Committee disagreed with Franck and Szilard. They dismissed the effectiveness of a harmless demonstration of an atomic explosion, especially considering the limited supply of bombs. They argued that military use of the bomb was necessary not only to save the lives of American troops; the sheer frightfulness of its results might knock Japan out of this war and prevent future wars as well. They concluded:

> we can propose no technical demonstration likely to bring an end to the war; we see no acceptable alternative to direct military use.[2]

Other reasons for opposing the use of the bomb were stated by Ralph Beard, Undersecretary of the Navy:

> During recent weeks I have had the feeling that the Japanese government may be searching for an opportunity that they could use as an excuse to surrender. Emissaries [representatives] from the U.S. could meet with representatives from Japan on the coast of China and tell them of Russia's position [on getting territory in Asia] and information concerning the proposed use of atomic weapons, together with assurance the President might care to make with regard to the Emperor of Japan and the treatment of the Japanese nation following unconditional surrender. It seems quite possible to me that this represents the opportunity [to arrange for the terms of an honorable surrender] which the Japanese are looking for. The only way to find out is to try it out.[3]

The Interim Committee advised President Truman to use the bomb against Japan as soon as possible on a target that was both military and civilian without issuing a prior warning of the nature of the explosive power of this new weapon. Some of the arguments supporting this decision were reviewed by the Chairman of the Committee, Henry L. Stimson:

> As we understood it in July, there was a very strong possibility that the Japanese government might determine upon resistance to the end, in all the areas of the Far East under its control. In such an event the Allies would be faced with the enormous task of destroying an armed force of 5 million men and 5 thousand suicide [*Kamikaze*] aircraft, belonging to a race which had already demonstrated its ability to fight to the death.
>
> I felt to extract a genuine surrender from the Emperor and his military advisors, they must be administered a tremendous shock which could carry convincing proof of our power to destroy the Empire. Such an effective shock could save many times the lives, both American and Japanese, that it would cost.
>
> Nothing would have been more damaging to our effort to obtain surrender than a warning or a demonstration followed by a dud [bomb that would not go off] – this was a real possibility. Furthermore, we had no bombs to waste. It was vital that a sufficient effect be quickly obtained with the few we had.[4]

Japan Seeks a Negotiated End to the War

While American decision-makers were debating, the movement for peace at the highest level of the Japanese government was growing stronger. Japan's Supreme Council was called by the Emperor himself, an event that had never occurred before. The Council decided to seek Soviet help in arranging a negotiated peace. On the day in June that Okinawa fell, the Emperor appointed Prince Konoye, his favorite cousin, to negotiate with the Soviets. But Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov was too busy preparing for the July Postdam Conference to meet with Konoye. U.S. leaders were aware of Japan's intention to seek a negotiated end of the war, since messages were monitored by U.S. intelligence agents who wrote about these negotiations in their diaries.

Time for a Decision

On July 16, 1945, the U.S. detonated [exploded] the first atomic bomb in Alamogordo, New Mexico. Not long after its mushroom shaped cloud rose over the New Mexico desert, President Truman faced an agonizing decision. Should he demand an unconditional surrender, making no specific reference to the nature of the atomic bomb, and use it on a military/civilian target if the Japanese refused to surrender without conditions? Or should he drop a demonstration bomb on some sparsely inhabited area [where few people lived], and press for a negotiated surrender?

Truman's decision was one of the most important ever made by a world leader. What should it be?

Chapter Questions:

1. Identify or define and briefly tell the importance to this chapter of each of the following:
   - Manhattan Project
   - Coral Sea
   - Midway
   - Henderson Field
   - leapfrogging
   - Iwo Jima and Okinawa
   - General LeMay
   - three-stage defense plan
   - bamboo poles
   - blockade
   - Hirohito and Konoye
   - Franck and Szilard
   - Interim Committee
   - emissaries
   - tremendous shock
2. On your map from Chapter 4, label the month and year of major U.S. campaigns and battles in the Pacific.
3. Prepare a position paper arguing either:
   a. that President Truman should order the use of an atomic bomb against a Japanese city.

   or

   b. that President Truman should order that a demonstration bomb be dropped on some uninhabited area and assure the Japanese that they could keep their emperor.
4. Play the roles of Interim Committee or Franck-Szilard group scientists in a meeting to persuade President Truman to use the atomic bomb as you advise.

Sources

1. James Frank et al., "A Report to the Secretary of War," quoted in Morton Grodzins and Eugene Rabinowitch, eds., *The Atomic Age* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1963), p. 24.
2. Henry L. Stimson, "The Decision to Use the Bomb," in Grodzins and Rabinowitch, p. 35.
3. "Truman Did Not Understand," *U.S. News and World Report* (August 15, 1960), p. 74.
4. Henry L. Stimson, *op. cit.*, pp. 35-37.

CHAPTER 8: THE BOMB, PART II

In the previous chapter, you were asked to decide whether the United States should drop an atomic bomb on a Japanese city without first demonstrating to the Japanese the awesome power of this weapon. This chapter reports what the United States did and how the war ended. Read this chapter carefully to see if it in any way changes your opinions on the use of nuclear weapons.

The Potsdam Declaration

President Truman had been told the first atomic bomb would be ready for use by August 1, 1945. The President received this information while at a conference in Potsdam with Soviet and British leaders. At the time the Potsdam Conference concluded, the components of an atomic bomb, including 100 pounds of uranium 235, were on their way across the Pacific. Nicknamed the "Little Boy," probably because of its great size and five-ton weight, the bomb was assembled on the island of Tinian. Here a crew specially trained to fly the B-29s slated to drop the bomb was waiting. In the meantime, President Truman ordered the release of the Anglo-American Potsdam Declaration to Japan. While holding out hope for fair treatment, this surrender ultimatum [last warning] said nothing on two important matters: (1) the future of the Emperor, and (2) the nature of the weapon poised for use against the Japanese. The declaration did say:

> We call upon the government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all Japanese forces, and to provide proper assurances of their good faith in such action. The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction.

Hundreds of thousands of leaflets containing this warning were dropped all over Japan. No doubt millions of Japanese saw and read this warning, which was written in their language. The Japanese government, however, made no official reply and unofficially dismissed the warning as American propaganda.

The Bomb and Its Effects

On August 4, 1945, the bomb was ready. President Truman gave orders that this and the other atomic bombs should be used as soon as possible. On August 6, 1945, the weather was perfect, as the first of three planes approached Hiroshima from an altitude of five miles. It was 8:15 a.m. The *Enola Gay* released its single bomb close to its target, the center of the city. Immediately afterwards, the plane turned upward sharply to avoid the shock wave of the blast. The bomb hurtled toward the city, where some 350,000 people were just starting their day's activities. It exploded 1,850 feet above the ground, the altitude at which experts believed the destructive effects of the bomb would be greatest.

In the city below, the air raid sirens had already sounded the all-clear. At that very moment, a blinding fireball exploded, raising temperatures briefly to one million degrees fahrenheit. Within seconds, some 50,000 people, mostly civilians, were dead; fires were started up to two miles away. Altogether 71,379 people were killed or missing. Another 68,023 were serious injured, most terribly burned, only to die of radiation exposure later. Nearly 5 square miles of the city were reduced to rubble, and 80 percent of Hiroshima's buildings were destroyed.

The heat of the blast melted the eyes of soldiers at anti-aircraft guns who had looked at the explosion. Children were killed instantly on their way to school, and longshoremen died at their docks. What few medical supplies remained in Hiroshima were soon used up. The doctors who survived the blast were unable to do much more than ease the pain of the dying. The human dimensions of this tragedy are best described by a single example, multiplied 71,379 times:

> A first grader, Issaku Watanabe, was walking with a friend to their school at the instant of the explosion. Shocked and numbed, they turned in their tracks and started back to Issaku's house. On the way, Issaku's friend died. He himself, face inflated like a grotesque [ugly] balloon, somehow managed to get home. The only clothes left on his

body were a pair of underpants; even his shoes had disintegrated. By the time he reached home he was trembling all over.

While his mother ran to take him in her arms, he cried, "Don't touch me! Everything hurts so! Just let me sleep." In the house the blast had turned everything upside down. Issaku's mother managed to push two sofas together in the guest room, and there the boy lay down for a time. He could feel that the skin on the palms of his hand had by now peeled completely away; he knew that his head was badly burned, his eyes and mouth grossly swollen.

As Mrs. Watanabe stood sadly over him, wondering what she could do for him, he muttered, "Mother, I can't see your face."

"Open your eyes slowly," she said, "Then you'll be able to see me."

By now Issaku's pain had grown much worse. In obvious agony, he writhed [squirmed] on the bed and then threw up....

"What is it?" [his mother] cried. "What hurts you worst?"

"My arms and legs," he muttered, his words hardly audible.

What was she to do? There was no medicine in the house that could assuage [relieve the pains of] such severe burns. In stricken silence, she sat down besides her suffering son; she was too saddened even to be able to cry....Sometime later..., Issaku was put on a wooden trestle and carried to a reception center. [He] was running a temperature. His mother kept putting wet towels on his forehead, but they did no good. He was soon delirious, and at six in the morning he died....[1]

The Soviet Union Declares War on Japan

On August 7 and 8, the stunned Japanese government gathered what information it could to learn exactly what happened in Hiroshima. At 5 p.m. on the 7th, Prince Konoye, the Emperor's representative, was finally granted his long-delayed meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov. Molotov immediately informed the ambassador that the Soviet Union would declare war on his country within seven hours. Thus, all hopes ended that the Soviet Union would help Japan start peace talks with the United States.

The next day, August 8, Soviet troops stormed across the Manchurian border and attacked Japanese forces. The Japanese army put up very little resistance.

On August 9 a second atomic bomb was dropped – this time on Nagasaki. Originally, this bomb had been scheduled for use on August 11, but a great effort was made to prepare the bomb and plane before several days of predicted bad weather. Thus, another 39,000 people were killed before the Japanese surrendered unconditionally.

Japan Surrenders

On August 10, the Japanese government informed the Allies that it would agree to the Potsdam terms if the Emperor was allowed to keep his position as titular [in name only] head of the government. America's reply was vague. The Japanese were told that the Emperor would be "subject to the Supreme Commander of the Allied powers" who would "take such steps as [it] deems [thinks] proper to effectuate [bring about] the terms of surrender."

On August 15, the Emperor decided to end the fighting. His announcement was broadcast all over Japan. This was the first time in a very long history that a Japanese Emperor directly addressed his people.

American experts on Japan had predicted that the Emperor could end the war by ordering all his subjects to surrender. This is indeed what happened. In China, in Indochina, in Thailand, in Malaya, and on dozens of small islands in the Pacific, more than 5 million Japanese soldiers heeded the Emperor's request to lay down their weapons.

In the peace that followed, Emperor Hirohito was permitted to maintain his role in the Japanese government. He died in 1989, much honored and loved by his people.

Children's Memorial, Hiroshima Peace Park

Chapter Questions

1. Identify or define and briefly tell the importance to this chapter of each of the following:
   - Tinian
   - Little Boy
   - Potsdam Declaration
   - August 6, 1945, 8:15 a.m.
   - number killed and wounded in Hiroshima
   - heat of the blast
   - three things that happened to Issaku Watanabe
   - multiply by 71,379 times
   - Prince Konoye
   - Nagasaki
   - how the war ended
   - fate of the Emperor
2. Write your personal reactions to the information in this chapter.
3. Did the information in this chapter cause you to change your mind regarding the decision to drop the bomb on a Japanese city without warning? Why or why not?

Source

1. The Pacific War Research Society, *The Day Man Lost* (Tokyo: Kodansha International Ltd., 1972), pp. 245-246, 288.

CHAPTER 9: BAN THE BOMB? THE IMPASSE OVER NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

Ban the atomic bomb? Would it be possible to outlaw the most powerful weapon on earth? Would it be smart for the United States, the only country in the world that had the bomb, to give up its nuclear superiority?

Try to understand the alternative many American leaders proposed to what would surely be only a temporary U.S. monopoly on nuclear technology. They thought that all future development of nuclear energy for peaceful or military purposes should be controlled by the United Nations.

In this chapter, you will learn of the proposal that the United States made to give the United Nations the knowledge and resources needed to make nuclear weapons. You also will read arguments for and against this proposal, and the Soviet Union's response to it. Finally, you will be asked to evaluate the Soviet response to American attempts to avoid a nuclear arms race.

Truman's Cabinet Debates Sharing the U.S.'s Nuclear Information

On the advice of his Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson, President Truman raised the issue central to this chapter at a meeting of key advisors on September 18, 1945. Their debate was so intense that Truman decided to devote the next cabinet meeting to the subject.

At the next meeting of the cabinet, three days later, Stimson made a compelling argument in favor of his proposal. He said the scientific knowledge needed to produce the bomb was understood by scientists of many nations, including the USSR. The question, therefore, was not *whether* the United States would always be the only country with nuclear weapons. Rather, the question was whether the United States ought to share its knowledge with other nations while it still had the lead in nuclear technology. This sharing could establish an atmosphere of international trust concerning nuclear power. This trust, Stimson thought, could prevent an arms race costing untold billions of dollars and leading to nuclear holocaust (total destruction).

The following is a dramatization of the discussion that actually took place at the September 21 meeting:

> **Henry Wallace** (Secretary of Commerce and former Vice President): The USSR is a young and vigorous nation. To maintain peaceful relations with the Soviet Union, we must keep in the closest possible touch with Soviet scientific, agricultural, economic, and cultural development. In this way we can both protect ourselves from surprising developments and gain a true friend.
>
> **Clinton Anderson** (Secretary of Agriculture): The bomb and the knowledge that produced it are the property of the American people. The people of this country do not want the knowledge of the bomb given away to the Soviets.
>
> **Vannevar Bush** (Director, Office of Scientific Research and Development): The proposal considered does not involve giving away the secret of the atomic bomb. That secret resides principally in the details of the construction of the bombs themselves. What is proposed is the sharing of scientific information about nuclear fission. We cannot keep such essentially scientific information from the Soviets without keeping it from...our own scientists.
>
> **James Byrnes** (Secretary of State): It is very well for you to say that scientific knowledge knows no boundaries, but that actually does not apply to Mr. Molotov and Mr. Stalin. They would never allow us to inspect their bomb-producing factories and laboratories.

Henry Stimson: Whether the USSR gets control of the bomb in four years or in twenty is not as important as making certain that when they do, they will be willing and cooperative partners among the peace-loving nations of the world.

James Forrestal (Secretary of Navy): We must remember we trusted Japan during World War I. The Japanese were our allies, just like the Soviets in World War II. After the first war, we made naval agreements with the Japanese; they did not live up to those agreements. The Soviets, like the Japanese, are Oriental in their thinking....We should not believe in their promises....We tried that once with Hitler, but our trust was only interpreted as weakness.

Stimson: My judgment is that the Soviets would be apt to respond sincerely to a direct and forthright approach made by the United States. The chief lesson I have learned in a long life is that the only way to make a man trustworthy is to trust him...[1]

The Plan to Ban Nuclear Weapons and for International Control of the Atom

After this cabinet meeting,Truman consulted with key congressmen and other heads of state. He decided to place a proposal to ban nuclear weapons before the United Nations. He turned the actual drafting of a proposal over to Robert Oppenheimer, the father of the A bomb; David Lilienthal, head of the Tennessee Valley Authority; and Dean Acheson, a future secretary of state. The man he asked to fine tune the formal plan was Bernard Baruch. Baruch was a well-known industrialist and elder statesman. He was trusted and popular in Congress but had no specialized information concerning nuclear weapons or negotiating with Russia.

The Baruch Plan called for creation of an Atomic Development Authority (somewhat like the TVA) as part of the administration of the United Nations. This super-agency would be given wide powers over the production, stockpiling, and regulation of nuclear energy, as well as of the mining of uranium and other materials needed to make nuclear weapons. Specifically, this proposed international agency would have the power to:

1. Mine the uranium and thorium required to produce nuclear weapons and thus provide for international control over fissionable materials.

2. Continue research and development of nuclear energy.

3. Process and stockpile these materials to keep them outside the national control of any single country.

4. Lease nuclear materials and license carefully defined non-military nuclear projects to permit the peaceful development of atomic energy.

5. Conduct unlimited international inspections of nuclear facilities all over the world to prevent cheating.

6. Suggest severe punishments to be prescribed by the U.N. Security Council. By majority vote, the Security Council (where the Soviet Union would be outvoted 4-1) would decide upon and administer the punishment for violation of Atomic Development Authority regulations.

Bernard Baruch called for three distinct and separate steps to be taken before full implementation of his plan. First, the Atomic Development Authority would survey existing uranium mines and stockpiles of nuclear materials. Second, the world's nations would exchange existing scientific information. Finally, when (*and only when*) the above were completed, the United States would destroy all nuclear weapons.

The Soviet Plan

Most of the non-communist world applauded the Baruch Plan as an honest attempt to put the nuclear genie back into its bottle. However, it was the USSR's willingness to go along with the plan that would matter most. Paying scant attention to the American plan, however, the Soviets proposed their own.

The Soviet plan called upon all nations to promise not to produce nuclear weapons and to dismantle existing atomic bombs. Inspections to insure compliance by the world's nations would also be held. These could be vetoed in the U.N. Security Council by any of the five major powers – the United States, USSR, Britain, France, and China.

The Soviet plan differed with the U.S.'s in four major areas:

1. The Soviets wanted all of the nations with nuclear weapons to dispose of them. Once this had occurred, inspections to see if any one cheated could begin. American diplomats wanted the system of inspections to begin before the United States gave up its nuclear weapons.

2. The Soviets were opposed to giving control of nuclear development and research to a super-agency. The American plan to ban the bomb hinged on establishing an international agency.

3. The United States wanted to abolish the Security Council members' veto power in order to allow the Atomic Development Authority complete freedom to inspect all areas where possible violations might take place. The Soviets refused to give up their veto or permit unlimited international inspections.

4. The United States wanted the U.N. Security Council to set punishments for violators of the nuclear agreement by a simple majority vote. The Soviets refused to surrender their veto in the Security Council over proposed punishments for violating international nuclear agreements.

Negotiations Fail

The battle lines between Soviet and American diplomats on the question of control of nuclear weapons, drawn in June 1946, changed in one significant way during some 25 months of negotiations. The Soviets offered to give up their right to prevent *international inspection* teams from *searching for violations* of the Baruch Plan. They would not back down on the issue of using their *veto* power *to punish violators* of the nuclear weapons agreement. The United States, however, refused to make "any compromise that impaired (reduced) the principle of international control."[2]

Repeated U.S. tests of nuclear weapons during the two years of discussions over the Baruch Plan did not improve the negotiating climate. For their part, the Soviets conducted research to develop their own atomic bomb at a breakneck pace. In a climate of mutual suspicion and hostility, little progress was made in nuclear weapons negotiations. The talks broke off on May 17, 1948.

One year later, the Soviet Union exploded its first atomic bomb. The resulting arms race has cost both countries literally trillions of dollars.

Chapter Questions

1. Identify or define and briefly tell the importance to the rest of the chapter of each of the following:
    - Henry Stimson
    - Henry Wallace
    - Clinton Anderson
    - Vannevar Bush
    - James Byrnes

- James Forrestal

2. Do you believe the United States was wise in proposing the Baruch Plan for banning nuclear weapons and international development of atomic energy? Or was it foolish for the United States to offer to surrender its lead in the field of nuclear weapons?

3. Compare the Baruch and Soviet plans on banning nuclear weapons. Can any case be made that the Soviet plan was more fair to both sides? Explain.

4. The Soviet position on the Baruch Plan was they would not give up their right to have nuclear weapons in exchange for unlimited inspection of their critically kept nuclear secrets. Some observers have argued that the USSR, a closed and secretive country, could hardly be expected to suddenly open its doors to an international team of inspectors. The Soviets also feared they might be unjustly accused of violations that could be used as an excuse to "punish" them. The bomb itself would remain an American (and British) monopoly while the USSR could be punished for an alleged nuclear program by majority vote of the Security Council.

   Was this a sensible or justified criticism of the Baruch Plan?

Sources

1. This dialogue was based on accounts from the diaries and memories of Harry S. Truman, Henry Stimson, James Forrestal, and Henry Wallace. Bush and Byrnes were not actually at the meeting, but sent memoranda afterwards on the request of the President.

2. Arthur S. Link, *American Epoch* (New York: Alfred L. Knopf, 1955), p. 658.

CHAPTER 10: FROM WARTIME ALLIES TO COLD WAR ENEMIES

During and after World War II, Presidents Roosevelt and Truman tried to remain on good terms with the Soviet Union. They believed the key to a future of peace and prosperity was maintenance of good U.S.-USSR relations. If the Soviets had met the Americans half way, the Cold War could have been avoided. The United States did everything that could have been reasonably expected to prevent the development of a state of hostilities with the USSR. It was Soviet suspicion and aggression that caused the break up of the Grand Alliance.

Is the above true?

No, the above is false. The United States and other Western democracies were as responsible as the Soviet Union for breaking up the Grand Alliance. The Soviets were ready to make a deal with the United States if the Americans had allowed them a defensive sphere of influence (place recognized by other countries as none of their business) in Eastern Europe. Instead, the United States kept holding the USSR to a higher standard of democratic behavior than was practiced in either the United States or the British colonies.

Is the above true?

No, the above is false. United States diplomats practically laid down on the ground to let the Soviets walk all over them. Americans should have learned from Munich that appeasing a dictator only increases his appetite for conquest. The United States should not have worried about how the Soviets might interpret its actions. If America had been tougher with the Soviets, they would have backed down and be far less of a menace to world peace today.

Is the above true?

Three Schools of Interpretation

The arguments you just read are derived from three different schools of historical thinking. The first statement represents the traditionalist school, widely accepted by liberal historians. The second position is held by revisionist historians, who became more critical of U.S. foreign policy during the Vietnam War. The third stance reflects the thinking of conservative historians, who think that the United States has not been tough enough with the USSR.

Most Americans would agree with one of these statements. You are invited to join the debate and come up with your own position based on the facts and your interpretation of them. This chapter provides information that can help you form your own opinion as to which school of historical interpretation to accept.

From Collaboration to Confrontation

February 11, 1944

Mussolini was overthrown, though Germany remained in command in Northern Italy. The United States and Britain (US/B) recognized Badoglio's Italian government composed of conservative and liberal anti-fascist politicians. The Soviets complained that communist politicians who had led the resistance to Mussolini played only a minor part in the new Italian government. Soviet objections were largely ignored. The US/B disarmed communist resistance fighters who had fought bravely against Germany. The US/B put the Italian king back on the throne.

August 1, 1944

With Soviet troops only 20 miles away, the Polish underground began an uprising against German occupation forces in Warsaw. The Red Army waited six months before resuming its Polish offensive.

By October, the Polish Home Army of some 40,000, with ties to the London Poles, was defeated. In all likelihood, the Soviet Union delayed its attack for political rather than military considerations (i.e., the Soviet Union wanted to establish a friendly socialist government – the Lublin Poles – in Poland).

October 9, 1944

At a meeting in Moscow, Churchill and Stalin came to an *unofficial and nonbinding* agreement to define their "spheres of influence." Joseph Stalin and Winston Churchill reportedly agreed to allow Britain 90 percent control of Greece if the USSR was granted 90 percent predominance in Romania and 75 percent in Bulgaria. Influence over Hungary and Yugoslavia would be split at 50 percent each. (Note: No agreement was reached on Poland or Czechoslovakia, nor was the United States consulted.)

December 3, 1944

In Athens, unarmed, pro-communist demonstrators were shot by Greek police. British troops began clearing communist guerrillas out of Athens. The communist party of Greece was very popular because of its resistance to German occupation. It took the British six weeks to suppress (put down) the communist rebellion. During this time, the Soviet government neither issued a formal protest nor helped the communist party in Greece. The communists later lost the elections.

February 12, 1945

The Yalta Conference ended with an agreement that provided for self-determination in Poland and East Europe, USSR membership in the United Nations with a veto in its Security Council, four-power occupation of Germany, German reparations, and USSR entrance into the war against Japan.

April 12, 1945

Franklin Roosevelt died, and Harry Truman became President. Truman had not been informed on previous negotiations with the USSR and was given a quick cram course.

April 21, 1945

The USSR and a provisional government composed of communist Poles signed a 20-year treaty of mutual aid. The United States protested this violation of the Yalta Agreement. Stalin replied that he was justified in interfering in Poland's affairs for reasons of self-defense. He pointed out that the British had interfered in the affairs of Greece.

April 23, 1945

Truman told Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov that it was time for the Soviets to begin to carry out both the letter and the spirit of the Yalta Agreement concerning Poland. Molotov responded that he had never been addressed in such strong language before. Truman replied that he would not be talked to that way if the Soviet government carried out its agreements.

April 30, 1945

At the U.N. organizational meeting in San Francisco, the United States and others denied membership to Poland's Lublin government. The Soviets protested. They protested again when the United States successfully backed U.N. membership for Argentina's pro-nazi government.

May 7, 1945

Germany surrendered, ending six years of constant warfare in Europe. The United States quickly stopped shipping Lend-Lease aid to the Soviet Union. Ships already en route to the USSR were called back. The Soviets protested, and the order was reversed.

May 21, 1945

Syria and Lebanon, former French colonies, broke off diplomatic relations with France because the French attempted to regain control over them. Within two weeks, French and Syrian troops clashed in Damascus. In September 1946, revolutionaries and French soldiers came to blows when the French tried to once more rule North and South Vietnam as well as Laos and Cambodia. Ho Chi Minh, a communist and a nationalist, prepared his people to fight a guerrilla war for Vietnamese independence.

July 21, 1945

In accordance with the Yalta Agreement, the US/B pulled troops several hundred miles back from positions in central Europe during the last days of World War II. Earlier, General Eisenhower had to restrain General Patton from taking Berlin, Germany, and Prague, Czechoslovakia.

July 17-August 2, 1945

USSR and US/B met at Potsdam, Germany, to revolve issues not settled at Yalta. Reparations from Germany were reduced from $20 billion to what Germany was able to pay. The US/B did not want to allow the Soviets to bleed Germany of everything it had for several reasons. One reason was that they wanted West Germany as a potential ally, if relations with the USSR worsened.

August 6-14, 1945

Hiroshima and Nagasaki were destroyed by A bombs, and the Soviets entered the war against Japan. Japan surrendered; under the terms of surrender, the USSR took over the Kurile Islands and the southern Sakhalin peninsula. Moreover, the USSR was allowed to temporarily occupy Outer Mongolia, North Korea, Port Arthur, and parts of Manchuria. The United States refused to allow the Soviets a role in occupation and reorganization of Japan.

January 6, 1946

The USSR-supported Polish government took over all industries in Poland. Land redistribution was also declared. Communist officials began to limit freedom of press, speech, and assembly in order to weaken opposing parties. The Soviets defended these actions, and similar measures taken in Romania and Bulgaria, as necessary to root out fascism and to build truly democratic peasant and worker governments. The Soviet Union also claimed it needed buffer states in its sphere of influence to protect it from invasion by hostile countries in the West.

January 27, 1946

Local elections were held in the American zone of occupied Germany. Representatives ranging from communists to former supporters of the Nazis were elected. Elections were conducted in Italy later in the year. The pro-American Christian Democratic party (with American backing, including that of the CIA) came to power, and Italy was proclaimed a republic. The United States emphasized the need to rebuild Italy and Germany, supporting amnesty for former government officials. Industrial leaders who had backed Hitler and Mussolini were allowed to keep their factories and property. No major social reforms were undertaken.

February 9, 1946

In a speech, Stalin boasted of the Red Army's power and the Soviet people's allegiance to communism. He proclaimed that capitalism led to political repression, economic crises, and war and made a peaceful international order impossible.

March 5, 1946

Speaking in the United States, Winston Churchill declared that an "iron curtain" was descending on Eastern Europe. The USSR, Churchill said, was denying millions their basic freedoms. Churchill suggested that all English-speaking people "establish the condition of freedom and democracy" as fast as possible in these countries.

By March 1946, the wartime allies had become Cold War enemies. Why had the Grand Alliance broken up so dramatically? Who was most responsible for the growing state of hostilities among the post-war superpowers?

Chapter Questions

1. Identify or define and briefly tell the importance to this chapter of each of the following:
   - three schools of thought regarding the beginning of the Cold War
   - sphere of influence
   - forming the Italian government
   - Polish Home Army
   - revolt in Athens
   - seating the Lublin Poles at the United Nations
   - Syria, Lebanon, and Vietnam
   - US/B troop withdrawal
   - change in reparations from Germany
   - what US/B saw Soviets doing in Eastern Europe
   - Iron Curtain speech
2. Make three headings on your paper as shown below. Give yourself more room to write. Then review the reading and list events that support the case of each of the three schools. Be prepared to support your decisions.

   Traditionalist School **Revisionist School** **Conservative School**

3. Prepare a speech supporting one of the three schools of thought regarding who was responsible for the breakup of the Grand Alliance. Playing the role of a delegate to the United Nations from Britain, the United States, or the USSR, defend your nation's actions and criticize your opponent's. (Note: The traditionalist school would defend U.S. and British actions, the conservative school would be critical of the U.S. for having surrendered too much to the Soviet Union, and the revisionists would say that the Anglo-American allies had not treated the USSR fairly in their efforts to shape the post-war world.)

   Your speech may draw on materials other than those covered in this chapter.

CHAPTER 11: YEARS OF DECISION

"The United States has got to learn to live with the Soviet Union. The United States can't act like the world's police force, getting involved in Europe and mainland Asia, where we have no business in the first place. Let's recognize the USSR's defensive needs and look for ways of building trust and cooperation between our two countries."

"Wait a minute! Unless the United States takes the lead in the battle against communism, the Soviets are going to take over the world. The only language those commies understand is force. What you have to do is draw the line. Then tell them if they cross it, they are going to get hit with everything we've got! We need a strategy that does more than stop the spread of Soviet domination. Our goal should be to roll back the Soviet empire and free captive people from communism."

"You're right! You can't trust the Soviet Union. As long as they can get away with it, those Soviets will try to take over more countries. But we don't want to start World War III either. What America should do is stand up to the USSR by helping countries resist communism. Don't give the Soviets any easy victories, and they'll stop trying to rule the world."

The above conversation might have taken place any time between 1946 and today. Each person in this debate represented a different approach to dealing with the Soviet Union. In this chapter, you will learn more about the thinking of leaders who argued these different positions concerning U.S./USSR relations. You will also have the opportunity to decide which approach you would like to use in response to each of five different challenges from the Soviets between 1946 and 1950.

Sphere of Influence and/or Isolation

Before Pearl Harbor, most Americans wanted their country to maintain the foreign policy it had followed for most of its 160 years. After World War II, many wanted to return to the traditional isolationist policies practiced before World War II. This would mean keeping out of Europe's affairs. In turn, European countries would be expected to stay out of North and South America. After World War II, this line of thinking was expressed by Henry Wallace. Wallace, who had once been Roosevelt's Vice President, believed there were a number of different power centers or spheres of influence in the world. For real peace, Wallace argued, the U.S. must do the following:

> recognize that we have no more business in the political affairs of Eastern Europe than the USSR has in the political affairs of Latin America. We may not like what the Soviets do in Eastern Europe. Communist land reform, industrial expropriation [government take-over of businesses], and suppression of basic liberties offends the majority of Americans. But whether we like it or not, the Soviets will try to socialize their sphere of influence, just as we try to democratize ours.
>
> We must realize that we are reckoning with a force which cannot be handled successfully by a "get tough with the USSR" policy. "Getting tough" never brought about real and lasting peace -- whether with schoolyard bullies or businessmen, or world powers. The tougher we get, the tougher the Soviets will get. What we need to do is find issues on which we and the Soviets can cooperate. Then we can negotiate agreements on these issues and thus build up a peace based on trust and mutual interest.[1]

Containment

George Kennan, who served as ambassador to the Soviet Union, became one of America's most respected diplomats and Cold War strategists. Kennan's position was that Soviet leaders were not like Hitler. They were not impatient and reckless. They did, indeed, believe in their system, and they thought that the world's nations would eventually have communist governments. However, the Soviets could be stopped as long as the United States remained patient, did not back them into a corner where they had to fight, and applied constant but firm counter-pressure to contain them.

> [I]t is clear that the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies. This will be done by the adroit [skillful] and vigilant application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy. The Soviet threat, however, cannot be charmed or talked out of existence.
>
> It is important to note, however, that such a policy [containment] has nothing to do with outward histrionics; with threats or blustering or superfluous gestures of outward "toughness." While the Kremlin is basically flexible in its reaction to political realities, it is by no means unamenable to considerations of prestige....It can be placed by tactless and threatening gestures in a position where it cannot afford to yield.
>
> [B]ut the United States has it within its power to increase enormously the strains under which Soviet policy must operate and will promote tendencies...[to] the gradual mellowing of Soviet power. This eventually will bring Soviet leadership to adjust itself in one way or another to the logic of that [U.S.-produced] state of affairs.[3]

Massive Retaliation and Liberation

As Secretary of State under President Eisenhower, John Foster Dulles became the spokesman for the retaliation and liberation school of thought. Dulles believed we could never stop the Soviets from expanding by just waiting to see where they would attack next. Instead, the United States should take the offensive by liberating people under Soviet control. Further, Dulles believed, the United States should and could use the threat of nuclear war to stop Soviet expansion.

> (W)e shall never have a secure peace or a happy world so long as Soviet communism dominates one-third of all the peoples that there are, and is in the process of trying at least to extend its rule to many others.
>
> [A] policy which only aims at containing Russia where it now is, is in itself an unsound policy; but it is a policy which is bound to fail because a purely defensive policy never wins against an aggressive policy. If our only policy is to stay where we are, we will be driven back. It is only by keeping alive the hope of liberation, by taking advantage of that wherever opportunity arises, that we will end this peril which threatens the world.
>
> We need a security system for ourselves and other free nations, a maximum deterrent at a bearable cost. Local defense will always be important. But there is no local defense which will contain the mighty land power of the Communist world. Local defense must be reinforced by the further deterrent of massive retaliatory power [the atom bomb]. A potential aggressor must know that he cannot always prescribe [choose] battle conditions that will suit him. Otherwise he might be tempted to attack in places where we are weak.[2]

Five Crises

Sphere of influence/isolation, liberation/massive retaliation, or containment -- these philosophies were advocated in the 1940s, and each still has its followers today. In the next few pages, you will read of five different situations. Your skill as an advisor to President Truman will be tested, as you try to pick the best approach to resolve each of these crises.

War-Torn Europe

Two years after World War II ended, Europe had not begun to recover from the most destructive war in its history. Cities had been systematically destroyed, block by block. Where apartment houses once stood, rubble lay as far as the eye could see. There were no police, no fire departments, no running water, no sewers, no schools, and no operating factories. People fainted on the streets from

hunger and froze to death in their homes. Some even burned their own furniture for temporary relief from the cold. This was the situation everywhere in Europe – in Berlin, Rome, and London as well as in dozens of smaller cities, hundreds of towns, and thousands of villages.

To many it seemed that Europe would not revive itself. There was no money to open mines, repair railroads, repave streets, rebuild bridges, and restore hope. There was not even enough money in Europe to feed its starving millions.

These economic hardships also created great political difficulty. People on the verge of starvation could easily be tempted into supporting major economic changes. In France and Italy, for instance, somewhere between 25 and 40 percent of all voters were willing to vote for communist parties that made great promises of improvement in their lives. There was a distinct possibility that the communists would win the next election in Italy.

Proposed solutions:

a. State U.S. concern and willingness to lend money.

b. Warn the Soviets that the United States would not allow a communist government to come to power in France or Italy and would take strong measures to restore democratic rule.

c. Spend somewhere between $120 and $170 billion (1988 dollars) to put the countries of Western and Central Europe (including Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary) back on their feet so they could support themselves.

Military Pressure on Greece and Turkey

For many decades, Britain had considered Greece and Turkey to be in its sphere of influence, but in 1947 the British told the United States they could no longer afford to support either of these countries. In Greece, communist-led guerrillas (with help from non-communists) were waging a civil war to overthrow the pro-British but corrupt and repressive Greek monarchy. This time, the Greek communist party was receiving help from the Soviet Union. The USSR sent in supplies by way of Yugoslavia. Without outside help, the King of Greece and his government could not defeat the revolt.

Meanwhile, the USSR was putting pressure on Turkey for an agreement that would place control of the Bosporus and Dardanelles in Soviet hands. Control over these choke points between the Aegean and Black Seas would give the Soviet navy free access to the Mediterranean. In addition, the Soviets wanted Turkey to grant them provinces in East Turkey that had once belonged to the Russian Empire.

Proposed solutions:

a. Inform the Soviets that the United States frowns on their expansion into Greece and Turkey.

b. Threaten the USSR with military retaliation (from U.S. B-29s that could carry nuclear bombs) if the Soviets tried to attack Turkey. Start a war of liberation to free Yugoslavia from Soviet control.

c. Give Greece and Turkey $8 billion (1990 dollars) worth of economic and military assistance so that they could defend themselves and remain independent of the Soviets.

Coup in Czechoslovakia

For three years after World War II, the Czechoslovakian government of Eduard Benes was undermined by the Soviet Union, whose Red Army had driven the Germans out of the country. In February 1948, communists in the coalition Czech government threatened a coup d'etat or seizure of the government to force Benes to turn the government over to them. An important resister against this coup, the son of Czechoslovakia's founder, Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk was found dead in the street under his

third floor office window on March 10. Few American experts on Eastern Europe believed the police report that Masaryk committed suicide.

Proposed solutions:

a. Send a formal note of protest to the Soviet Union.

b. Give assistance to anti-communist guerrillas in Czechoslovakia, and tell the Soviets they had three months to withdraw all of their troops from that country, or face nuclear destruction.

c. Support other non-communist governments in Central Europe to strengthen them against similar tactics.

Berlin Blockade

The USSR announced that, starting April 1, 1948, it would carefully inspect all goods shipped through its occupation zone to West Berlin. In practice, this meant that the Soviets would make it impossible for the United States, Britain, and France to trade freely with Berlin. The British, French, and American occupation zones of Berlin would then become completely dependent economically on Soviet-occupied East Germany.

In taking action on April 1, the Soviets were not breaking a signed agreement. In the discussions of the future of Germany during the Yalta and Potsdam conferences, the Soviet Union only gave oral consent for free access to Allied sectors of Berlin. The Soviets never made a written commitment to allow passage through their zone in East Germany to Berlin.

By July 1948, the Soviets had totally stopped rail and road traffic for the 110 miles between Berlin and the West. The Berlin blockade was the latest in a series of provocative Soviet actions. The Soviets had earlier taken goods worth many billion dollars out of East Germany as partial payment of $10 billion they had been promised at Yalta. They also demanded reparations from the zones of their former allies. Furthermore, in response to a currency reform in the western zones, the Soviets flooded their zone with paper currency, causing inflation throughout Germany. The Soviets suspected that Britain, France, and the United States were working ever more closely together to create an independent West Germany. The blockade was, in part, an attempt to prevent further cooperation among the Western democracies.

Proposed solutions:

a. Allow unification of East Germany with Berlin, and unify British, French, and American occupation zones into West Germany.

b. Use U.S. tanks with air support to lead convoys into Berlin from West Germany.

c. Fly over the blockade and supply West Berlin by air until the Soviets open the routes to West Berlin again.

Soviet Military Presence in Europe

Shortly after World War II ended, the United States brought 90 percent of its troops home from Europe, leaving slightly more than 300,000 on the continent. In contrast, the Soviets maintained 4,000,000 Red Army soldiers under arms, none very far from Western Europe. Satellite (pro-Soviet) countries in East Europe had 1,000,000 soldiers – compared to 860,000 troops in West Europe. In addition, large part of the British and French armies were in Asia, trying to hold on to their colonies. These soldiers would not be available in time to defend their homelands in case of a Soviet attack. Unless one counted the U.S. absolute superiority in nuclear weapons, the political balance in Europe had shifted to favor the USSR.

Up until 1949, U.S. defensive strategy relied mainly on its possession of nuclear arms, but the Soviets exploded their first nuclear device in August that year. U.S. strategy, henceforth, could no longer be based on America's sole possession of atomic weapons.

Proposed solutions:

a. Call for the countries of Western Europe to play a larger role in defending themselves. Do not become involved in wars to maintain their colonies.

b. Continue surrounding the Soviet Union with bases for U.S. bombers equipped for nuclear weapons, and remind the Soviets of U.S. supremacy in this regard.

c. Strengthen U.S. conventional (non-nuclear) forces in Europe, and ask Britain, France, and other Western European nations to increase their military strength.

Chapter Questions

1. Identify or define and briefly tell the importance to this chapter of each of the following:
   - sphere of influence
   - Henry Wallace
   - "land reform"
   - "school yard bullies"
   - John Foster Dulles
   - "containment unsound"
   - liberation
   - massive retaliation
   - George Kennan
   - "adroit and vigilant application of counter-force"
   - containment
   - "gradual mellowing"
   - five major crises
2. State which of the three policies sounds most sensible to you. Give reasons to support your opinion.
3. Carefully read at least two of the five crises and prepare a report covering:
   - the relevant facts of the case
   - a proposed solution and reasons you reject it
   - a proposed solution and reasons you accept it

Sources

1. Richard J. Walton, *The Price of Vision, The Diary of Henry A. Wallace* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973).
2. Quoted in Richard Hofstader, ed., *Great Issues in American History* (New York: Vintage Books, 1958), Volume II, p. 439.
3. Adapted from Hofstader, pp. 422-423, 427.

CHAPTER 12: SOLUTIONS TO FIVE CRISES

In the previous chapter, you were presented with five crises for U.S. foreign policy. You were asked to choose among three solutions for each of these problems. This chapter will explain how President Harry Truman, his advisors, and Congress actually responded to each of these crises.

The Marshall Plan

On June 5, 1947, President Truman's Secretary of State, George Marshall, addressed Harvard's graduating class. In his speech, Marshall announced that the United States was prepared to do whatever was necessary to assist Europe "in the return of normal economic health....Our policy," he stated, "is directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos. Its purpose should be the revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist."

Marshall's offer was grasped as a lifeline by the destitute nations of Europe. Before the end of June, foreign ministers of several Western European countries held a meeting attended by representatives of countries within the Soviet zones of occupation.* Three months later, the noncommunist nations of Europe drew up comprehensive plans for economic recovery. In December 1947, President Truman asked Congress for $17 billion (over 100 billion 1989 dollars) over the next four years to pay for this program. Final approval of the plan was voted on March 31, 1948, shortly before an election in Italy in which a communist majority was predicted.

The impact of the Marshall Plan was both immediate and enduring. In April 1948 elections, the communist party in Italy won only 31 percent of the vote. Over the next three years, industrial production in Marshall Plan countries increased by 37 percent, and steel manufacturing doubled. By 1952, output in most of these nations surpassed pre-war levels. This rate of growth has continued from the 1950s to the present day. In contrast, the countries of Eastern Europe, which were less industrialized before the war, have struggled economically under the communist economic system. Yet the total bill for the Marshall Plan was only $12 billion, actually $5 billion less than appropriated.

The Truman Doctrine

President Truman's determination to contain Soviet expansion was expressed in a March 1947 speech in which he asked Congress to appropriate $400,000,000 to help Greece and Turkey defend themselves. "If we falter in our leadership," Truman warned, "we may endanger the peace of the world – and surely endanger the welfare of our nation." This speech and the aid package he requested are known as the "Truman Doctrine."

Truman's request caused a flurry of protests throughout the land. The president, after all, was asking Congress to break with tradition. He asked Congress to supply arms and money to two small nations, neither particularly democratic, 4,000 miles from U.S. shores. Neither Greece nor Turkey was viewed as vital to the defense of the United States. Neither was an important trading partner. Might the United States bleed itself dry, the opponents of the aid package argued, trying to defend every anti-communist government throughout the world? Nevertheless, after much debate, Congress voted for Truman's aid package.

The economic and political assistance provided by the United States helped Greece and Turkey resist communist pressure. By October 1949, the Greek government had won the civil war against their communist opponents. Turkey resisted the USSR's demands for bases and territory. Today, both Greece and Turkey are still allies of the United States. Furthermore, after many years of right-wing military rule, Greece has become a democratic country.

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*The USSR ordered the countries under its control to withdraw from seeking aid.

The Coup in Czechoslovakia

Truman did nothing to prevent the communist party takeover of Czechoslovakia following Jan Masaryk's 1948 fall from his office window. Under the leadership of Communist Party chief Klement Gottwald, Czech industry was nationalized, collective farms were set up, opponents were jailed, and all economic ties with Western Europe were severed. As of 1990, Czechoslovakia is still a socialist state, part of the Comecon (economic league of communist countries), and a member of the Warsaw Pact, the USSR's East Europe military alliance system. In 1968 a brief attempt by reformers in the Czechoslovakian Communist Party under Alexander Dubcek to liberalize Czech society was suppressed by the Soviet Union without intervention from U.S. President Johnson. U.S. Presidents Eisenhower and Reagan also stood by when the Soviet Union suppressed similar efforts by reformers in Hungary and Poland to establish greater freedom and democracy.

The Berlin Blockade

The most dramatic response to the Soviet challenge in Europe was the American airlift to Berlin. In July 1948, the USSR announced a halt to the flow of passengers and freight into West Berlin. The United States feared that this blockade might ultimately lead to the incorporation of West Berlin into East Germany.

America's response to this threat was the Berlin airlift, a plan to fly goods into West Berlin over the Soviet zone. The United States, Britain, and France managed to fly in 8,000 tons of goods every day, enough to feed, clothe, and supply the city of 2,500,000. As many as 1,071 planes in one day (almost one a minute) flew into West Berlin. The airlift brought West Berliners sufficient raw materials and fuel to supply their factories. Thoroughly embarrassed for 11 months, the Soviets finally lifted the blockade in May 1949. Around the same time, the American, French, and British zones of Germany were united into the Federal Republic of Germany. West Berlin was officially united with West Germany.

In 1961 the East German government closed the border between East and West Berlin and built a wall across the city. The purpose of this wall was to prevent East Germans from fleeing west in search of political freedom and better economic conditions.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Following World War II, the Soviet Union did not withdraw its troops from Eastern Europe. Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg reacted to the threat of overwhelming conventional Soviet force in Eastern Europe. In 1948 these countries signed the Brussels Treaty to form a mutual defense pact. Supported by Congress, President Harry Truman began negotiations that eventually led to the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in April 1949. Member nations pledged to defend one another in case of attack. Sixteen nations are now members of NATO. They are:

Belgium	Denmark	Iceland	Netherlands	Spain	West Germany
Britain	France	Italy	Norway	Turkey	
Canada	Greece	Luxembourg	Portugal	United States	

American isolationists complained that by joining NATO, the United States was breaking away from its historic tradition of avoiding permanent alliances, but internationalists in Congress won the debate over joining NATO. For almost 40 years, NATO has helped protect Western Europe from the possibility of Soviet attack. Today, debates about NATO focus on the following issues: (1) whether the United States is paying more than its fair share of the cost of protecting Western Europe, and (2) whether the NATO allies ought to trust the Warsaw Pact enough to negotiate the demilitarization of Europe.

Conclusion

The American response to the post-war crises in the late 1940s shaped U.S. policy toward Europe over the next 40 years. Since the fall of Czechoslovakia in 1948, no Soviet troops moved west from the Soviet-controlled parts of Europe. But with the exception of the Soviet zone of Austria, the Soviet

Union, up until 1989, maintained control of all the countries it seized from Germany in 1943-1945. One might say that the United States and the USSR have never resolved the conflicts raised by their defeat of Germany in 1945.

Recently, Mikhail Gorbachev was elevated to the position of premier of the USSR, as well as General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party. He has promised a new openness in Soviet society as a restructuring of the USSR's economy. Internationally, he and other Soviet reformers have indicated their willingness to permit more freedom of choice for Eastern European nations. Moreover, Gorbachev has offered to negotiate wide-ranging disarmament agreements with the United States. Whether this signals the end of the Cold War, or simply another battle lull, is now up to American and Soviet negotiators. How will our perceptions of our Cold War history influence these negotiations? What effect will our shared past have on the future of Europe, as well as of our two countries?

Chapter Questions:

1. Identify or define and briefly tell the importance to this chapter of each of the following:
    - Marshall Plan
    - Italian elections
    - contrast between Germanies
    - Truman Doctrine
    - "if we falter"
    - outcomes in Greece and Turkey
    - Jan Masaryk
    - Klement Gottwald
    - Alexander Dubcek
    - airlift
    - formation of West Germany
    - NATO
2. Explain the philosophy represented by the five solutions. Evaluate whether it was the best philosophy for dealing with Soviet expansion.
3. Evaluate three of the five solutions, explaining whether they were good solutions and why.

ESSAY QUESTION FOR THE UNIT

In this unit, you have been answering questions concerning what countries (mainly the United States) should do in regard to conflict with non-democratic states. You have then been told what the United States did, and you have been given an opportunity to evaluate these acts -- whether they were farsighted and in keeping with America's highest ideals, or narrowminded and too concerned with selfish advantage and/or revenge.

To help you evaluate the actions of the United States, you are now going to answer a question that will call upon you to examine this unit as a whole. You will need to recall the first chapter of the unit, which described the rise of dictatorships in the Soviet Union, Italy, and Germany, and to think of ways the Western democracies, the United States included, should have responded to these events. Later you studied the Munich crisis and the decision to turn the Sudetenland in Czechoslovakia over to Germany. You learned how Hitler took advantage of this opening to make a truce with the Soviet Union, seize Poland, and, six months later, employ his blitzkreig tactics to overrun the Low countries, Norway, Denmark, and France. You were asked to make a crucial decision about providing Britain with enough help to continue the war. Then you studied the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, which left the United States with no choice other than to defend itself.

In subsequent chapters you were given enough information to simulate the Yalta Conference and to decide whether the United States should drop atomic bombs on Japanese cities without a clear and specific warning. You looked into the events following Yalta and Hiroshima that led directly to the breakup of the Grand Alliance. You have been asked to play roles, occasionally involving Soviet as well as U.S. decision-makers, and to debate whether the United States should take such specific actions as offering the Baruch Plan. In addition, you responded to the post-war European economic collapse, subversion in Greece and Turkey, the Berlin blockade, the coup in Czechoslovakia, and the military threat from Eastern Europe. All of these activities lead to a single question encompassing all of the events you studied. This question is:

> Were the United States and the other Western democracies minimally, equally, or primarily responsible for the Cold War?

To answer the question, you will need to consider such subordinant questions as:

- Did Britain and France abandon their obligations to defend central European countries in order to use Hitler to destroy Soviet communism, or were their policies toward Nazi Germany reasonable given the situation at the time?
- Were the Soviets denied legitimate security needs at Yalta and can they therefore be excused for breaking their promises? Or did the Anglo-Americans give up too much at Yalta only to be betrayed by the Soviets?
- Was the United States too quick on the trigger in dropping the bomb and deceptive in its alleged plan to give up its nuclear monopoly? Or was U.S. policy regarding the bomb reasonable (re: Japan) and generous (re: Baruch Plan)?
- Did the United States overreact to Soviet action in Europe? Or were U.S. responses reasonable and constructive? Draw examples from three of the following: the Marshall Plan, response to crisis in Greece and Turkey, coup in Czechoslovakia, Berlin airlift, and formation of NATO.

Your essay should contain a thesis statement (stating the point you will prove); foreshadowing (a brief statement of the most important arguments you will make); a main body (the information, analogies, evidence, and logic needed to support the arguments you foreshadowed); and a conclusion (short restatement of major arguments or a statement showing why what you proved is important).

CHAPTER 13: GORBACHEV AND THE COLD WAR

From the late 1940s until the end of the 1980s, the United States and the USSR were engaged in a global rivalry known as the Cold War. In previous chapters, you learned that U.S.-supported NATO and the Warsaw Pact backed by the USSR were at a standoff in a divided Europe. Both the Soviet Union and the United States developed gigantic conventional military forces, vast nuclear stockpiles, and immense defense budgets. Where the threat of nuclear escalation was not thought likely, global competition often resulted in direct intervention in civil conflicts. Yet the rise of a new leader in the USSR in 1985 brought about dramatic changes in Soviet policy that had profound repercussions within the USSR, in Eastern Europe, and around the world. These changes involve decentralization of the Soviet economy, democratization, freer flow of information, and arms reductions. This chapter asks you to consider how the United States should respond to these reforms.

From Brezhnev to Gorbachev

The political reorganization of Eastern Europe was in no small part due to reforms that addressed long-term problems in the USSR. The Soviet system that survived Stalin's death in 1954 was plagued with deeply rooted difficulties. Stalin's successor, Nikita Khrushchev, tried and failed to reform the system. Under the rule of Leonid Brezhnev (1964-1982), Soviet economic growth ground to a halt. Corruption and cronyism permeated Soviet government. Both young and old expressed cynicism about the values and attitudes the state-controlled media tried to instill. The Soviet standard of living fell further and further behind that of the West. Chronic food shortages, shoddy goods, inefficiency, and discontent characterized life in the USSR. The Soviet Union remained competitive with Europe, Japan, and America only in the area of military hardware, Olympic athletics, and addiction to alcohol.

When Brezhnev died in 1982, he was succeeded by Yuri Andropov, who died after only 15 months on the job; his successor, the elderly Konstantin Chernenko, served even less time in office. Chernenko's death in early 1985 led to the appointment as General Secretary of the Communist Party of an agricultural expert, Mikhail Gorbachev. Born in 1931, Gorbachev had grown up in years of social upheaval and world war. He was raised in a rural district but had attended prestigious Moscow University, so he could understand the perspectives of both farmers and intellectuals. Frequent travel as an agricultural representative of the USSR helped Gorbachev develop a keen understanding of Western culture and politics. He also became aware of how far behind the West the USSR was lagging economically. He came to view the arms race and the international geopolitical struggle between the Soviet Union and the West as ruinous to the Soviet economy. As head of the Communist Party, premier, and later president of the USSR, Gorbachev was at last in a position to do something about this situation.

Gorbachev was in office for less than three months before he called for economic, political, and diplomatic change in the Soviet Union. He began to seek sweeping reforms embodied in the slogans *perestroika* (restructuring), *glasnost* (openness), and "new thinking." By *perestroika* Gorbachev meant that the USSR ought to reorganize its economy and make its government more democratic. He backed measures such as the 1988 Law of the Enterprises, which gave workers a share of factory profits and managers control over buying and selling products. In addition, he permitted cooperative companies and independent tradespersons to do business without direct government supervision. Soviet farmers were allowed to lease land and own such methods of production as tractors. At the same time, Gorbachev planned to reduce military expenditures (20 percent of government spending) in order to commit more resources to the manufacture of consumer goods. He was careful to emphasize the limits of economic reform, however, when he commented that "our intention is not to replace socialism by some other system, but to reinforce it."[1]

Gorbachev also wanted to bring *perestroika* to the Soviet political system. Since he believed that the Communist Party had grown self-serving and bureaucratic, he purged it of thousands of dishonest, incompetent, and unpopular members. Wishing to make government less stagnant and more responsive to the needs of citizens, Gorbachev backed multiple-candidate slates for local and national legislative elections. He also allowed political groups other than the Communist Party to compete in

elections. This did not mean, however, that he wished to turn the USSR into a true Western democracy by abandoning the special political role of the Communist Party. "The Party," he said, "is the authentic organizer and true vanguard of society. I do not believe there is anyone who thinks we can do without it."[2]

Gorbachev's second major policy was *glasnost*, which means literally "to make known something that had been hidden." He hoped that criticism of the actions of government, long suppressed in the Soviet Union, would help spur *perestroika*. Thus, from his first days in power, Gorbachev encouraged Soviet journalists, intellectuals, and ordinary citizens to speak out about social and economic problems, even if that meant attacking high-ranking officials. He personally contacted prominent dissidents, like Nobel Prize winner Andre Sakharov, and urged them to become more involved in the political process. Soviet media began reporting on social ills like alcoholism. Some reporters even investigated the behavior of high Party leaders, especially those resistant to change. Gorbachev hoped that the press might serve as a counterweight to those in power. But, he added, "Glasnost means criticism of shortcomings: it does not mean torpedoing socialism and its values."[3]

The third major Gorbachev reform movement was "new thinking," by which he meant a defusing of the dangerous rivalry between the USSR and the West, more specifically, the United States. He perceived that the arms race and superpower politics were bankrupting the Soviet Union. From the 1950s, the Soviet Union had been committed to backing revolution in the Third World. This policy had caused the Soviets to supply weapons, funds, and advisors to countries like Cuba and Angola, and even to send troops into Afghanistan in 1979, all with little concrete benefit to the USSR. Moreover, in the 1960s and 70s, Soviet leaders had resolved to achieve parity with the United States in nuclear arms. This led to technological competition for ever-more-sophisticated defensive and offensive weapons that became astronomically expensive. So Gorbachev did his best to forge agreements with the United States to control the expansion of nuclear arsenals. Moreover, he pulled Soviet troops out of Afghanistan, where they had been fighting a futile anti-guerrilla war in support of a client regime. Lastly, he sought to lessen cause for tension and distrust around the world by cooperating with Western leaders, declaring that "the characteristics of the Cold War should be abandoned."[4] This "new thinking" policy of detente with the West, coupled with *perestroika* and *glasnost*, had a particularly powerful impact on Eastern Europe.

Perestroika in Eastern Europe

Under the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine, the USSR had opposed reform in Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union reserved the right to send Soviet troops into a fellow Warsaw Pact state whenever the continued existence of its socialist system seemed to be at risk. In accordance with his "new thinking" on foreign policy, along with his commitment to reform, Gorbachev called for a "hands-off" Soviet policy toward internal changes in Eastern Europe.

In the late 1980s, Gorbachev openly advocated *perestroika* and *glasnost* for the communist regimes in Eastern Europe. Stirred by the news of change in the Soviet Union, the people of Poland, Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria began demanding political reforms. The Soviet premier urged neighboring communist leaders to compromise with opponents by allowing a multi-party system to replace political domination by the Communist Party. In addition, Gorbachev did not oppose guaranteeing the freedom of speech, press, and the right to assemble, and granting noncommunists the right to campaign for office in Eastern Europe.

Once unleashed, the forces of political reform in Eastern Europe worked so rapidly that in a period of less than one year, six different communist governments were overthrown or profoundly restructured. This is what happened to governments in Poland, Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania.

Poland was the first satellite state to leave the Soviet orbit. As far back as 1980, a union of shipyard workers (Solidarity) led by Lech Walesa had been able to gain recognition from the Polish government. Soon afterwards, however, this movement was suppressed and Walesa was thrown in jail.

After half a decade of failure to better Poland's economic problems, the communist government again legalized Solidarity in 1987 and allowed it to participate in an election. The election results were a repudiation of Polish communist rule. Accordingly, a noncommunist government was formed in August 1989. Solidarity and its noncommunist allies had won the right to struggle with the previous regime's legacy of debt and inefficiency. Other countries followed a similar path, outvoting, restructuring, or overthrowing communist leaders. Hungarian communists dissolved their party and reorganized as social democrats, but fooled no one and were trounced at the polls. East Germans indicated eagerness to reunify with West Germany. The Czechs elected Vaclav Havel, a playwright dissident who had spent five years in communist jails, to lead them. Bulgarians were promised reforms and elections. And Romanians overthrew, tried, and executed their oppressive dictator, Nicolai Ceausescu. As of this writing, only Albania remained in the grip of an unreformed communist dictatorship.

Perestroika and Glasnost in the Soviet Union

While these changes took place in Eastern Europe, Mikhail Gorbachev made no attempts to save his old communist allies, even suggesting that they make the reforms demanded of them. Gorbachev was less tolerant of demands made by Soviet republics along the Baltic Sea. Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia had been independent countries from 1918 until occupation by Soviet troops in 1940. For them, *perestroika* meant freedom from communist rule and a return to their former status as self-governing nations. On March 11, 1990, the Lithuanian parliament voted 124-0 in favor of independence. Estonia and Latvia were poised to make similar pronouncements. Gorbachev's own policies thus confronted him with a difficult situation. On the one hand, the Baltic republics were acting on the Soviet premier's call for reform in the same manner as the Eastern Europeans. On the other hand, if other Soviet republics imitated their action, the Soviet Union would be threatened with dismemberment.

Another difficult problem was the unleashing of ethnic hostilities in the southern republics. In the Soviet republic of Armenia, activists claimed part of neighboring Azerbaijan, where many ethnic Armenian Christians lived. Azerbaijani Moslems resented this attempt to dissect their republic and in the summer of 1989 attacked Armenians in Azerbaijan cities. Armenians armed themselves and massed on their border to confront armed Azerbaijanians. Only rapid deployment of Soviet troops throughout the region prevented all-out civil war. Here again, Gorbachev could not maneuver to defuse the situation without further antagonizing either or both parties in this dispute. Moreover, his opponents in the Politburo, USSR's central governing council, could point to such ethnic violence as an inevitable consequence of policies that grant too much freedom.

Perestroika and the Political Economy of the Soviet Union

It is still too early to comment extensively about the results of Gorbachev's reforms. No wide-ranging restructuring of the ministries of production is evident at this time. Their administrators seem to be very resistant to the idea of decentralization of economic decision-making. Moreover, because these Soviet industrial managers lack capital for foreign purchases and are denied Western high technology, they have done little so far to modernize Soviet industry. Nor have consumer goods flooded Soviet stores: in fact, many consumers blame the cooperatives for high prices and persisting shortages. Food also is in short supply in the cities, partly because collective farmers do not trust the government enough to take up Gorbachev's offer to lease them land to cultivate for personal profit.

Despite legislation and press investigations, the Communist Party elite still seems to control the levers of power on the government and the economy. Increasingly, too, these officials are criticizing the social disruptiveness and lack of direction of Gorbachev's reforms. Many Russian nationalists in the party and the military blamed Gorbachev for dismantling the power of the Soviet state, while workers worried that economic restructuring would threaten the gains of the 1917 revolution, such as job security and cheap housing. Recently, Gorbachev has spent more time responding to critics than reforming society.

New Thinking and Military Strength

Faced with a bankrupting arms race and a faltering economy, Mikhail Gorbachev seemed to have decided to decrease defense spending. The first indication of such a policy came early in the Gorbachev era, when he announced a unilateral moratorium on testing nuclear weapons. Though the United States and its allies dismissed the move as propaganda, the Soviets did not test nuclear weapons for three years (1985-1987), while the United States continued testing. Next, Gorbachev announced that he would end Soviet intervention in Afghanistan; he began to withdraw Soviet forces from this nation in May 1988 and completed this pullout the following year.

Gorbachev also suggested that the United States and the Soviet Union reduce their intermediate-range nuclear missiles in central Europe. After much negotiation, the Soviets agreed to destroy 826 of their missiles in Europe while the United States destroyed 282 of its own. Furthermore, the Soviets agreed to allow the United States up to 20 inspections a year anywhere in the Soviet Union to see that the terms of the treaty were being followed. American negotiators were surprised that the USSR would reverse its long-standing policy of opposing inspection by outsiders and agreed to similar on-site inspections in the United States. Gorbachev also unilaterally reduced Soviet armed strength in Eastern Europe by six divisions, destroyed more than half of these tanks, and placed remaining forces on a defensive footing. While these acts were also unprecedented, it should be pointed out that even with the aforementioned reductions, the USSR has many more missiles and troops close to central Europe than the United States.

Implications for Policy

The changes sweeping through the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe cause U.S. strategists to reexamine their policies in relation to the USSR. Some U.S. policymakers see the changes under Gorbachev as irreversible. Others believe that if Gorbachev cannot score some major gain in improving the Soviet economy, he may be replaced by a hard-line, Soviet cold warrior. In either case, these strategists argue, it is in America's interest that Gorbachev continue his policies of *perestroika*, *glasnost*, and new thinking. The United States, these policymakers argue, should help Gorbachev stay in power. The United States should take advantage of the opportunity Gorbachev has offered by agreeing to make significant reductions in U.S. troop strength in Europe and postpone the development and deployment of new missiles around the world. In addition, these planners have recommended providing some form of economic aid, such as purchase financing (remember lend-lease?) and sale of high-technology machinery. They hope thereby to encourage Soviet economists to replace communist-style central planning with capitalist-style free-market economics. Such steps, these planners claim, would significantly reduce U.S. defense spending without sacrificing the security of America and its NATO allies. The Soviet Union would buy U.S. goods and technology, and American savings from reduced military spending could be used to address a long list of U.S. social needs and/or reduce the immense budget deficit.

Another school of U.S. foreign policy thought still considers the Soviet Union a dangerous foe reeling under the twin burden of countering American military pressure and improving faltering production of consumer goods. According to this estimate, Gorbachev is a dedicated communist who is simply seeking a truce in the Cold War in order to retool the Soviet Union's socialist economy for more efficient military and consumer production, while streamlining party-controlled government. Citing the eight years of military build-up under Reagan as the impetus for Gorbachev's reforms, these strategists think the United States should not make any dramatic concessions to Gorbachev. They see no reason for the United States to supply aid that would allow the Soviets to meet domestic demands for consumer goods. Nor should Americans sell the Soviets high technology that would enable them to maintain military superiority in Europe and a nuclear arsenal pointed at the United States. As long as the Communist Party controls the Soviet Union, meaningful reform, these strategists hold, is impossible. Rather, the United States ought to accept Gorbachev's concessions when they are in America's interest, but neither bankroll Gorbachev's reforms, not let down America's defenses.

What policy do you think the United States should pursue toward the Soviet Union? Is the Cold War over, or has it simply passed into another stage of conflict?

Chapter Questions:

1. Identify or define and briefly tell the importance to this chapter of each of the following:
   - "deeply rooted difficulties"
   - Soviet standard of living
   - Mikhail Gorbachev
   - ruinous arms race
   - *perestroika*
   - *glasnost*
   - Sakharov
   - "new thinking"
   - astronomically expensive
   - Brezhnev doctrine
   - six former Communist countries in Eastern Europe
   - formerly independent countries and what they want
   - ethnic hostilities
   - success or failure of *perestroika*
2. Describe Gorbachev's reforms – *perestroika*, *glasnost*, and "new thinking."
3. Prepare a case for one of the following positions:

   The United States should pursue a policy of cooperation with Gorbachev, including U.S. defense budget cuts, technological assistance, and financial aid because the success of his reforms is in America's national interest.

   The United States should pursue a policy of maintaining pressure on Gorbachev, including no U.S. defense budget cuts, continued restrictions on technological exchange, and no financial aid because it is not in America's national interest to make Soviet communism work better.

For Cooperation

The United States ought to be concerned about *perestroika* in the Soviet Union for reasons that do not stem from altruistic motivations, nor out of admiration for the courage of Mikhail Gorbachev, but because of enlightened self-interest. This self-interest tells the powers-that-be in Washington that *perestroika* in the Soviet Union, with its concommitants of *glasnost*, democratization, and the rule of law, is creating a civilized country out of what was formerly dubbed the evil empire. This alone is worth encouraging. *Perestroika* also entails more stress on butter, and less on guns... If *perestroika* fails, the country's (USSR's) foreign policy would be stiff and frozen, complicating the prospects for reform of the U.S. military budget and for restructuring the U.S. economy... The U.S. can undertake to help expand economic relations between the two country's and thus help *perestroika*. Among such measures would be...reintroduction of export guarantees for companies doing business with the Soviet Union, the easing of financing for the purchase of U.S.-made goods, (and) the shortening of the list of goods banned for export to the Soviet Union.[5]

For Maintaining Pressure

Can Gorbachev succeed? Should we help him?... if, by *perestroika's* success, we mean producing a communist system that is economically effective and politically democratic, the answer must be no:

the empirical record of seventy years shows the fundamental structures of the Leninist system reached an inextricable impasse at the end of the 1970s and the mounting contradictions of *perestroika* indicate that the system cannot be restructured or reformed, but can only either stagnate or be dismantled and replaced by market institutions over a long period of time. In this case, any aid the West might render to the Soviet state to save or improve the existing system would be futile.... Gorbachev is beyond our help.... Aid to the Soviet government would simply prolong the agony of everybody concerned.[6]

Sources

1. Basile Kerblay, *Gorbachev's Russia* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1989).

2. *Ibid.*, p. 25.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 24.

4. *Boston Globe* (January 17, 1990).

5. Henry Trofimenko, "The End of the Cold War, Not History," *The Washington Quarterly* (Spring 1990), p. 23.

6. Z, "To the Stalin Mausoleum," *Daedalus* (Winter 1990), p. 338.